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Thesis directed by Professor Richard Lindrooth 
ABSTRACT 
Nonprofit hospitals (NFP) must provide certain types of community benefit (CB) in order to keep 
their tax-exempt status. The IRS reported that NFPs spent over $60 billion on CB activities in 2011. NFPs 
have dedicated most of their CB dollars to charity care. Section 9007 of the ACA falls under IRS CB 
regulation and is a promising regulatory approach to steer NFPs towards providing community health 
activities that fall outside its acute care focus. It required NFPs to submit a triennial community health 
needs assessment and an implementation strategy. 
A few states leverage Section 9007 to encourage collaboration between NFPs and local health 
departments (LHD). New York is the only state that has required NFPs and LHD to collaborate in local 
health planning. Despite this trend in which states either require or encourage NFPs and LHDs to 
collaborate, there is little evidence of the impact of collaboration on NFP CB spending and community 
health outcomes. 
Leveraging the implementation of Section 9007 and the NY requirement, we estimated 
difference-in-differences specifications which compared the change in the study’s two main outcomes 
(population health spending and drug-induced mortality) pre and post policy implementation. We also 
used random effects regression models to understand the association between community social capital 
and drug-induced mortality. 
We found that NFP-LHD collaboration was associated with an incremental increase in population 
health spending of approximately $260,000 per NFF. We also found that NPF-LHD collaboration in local 
health planning led to an incremental decrease in drug-induced mortality of approximately 4 deaths per 
iv 
 
100,000 residents. Finally, we did not find strong evidence that LHD social capital was associated with 
mortality and intermediate outcomes.  
The CB requirement for NFPs presents an opportunity to increase NPF collaboration with LHDs to 
improve population health. Some states have recognized the potential benefits of NPF-LHD collaboration 
and have implemented policies to require collaboration. New York was the first state to require this type 
of collaboration and our study results suggest that it can lead to increased population health investment 
by NPFs and improved community health outcomes. 
The form and content of this abstract are approved. I recommend its publication. 
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 In this chapter, we will introduce the “big picture” of our study: its context, its key concepts, and 
the main regulatory forces at play. We will highlight the potential for positive impact assumed to exist 
when the healthcare and public health sectors collaborate, as well as, the current state of collaboration 
between nonprofit hospitals and local health departments. This will culminate to a concise statement of 
the problem we seek to address and the purpose of our study. We then provide a brief overview of our 
study specific aims and our study’s significance.  
In chapter 2, we will provide a thorough review of the concepts that are central to our study. This 
review will include both an historical background that provides the context for our study questions, and 
more importantly, a thorough review of the academic and practitioner literature that will objectively 
identify some of the gaps that this study seeks to contribute to. Finally, in Chapter 3, we will present a 
detailed description of our methodological approach for each of the study’s aims. 
Collaboration and Its Potential for Positive Impact 
The potential that collaboration between organizations and across sectors holds for improving 
population health has long been a subject of great interest among academics, practitioners and 
policymakers. Collaboration is believed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of groups of 
organizational actors actively engaged in collaborative relationships. Furthermore, the assumption that 
collaboration promotes synergies among partners is another central theme of the concept of 
collaboration. For example, benefits of collaboration are used in arguments for mergers in the healthcare 
sector. Mergers can be seen as the ultimate form of collaboration, or more formally, integration and 
consolidation of two or more firms into a single legal entity.1 Economies of scale reflect the efficiency 
benefits of mergers, while economies of scope may in part reflect both efficiency and effectiveness, but 




may include price increases facilitated by increased market power, which have implications for the 
financial performance of merged organizations.1–10 This analogy is not a far-fetched one and has been 
used by other academics. For instance, D’Aunno and colleagues, in their review of the literature on 
collaboration among healthcare organizations, focused their study on mergers, alliances, and joint 
ventures “because they represent a continuum of approaches to collaboration among health care 
organizations”.1 There is a rich body of literature on the effects of the different types of collaboration 
among healthcare organizations with varying results of their impact.1,2,12,3–7,9–11 
 In the less studied area of collaboration between the healthcare and public healthcare sectors, 
many of the same expectations for improved performance, efficiency and effectiveness have driven a 
wide range of recommendations by leading experts13–22, as well as governmental intervention through 
regulation that seek to nudge these institutional actors towards each other.23–28 Their impetus lies in the 
potential value added that can be unleashed when these two sectors collaborate to improve population 
health. 
Multisectorial collaboration is believed to improve the efficiency of collaborative systems by 
focusing resources where they’re needed without duplicative efforts, which can translate into a better 
allocation of scarce resources. It holds the potential to improve effectiveness of programs because actors 
in collaborative systems work together towards a common set of overarching goals. This helps each actor 
to optimize the use of their financial and human capital towards aspects of a goal that they’re more likely 
to be effective, instead of overstretching their resources by attending to all goals.29,30 In another analogy, 
we compare this issue of resource optimization to “top-of-license practice”, which means practicing to 
the full extent of one’s education and training, instead of focusing effort on tasks that could be effectively 
done by someone else.17,31–35  
Top-of-license practice has received a renewed interest since the passage of the Patient 




value-based care, as well as the shortage of primary care physicians and mental health practitioners, and 
the needs of an aging population have re-emphasized the importance of practicing at the top of one’s 
license.17,31,32,35–37 The main difference between top-of-license practice to the broader resource 
optimization concept is that the first one focuses on optimizing human capital resources, while the second 
focuses on human, financial, physical and social capital resources.  
The synergistic potential of collaboration is also central to understanding if, why and how 
collaboration among the healthcare and public health sectors can impact population health and influence 
hospital behavior specific to community benefit spending. This is usually a more complex concept to 
identify and measure but potentially a very important mechanism through which collaboration can have 
a positive impact. Here, we suggest that the concept of social capital might be especially helpful in our 
understanding of aspects of the synergistic effect of collaboration. The premise behind the notion of social 
capital is straightforward, it is the “investment in social relations with expected returns in the 
marketplace.”38 Flap specified three elements of social capital: 1) the number of people or organizations 
in one’s network (i.e., social network size) who “are prepared or obliged to help you when called upon to 
do so”; 2) the strength of the relationship which indicates the propensity to help; and 3) the resources of 
these persons or organizations.39–42 Therefore, social capital is the product of availability of resources 
contained in a social network and the propensity by alters (i.e., partners) to offer such resources when 
prompted by other partners. Seminal authors of social capital theory may differ on the level at which the 
utility of social capital and its outcome can be assessed, but they all share a common understanding: 
“social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be 
mobilized when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in a purposive action.”38 
 Lin described a “converging consensus” among leading theorists of social capital that “social 
capital, as a theory-generating concept, should be conceived in the social network context: as resources 




organizational positions (Lin).”38 Coleman also conceptualizes social capital in the context of social 
networks. The three forms of social capital identified in Coleman’s theoretical framework are: obligations 
and expectations, information flow capability of the social structure, and norms accompanied by 
sanctions.43 A combination of Lin’s and Coleman’s approach is particularly useful for our study. We use 
Lin’s conceptualization to operationalize the concrete resources that are embedded in the social network, 
while Coleman’s characterization helps us understand the mechanism through which those embedded 
resources are more or less likely to be accessed and “purposively” used. Actors embedded in a social 
network operate under varying forms of obligations and expectations, as well as norms and sanctions. 
Sometimes these can be formalized (e.g., as through regulation: sanction for not adhering to a particular 
regulatory requirement), but very often, these types of social capital as defined by Coleman are informal 
(e.g., as in partners engaged in voluntary collaboration who have agreed to implement a program to 
address a problem; in this case each partner is expected to contribute its share of resources, and may feel 
“obligated” to provide such resources so they’re perceived as “team players”; the alternative would be to 
fail to contribute its share and run the risk of being negatively perceived by other partners). Even when 
informal they can still exert an enormous influence on actors’ behavior. The propensity of actors to share 
their resources to help others in their social network depends on: how connected they are; whether 
obligations and expectations have been established, even if informally (e.g., reciprocity); and the weight 
of the group’s norms and sanctions on actor-specific action (e.g., do they care about keeping a “good 
image” to others?).43  
 Finally, we draw on the corporate social capital and social liability literature to conceptualize social 
capital at the organizational and community levels. Most of the seminal theories and empirical work on 
social capital has been based on social capital at the individual level; however, we ground our 
conceptualization of social capital as an asset of organizational clusters that accrues benefits to the 




analysis is something that has also challenged scholars of human capital. Careful conceptualization and 
extension of seminal theories have allowed us to move across these levels, but not without challenges. 
The corporate social capital literature has produced important work to help move the 
conceptualization of social capital from the individual to the organizational level. Scholars of corporate 
social capital have treated social capital as an intangible asset that is not exclusively embedded in personal 
networks. They claim that social capital is often “depersonalized” in multiplex forms.44–46 Inter-
organizational links may be established through individuals and become perpetuated by other types of 
“links” such as contracts and institutional arrangements, such that other members of these organizational 
clusters will be governed by the norms and beliefs instituted by those initial link-forming activities (e.g., 
personal, contract, etc).45,46 In other words, the multiplexityi of relationships cease to be dependent on 
individuals acting as brokers.  
In Chapter 3, we will elaborate on this conceptualization of social capital to explain the logic and 
assumptions underlying our conceptual model. 
Healthcare and Public Health Sector Collaboration 
 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) and other leading nonpartisan research institutions, along with 
governmental agencies and practitioners of public health and healthcare have long advocated for 
increased collaboration between the healthcare and public health sectors.13–15,17–19,21,35,47 This is based on 
the premise that each sector can work individually to improve population health, but through 
collaboration they can be more effective and efficient in improving the public’s health. Over the course of 
decades, the IOM has shaped our understanding of the role of each sector, and our expectation for how 
organizations in each of these two sectors are to contribute to population health. Their guidance and 
recommendations are grounded in rigorous research and have been incorporated in several policies that 
                                                          




regulate the two sectors, including the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).48 We note that 
in 2016 the IOM was renamed the Health and Medicine Division to encompass a wider range of health 
matters, however, we will use IOM for its easier name recognition.49 
 In a 1988 report the IOM first introduced the concept of the public health system and described 
it as “the activities undertaken under the formal structure of government and the associated activities of 
private and voluntary organizations and individuals.”13 It defined public health as “what we as a society 
do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.”13 The report acknowledged the 
important role of the various actors in this public health system: governmental, public and private sectors. 
However, it dedicated most of its research and analysis towards clarifying the role of the governmental 
public health group of actors (i.e., Federal agencies, and State and local health departments). They 
emphasized that states and their local subdivisions retain the primary responsibility for health under the 
U.S. Constitution. Local health departments (LHD), as described in the report “serve as the governmental 
presence of public health and as the most frequent conveners and implementers of efforts to improve 
population health in the community.”13 
Implicit in this organizational framework for the public health system is the concept of 
collaboration and the expectation that while each actor can act individually, together they can deliver 
improved population health outcomes more effectively and efficiently. 
 Approximately 15 years after this report, the IOM further solidified its conceptualization of the 
public health system. It elucidated the public-private nature of the system and described the potential 
role that each key actor was expected to play. It emphasized the increasing complexity of shaping 
population health and the need for multiple sectors to focus their expertise and resources to address the 
multiple determinants of health. And once more, it served as a guide for regulatory action, and a call to 




 The key sectorial actors identified were: 1) governmental public health agencies; 2) healthcare 
delivery system; 3) public health and health sciences academia; 4) communities (e.g., schools, law 
enforcement); 5) business and employers; and 6) the media.14 While they acknowledged that each actor 
could “act powerfully for health”, the first three were described as the “most heavily engaged in and 
identified with health-related activities and are obvious actors in a public health system.”14 
 Local health departments (LHD) are conveners and expert practitioners in population health 
efforts, especially within the jurisdictions they serve (i.e., county level). They possess the necessary 
knowledge and resources to assess a community’s health needs, priorities and assets, and to evaluate 
program initiatives that seek to improve the conditions for health in their communities.13,14 It is because 
of this rich set of capabilities that communities may rely on LHDs for technical assistance on: inventory of 
resources, assessment of needs, formulation of collaborative responses, program evaluation, and 
elimination of health disparities.14 In this sense, LHDs are well positioned within the larger social network 
of the community, and have a superb knowledge of most or all the resources that a community possesses. 
They may play a key role in connecting the various actors in the public health system and other community 
actors to one another based on the resources required to achieve particular goals. For instance, a 
community based organization that targets substance abuse efforts might benefit from consulting with 
their LHD to understand where the relevant resources for substance abuse exist in their community. This 
helps the community based organization connect their clients to those resources. It likely would take this 
same community based organization much longer to identify all the resources if they were to do it on their 
own. 
 The healthcare sector also plays a central role in maintaining and improving population health. 
Organizations in this sector are expected to “adopt as their explicit purpose to continually reduce the 
burden of illness, injury, and disability, and to improve the health and functioning of the people of the 




services, educating health professionals, producing research, and organizing community health promotion 
and disease prevention activities. The IOM emphasized the role of hospitals as primary sources of 
emergency and highly specialized care.14,17  
 “Crossing the Quality Chasm”17 painted a picture of a very complex healthcare delivery system in 
the United States (US), with an especially negative impact on the most vulnerable populations (e.g., 
uninsured, people with chronic conditions, etc). The healthcare sector is decentralized and characterized 
by its fragmentation, which has led to a waste of resources and poor quality of care. 
 It is clear that there are overlapping areas of interests and activities between the healthcare and 
public health sectors, but there is still little collaboration between the two sectors. Boufford suggested a 
community health improvement strategy that identified how healthcare organizations could engage in 
community-based efforts.50 The recommendations reflect a clear expansion in the traditional institutional 
focus of the healthcare sector in treating and curing illness to also include a focus on prevention and 
population health. It seems reasonable to assume that the public health sector has much to contribute to 
this shift in institutional focus, or expectation, for the healthcare sector. However, due to how each of 
these sectors evolved through history and a whole host of other factors, there are still low levels of 
productive collaboration between the healthcare and public health sectors.13,14 
 The chronic and persistent low levels of collaboration between the two sectors is a multifaceted 
problem with historical roots relating to how each sector developed and evolved, especially after the 
Second World War. As disciplines and professional fields, they have evolved with minimal levels of 
interaction.13,14 The opportunities to work together to improve population health have often gone widely 
unrecognized. The enforcement role of governmental public health agencies (i.e., monitoring, licensing 
and rate setting authority) can create tension between the two sectors which has negative implications 




exposure to population-based concepts, and compounds the general inexperience that future physicians 
have with interdisciplinary collaboration.  
Another important driver of this lack of collaboration is how healthcare services are reimbursed 
in the US. The vast majority of reimbursement policies are not designed to support population-based 
services. The prevalent fee-for-service approach incentivizes volume over value, promotes further 
fragmentation and duplication of services, which lead to large inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in the 
healthcare sector.17 Furthermore, the structure and incentives of the healthcare sector are technology 
and procedure driven and are not conducive to the inquiry, reflection, communication, and external 
relationship building that characterize effective disease prevention and health promotion.14 
There is also a very unequal distribution of resources, prestige and political influence between the 
two.13,14 The healthcare sector usually commands more prestige and political influence which has 
implications for the distribution of limited resources.13,14  
The operational separation of public health and healthcare financing has detrimental implications 
for better collaboration among the two. For instance, the two largest public insurance programs (i.e., 
Medicare and Medicaid) are administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services with little 
joint planning with agencies of the US Public Health Service.14,51 
These status and resource differences are among the reasons for the lack of a natural alliance 
between healthcare and public health sectors.13,14 They work as barriers to “mutually respectful 
collaboration”14 and to improving population health through a shared vision and coordinated activities. 
The IOM emphasizes that the healthcare system in particular often does not interact effectively with other 
actors of the public health system, especially with governmental public health agencies.14 They attributed 
it to the history, structure and the highly competitive market in health services. 
Since our study is focused on collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs, we will briefly 




other types of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration.  One example of collaboration between the 
governmental public health agencies and hospitals is disease surveillance. However, adherence to disease 
reporting by healthcare providers varies widely which has implications for population health (e.g., 
inaccurate and underreporting may miss the beginning of an epidemic and place population health at 
risk). One example of successful collaboration in disease surveillance was a Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention funded project of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health and the Harvard 
Vanguard Medical Associates (a large multispecialty group). In this program, the Harvard Vanguard 
electronic medical system was queried each night for diagnoses assigned during the preceding day. The 
data collected is useful for real-time monitoring of unusual disease outbreaks, improvements in clinical 
care and population health.14,52 
 Collaboration and better coordination between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals has long been 
believed to hold great potential for better performance of the public health system, especially in the 
context of finite resources. Policymakers, the healthcare and public health sectors, and other stakeholders 
have been greatly concerned with the trajectory of US population health indicators. The US continues to 
experience poor health outcomes compared to similar countries, despite its trend of increasing healthcare 
expenditures and growing share of the gross domestic product (GDP).53 In this context, the need for 
population-based strategies that are well coordinated within the public health system is of even greater 
importance. Closer collaboration and integration between governmental public health agencies and the 
health care delivery system may enhance the capacities of both to improve population health and may 
support the efforts of other public health system actors.14,16,18 
 There has been much Federal and State regulatory action that seeks to align the key actors in the 
public health system and to move them towards greater collaboration with the goal of improving 
population health and controlling costs. We will discuss some of the main regulatory forces in the next 




Federal and State Regulatory Environment: Incentivizing Collaboration Between Nonprofit Hospitals 
and Local Health Departments 
 There have been many Federal and State-level efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the healthcare and public health sectors which preceded the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA); however, we will start with the ACA which is arguably one of the largest pieces of social policy 
to have passed in the United States (US) in the past 50 years. It ranks alongside the most important pieces 
of social policy legislation in recent American history, including the Social Security Act (1935) and the Civil 
Rights Act (1964).54 It seeks to decrease the nation’s uninsurance rate while “bending the cost curve”.55,56 
It has placed a categorical imperative on national, state and local governments, as well as the private 
sector, to reconfigure their health, social and human services sectors towards greater efficiency and 
effectiveness. The overarching mission of the ACA is reflected in its Triple Aim, which is to: improve 
population health, enhance patient and provider experience and reduce costs.57–59  
The document outlining the provisions of the law is a testament to the complex dynamics that 
exist within the healthcare sector. It contains over 950 pages, including 10 titles, each containing multiple 
subtitles with their respective parts and subparts.25 Implicit in this comprehensive reform is the 
identification of a larger and more encompassing system within which “traditional” healthcare is one of 
the actors. This is the public health system that was discussed in the preceding section. The ACA lays down 
the regulatory and financial building blocks for a system that will eventually align with its mission: the 
Triple Aim.  
Health, as conceptualized under the ACA, acknowledges all three levels of the social determinants 
of health: the upstream (e.g., policy and programs, social inequities), midstream (e.g., physical 
environment and behavior) and downstream (e.g., disease and injury, mortality).60–65 It envisions a 
movement from the prevailing state of ineffectiveness and inefficiency (i.e., episodic, acute, fragmented 




system characterized by a focus on population health, prevention, social determinants of health, better 
coordination across different types of providers and settings, and reimbursement approaches that value 
quality over quantity.17,35,66–71 
Individually, traditional healthcare providers do not possess the requisite human, financial and 
social capital required to achieve the ACA’s Triple Aim.43,72–77 Many of the activities and services necessary 
to meet the Triple Aim fall within the expertise and jurisdiction of other sectors (e.g., public health, social 
services, housing, transportation, foundations, community-based organizations). 
This comprehensive concept of population health serves as the basis for the development of 
performance metrics. Organizational performance is increasingly being measured at the regional level 
(e.g., county, accountable care organization region, etc). Healthcare payment and delivery reform ties 
financial incentives to many of these population health metrics. The litmus test for all payment and 
delivery models rests on the premise that by changing the way care is delivered and reimbursed from 
volume-based to value-based, the healthcare sector can move towards improved population health while 
decreasing spending.25,78 
The push for collaboration between the healthcare and public health sectors is embedded in most 
of the 10 titles of the ACA. Of particular relevance to our study is Section 9007 (Title IX, Subtitle A) which 
further defines the role of nonprofit hospitals in improving population health through its requirements 
for a triennial community health needs assessment (CHNA) and implementation strategy; and further 
clarification of their financial assistance policies.23,25 Noteworthy, is the inclusion of this requirement 
under “Revenue Provisions” in the ACA, which highlights the role that nonprofit hospitals are expected to 
play in funding some of the ACA initiatives.25 
Section 9007 is enforced through Form 990 and Schedule H of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
which all nonprofit hospital must file. The instructions for Form 990 and Schedule H explain that “CHNA 




CHNA presents an opportunity to bring together two major actors in the production of health; hospitals 
and public health agencies, each with their own expertise in improving population health. 
Historically, community benefit dollars have mostly been invested in provision of charity care that 
covers the cost of providing care to the uninsured and underinsured, as well as unreimbursed costs of 
means-tested government programs, generally Medicaid shortfalls.80,81 However, Medicaid expansion, 
health insurance subsidies and other ACA provisions have effectively decreased the demand for charity 
care which potentially frees up hospital community benefit dollars for population health focused 
activities.24,68,82–84 
Other titles of the ACA are also expected to exert influence on the behavior of both healthcare 
and public health sectors, and have the potential to improve the level of collaboration between the two. 
Among these ACA titles are: Title II “Role of Public Programs”, Title III “Improving the Quality and Efficiency 
of Health Care” (i.e., the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation was created under this title), and 
Title IV “Prevention of Chronic Disease and Improving Public Health”.25 The last one effectively recognizes 
the role that the public health sector plays in population health. It dedicates more resources to the sector 
(e.g., Prevention and Public Health Fund, community transformation grants), especially governmental 
public health agencies. It established the National Prevention Council (NPC) comprising 20 Federal 
departments, agencies and offices. The NPC released its National Prevention Strategy in 2011 and the NPC 
Action Plan in 2012, both reports highlight the opportunities and roles that various sectors can play in 
ensuring the “health, well-being, and resilience of the American people.” These reports include 
recommendations for LHDs to collaborate with hospitals on population health initiatives.19,85 
Many of the ACA provisions work to nudge the healthcare sector towards greater collaboration 
with the public health sector. Some titles also go in the opposite direction, as highlighted above, albeit 




The question about nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration and its potential for improved outcomes 
and allocation of resources is relevant even in the context of a new administration under which some 
provisions of the ACA have already been repealed and changed. Healthcare costs as a share of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) has been a great concern for policy-makers across political aisles for several years. 
Additionally, the relatively poor ranking of the US in population health indicators in comparison to other 
of “Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development” countries despite having the largest per 
capita healthcare spending, has also sparked debate about what can be done to address it. 
Another recent development is the accreditation of state and local health departments (LHD). The 
potential benefit of accreditation was prompted by two reports: the 2002 IOM report “The Future of the 
Public’s Health”, and the 2004 “Futures Initiative” by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.14,86,87 
The Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB) was formed as the non-profit entity to implement and 
oversee national public health department accreditation. This voluntary accreditation program was 
officially launched on September of 2011. 
Accreditation is believed to improve the performance of public health departments through 
various mechanisms.88 As of November 2017, there were 212 health departments that achieved five-year 
accreditation through PHAB: 31 state, 179 local, 1 tribal and 1 integrated statewide local public health 
department system.89 There are 158 accreditation applications currently being processed.89 According to 
the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO), there are 2,533 LHDs in the US.90 
Based on this information, only a small percentage of LHDs are currently PHAB-accredited. 
 Prior to applying for accreditation, public health departments have a set of prerequisites that 
must be met, including: community health assessment, community health improvement plan (CHIP), and 
a department strategic plan.91 The first two are equivalent to the requirement for nonprofit hospitals to 
conduct a CHNA and develop an implementation strategy as imposed by the ACA discussed previously. 




members in conducting the community health assessment and in developing the CHIP. This is another 
opportunity for LHDs to engage nonprofit hospitals in collaboration. According to NACCHO, in 2016, 78% 
of LHDs had completed a community health assessment and 67% had completed a CHIP.90 While the 
number of accredited LHDs is still low, many have engaged in community health assessment and CHIP. 
There is variation in state regulation in regards to LHD accreditation and its prerequisites. Some 
jurisdictions have established an accreditation process for their LHDs independent of the PHAB 
accreditation process.26 There are five states that encourage state health departments and/or LHDs to 
seek accreditation and one that mandates state health department accreditation.26,27 In regards to state 
regulation on community health assessment and CHIP requirements specifically for LHDs, there are 10 
states that require both community health assessment and CHIP.26,27 There are nine states whose 
regulations do not require LHDs to complete them; however, there is still regulatory language to 
encourage and incentivize these activities.26,27  
We briefly summarized some of the key regulatory forces that we believe are the most likely to 
influence collaboration between the healthcare and public health sectors, and more specifically LHDs and 
nonprofit hospitals. In the next section, we will provide a brief account of the current state of collaboration 
between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs. 
Nonprofit Hospitals and Local Health Department: Current State of Collaboration 
The regulations, policies and programs discussed in the preceding section have had some success 
in incentivizing and facilitating collaboration between local health departments (LHD) and nonprofit 
hospitals. This is especially the case in which there is an alignment between Federal regulation and State 
requirements and programs. This indicates the potential of regulatory action in shaping organizational 
behavior. We will highlight some examples that show this promising trend in increased collaboration 




Polk County in Wisconsin is one example of an established collaboration between the LHD and 
nonprofit hospitals. Polk County Health Department has had a long history of collaboration with the three 
local medical centers. Their Chronic Care Plus Program uses a “free clinic” model in which patients are 
screened by the LHD and then referred to one of the three local nonprofit hospitals.92 In another 
collaborative effort, two of the nonprofit hospitals  worked with the LHD on the Wisconsin Initiative to 
Promote Healthy Lifestyles project. The project housed a LHD health educator in clinic settings who 
provided care coordination for patients.92 These are some of the collaborative activities between the LHD 
and nonprofit hospitals , but despite this history, there was still a low level of collaboration on conducting 
the community health needs assessment (CHNA) and developing the community health improvement 
plan (CHIP). Nonprofit hospitals housed rich clinical data but were not using it for population health 
assessments, and were not sharing it with the LHD.92 Another reason for the low level of collaboration on 
CHNA and CHIP was that partners assumed that the LHD held virtually full responsibility for those 
activities.92 It was not until Section 9007 of the ACA (i.e., requirement for a CHNA and implementation 
strategyii) was enacted that nonprofit hospitals in Polk County started collaborating with the LHD on the 
county’s CHNA and CHIP, and their collaborative relationship was brought to a new level.92 The State of 
Wisconsin requires all LHDs to conduct CHNAiii and CHIP every five years while nonprofit hospitals are 
required to complete CHNAs every three years. In order to align these different timelines Polk County 
Health Department synchronized its CHNA cycle to align with the nonprofit hospitals’ CHNA cycle.92 In this 
collaboration, LHDs and nonprofit hospitals were able to assess community needs more thoroughly by 
pooling their rich datasets on population health and patient-level clinical data. Nonprofit hospitals also 
                                                          
ii The implementation strategy that nonprofit hospitals are required to develop is essentially the same as the community health 
improvement plan (CHIP) that local health departments develop. Therefore, we will use “CHIP” to indicate “implementation 
strategy”. 
iii Note that a community health needs assessment (CHNA) is the same as a community health assessment (CHA). The naming is 
different, with CHNA being used for nonprofit hospitals and CHA being used for local health departments. For ease of 




provided financial support for primary data collection, advertising and meeting costs.92 This particular 
collaboration capitalized on the strengths and interests of each organization (i.e., resource optimization). 
It also expanded the role of nonprofit hospitals in the CHNA process from only providing feedback to 
contributing substantial resources.  
The Florida Department of Health (FDOH) has long supported LHDs in CHNA and CHIP activities, 
especially after it launched its Florida State Health Improvement Plan which identified CHNA and CHIP as 
state health priorities.93 The FDOH has strongly encouraged LHDs to collaborate with their local nonprofit 
hospitals  on conducting the CHNA and CHIP.27 The FDOH saw the Section 9007 of the ACA as an 
opportunity to align LHDs and nonprofit hospitals in assessment, planning, and implementation of 
population health activities. One example of this collaboration in Florida is the Jackson Metropolitan 
Community Benefit Partnership which is composed of five healthcare systems, nine nonprofit hospitals  
and four LHDs.93 In mid-2011, this partnership conducted the first-ever multi-hospital system and public 
health sector collaborative CHNA. In 2013, the partnership released its CHNA for the Jackson metropolitan 
area.93 Infant mortality was identified as a top priority, and six nonprofit hospitals  have selected this as 
their focus area which prompted programs to improve the health of mothers, babies and families. 
In North Carolina, and predating ACA’s Section 9007, the state health director and the chief 
executive officer of the North Carolina Hospital Association convened a public health-hospital 
collaborative (i.e., NC Community Health Improvement Collaborative), which included representation 
from the North Carolina Institute for Public Health.94 The collaborative promotes collaboration among 
LHDs and nonprofit hospitals and is particularly involved with CHNA. Especially in the context of the ACA’s 
Section 9007 for nonprofit hospitals, many of the collaborative’s goals seek to align LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals in conducting CHNA and CHIP together. As in Wisconsin, LHDs were required to conduct CHNAs 
every four years which the North Carolina Division of Public Health recognized as a barrier to collaboration 




and LHDs, the state modified its CHNA cycle to every “three to four years”. North Carolina has a total of 
85 LHDs and, 19 of the 32 LHDs that were scheduled to complete their CHNAs in 2012 had chosen to 
switch their assessment period to every three years to align with the hospitals’ CHNA cycle.94 There are 
many counties in which LHDs and nonprofit hospitals  are collaborating in CHNA activities. Some successful 
collaborations identified were: Western NC Health Network, Davidson county, Alamance county, Pitt 
county and Dare county.94 
Finally, a 2014 report titled "Improving Community Health through Hospital-Public Health 
Collaboration: Insights and Lessons Learned from Successful Partnerships", highlighted other examples of 
collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals on various activities, including CHNA and CHIP.95 The 
study described 12 “successful partnerships involving hospitals, public health departments, and other 
stakeholders” that focused on improving the health in their communities.95 The majority had formed after 
2004 in places like Oakland (CA), New Orleans (LA), Portland (ME) among others. Assessing and prioritizing 
community needs was identified as an instrumental activity in shaping the partnership’s focus and 
functions.95 The study found that creating and sustaining partners’ interest and engagement was a key 
challenge, especially in the loose affiliation and coalition models that prevailed in these partnerships.95 
Securing sufficient and sustainable funding was another challenge. The study found that “large, successful 
healthcare organizations with deep commitment to improving the health of the communities they serve” 
(e.g., Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and Health Plans and MaineHealth) were central to funding the 
partnership.95 They found that approximately 70% of partnership funding was from hospitals and health 
systems.95 Another finding was that the LHD served as the anchor institution in several partnerships (e.g., 
the Florida Department of Health in St. Johns County, the New Orleans Health Department, the 
Montgomery County (Maryland) Department of Health and Human Services, etc).95 This finding aligns with 
the IOM reports mentioned previously which described LHDs as “most frequent conveners and 




The study also examined two state-level initiatives that promote LHD and nonprofit hospitals 
collaboration in improving population health. One of them is the New York State Prevention Agenda 
launched in 2008 in which the State Health Commissioner issued a directive that called for LHDs and 
nonprofit hospitals to collaborate in completing a CHNA and jointly select two to three health priorities 
to focus on.95,96 They were also “strongly recommended” to jointly develop a CHIP. Based on preliminary 
information, it appears that these directives have accelerated the development of communication and 
collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals.96 The second one is in Maryland, where the 
Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene initiated in 2011 a statewide effort to assess community health, 
identify and prioritize health needs, and promote collaboration among LHDs, nonprofit hospitals  and 
other stakeholders.95 So far, 22 “local health improvement coalitions” have been established, which are 
chaired by LHD officials and include representatives of hospitals.95 Both the Maryland Community Health 
Resources Commission and hospitals provide financial support for the coalitions. 
A set of recurring themes seem to be of central importance for the formation, sustainability, and 
performance of these nonprofit hospital-LHD collaborations. From a sustainability and performance 
perspective, the following activities may be fundamental: collaborative assessment of community needs 
(i.e., CHNA), prioritization of identified needs, and joint planning of how to address those priorities (i.e., 
CHIP). In regards to formation of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboratives, regulatory levers have proven to 
be effective, especially the alignment of Federal and State requirements (i.e., Section 9007 of the ACA and 
LHD requirements for CHNA and CHIP) and alignment of nonprofit hospital and LHD CHNA cycles.28,97–100 
The less stringent state regulatory language that provides guidance but no actual requirements (e.g., 
“may/can/authorized to” versus “must/shall”) also encourages nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration; 
however, more gradually.27 Some states have used different approaches to facilitate nonprofit hospital-




Statement of the Problem: Need for Evidence to Support Further Regulatory Action and Sustained 
Collaboration Between Nonprofit Hospitals and Local Health Departments 
There seems to be a wide spectrum of ways in which local health departments (LHD) and nonprofit 
hospitals collaborate. Based on studies that have examined these collaborations, it seems that 
collaboratively conducting a community health needs assessment (CHNA) and community health 
improvement plan (CHIP) positions the collaboration to be more effective. It is also clear that Federal and 
State regulatory action, as well as statewide population health focused programs are effective in 
promoting and accelerating the formation of collaborative relationships between LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals. One state stands out by setting a clear expectation for collaboration on CHNA and CHIP for all 
LHDs and nonprofit hospitals: New York. We will further elaborate on this initiative in Chapter 2. 
The evidence on the effectiveness of these nonprofit hospital-LHD collaborations is still vastly 
missing, especially their potential to improve population health. In fact, the concept of influencing 
nonprofit hospitals’ behavior, specific to community benefit spending, through nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration has never been explored. Leaders of many of these collaborations, as well as other 
healthcare and public health sector leaders have expressed great interest in both basic and applied 
research that investigate linkages between collaboration and community health. Furthermore, Title IV of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Subtitle D, Section 4302), sets a clear expectation 
for “research in the area of public health services and systems”.25 
As described in previous sections, Section 9007 of the ACA coupled with the decreased demand 
for charity care (i.e., due to the ACA’s individual mandate, Medicaid expansion, insurance subsidies and 
other provisions), were expected to eventually result in larger community benefit spending on population 
health focused categories. To date, there have been only minimal increases in population health 
community benefit spending.101 It is still unclear what influences hospital decision-making in their 




primarily by market demand (i.e., uninsured and underinsured population).101 Thirty-three states have 
expanded Medicaid and we have yet to see that translate into practically significant larger community 
benefit spending in population health focused initiatives. Nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration in 
CHNA and CHIP is a potential way to influence hospital behavior specific to community benefit spending 
in population health focused categories. No studies have looked at this potential mechanism.  
Purpose of the Study: Does Nonprofit Hospital-Local Health Department Collaboration Improve 
Population Health Outcomes and Community Benefit Investment in Population Health Focused 
Activities? 
This study will evaluate the effect of local health department (LHD) and nonprofit hospital 
collaboration on population health outcomes and community benefit spending by nonprofit hospitals 
More specifically, we will examine nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on community health needs 
assessment (CHNA), prioritization of community needs, and community health improvement planning 
(CHIP). New York (NY) is the only state that has taken a systematic approach to virtually require LHDs and 
nonprofit hospitals to: jointly conduct a CHNA, select two to three health priorities to focus on, and 
develop a CHIP. This was mainly achieved through the alignment of Federal and State regulation, as well 
as the state’s health improvement program (i.e., NY Prevention Agenda), as discussed in previous sections. 
For example, NY has an annual reporting requirement in place for both nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to 
document their collaboration, and all reports must be posted on their websites. Furthermore, the NY State 
Department of Health successfully negotiated with LHDs to conduct their CHNA every three years to align 
with the nonprofit hospitals’ CHNA cycle. Our preliminary analysis shows that as of 2012, close to 100% 
of all nonprofit hospitals in NY have jointly selected health priorities with their LHDs.  
We approach the implementation of the NY State Prevention Agenda as a natural experiment that 
gives us the opportunity to test a set of hypotheses. To assist us in this endeavor, we will curate a dataset 




Schedule H, health priorities identified in hospital CHNA or collaborative CHNA, market characteristics, 
demographic characteristics, local and state health department characteristics, and contextual regulatory 
factors of relevance to our study. For our dependent variables we will use data from “County Health 
Rankings & Roadmaps”, “Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project”, and IRS Schedule H.102–104  
Study Aims 
Aim 1 - Estimate the effect of the New York State Prevention Agenda on population health focused 
community benefit spending 
Aim 2 - Estimate the effect of the New York State Prevention Agenda on drug-induced mortality 
Aim 3 - Estimate the association of community social capital with drug-induced mortality 
Significance of the Study 
There have been some studies that examined local health department (LHD) and nonprofit 
hospital collaboration.92,93,109–113,94,95,98,100,105–108 Many were descriptive studies, while others focused on 
the organizational aspects of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration (e.g., formation, configuration, 
governance, sustainability, financing, etc). There have been several studies, in the past and recently, that 
examined nonprofit hospital behavior in community benefit spending.81,101,114–121 However, none have 
examined whether nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on community health needs assessment (CHNA) 
and community health improvement plan (CHIP) influences nonprofit hospital behavior specific to 
community benefit spending. And no studies have examined whether and how nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration on CHNA and CHIP impact population health outcomes. 
Rigorous research is needed to provide the evidence, insights and guidance necessary to continue 
to improve and solidify existing nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration. Stakeholders are more likely to 
remain actively engaged in collaboration if they can connect their efforts to concrete outcomes, regardless 




Also, while there is evidence of some increase in collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals in recent years, especially after the enactment of Section 9007 of the ACA combined with state-
level regulatory action and programs, there is still much unrealized potential as many jurisdictions across 
the United States have yet to engage in this type of collaboration. In the very least, it can help jurisdictions 
avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and resources. LHDs and nonprofit hospitals invest time and money 
in conducting a CHNA. By aligning their efforts into one CHNA, one implication is that each would spend 
less time and money in the collaborative endeavor. At its best, collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals holds the potential for a more efficient allocation of resources, for larger financial investment 
on population health by nonprofit hospitals (i.e., through community benefit dollars) and improved 
population health. 
Evidence can serve another key role in addressing the persistent lack of collaboration between 
LHDs and nonprofit hospitals. It may serve to encourage states to take regulatory action, such as: 1) 
require LHDs to conduct a CHNA and develop a CHIP; 2) align the CHNA cycles of nonprofit hospital and 
LHD; and/or 3) require LHDs and nonprofit hospitals to work collaboratively in prioritizing community 
health needs and developing a CHIP. Finally, it can also influence the accreditation requirements set by 
the Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB) to require nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on the 
accreditation pre-requisites (i.e., CHNA and CHIP specifically). 
At the Federal government level, it is not inconceivable to imagine that adjustments could be 
made to the language in Schedule H form and instructions. It could require nonprofit hospitals  to conduct 
a CHNA jointly with their LHD, instead of the more ambiguous language that requires nonprofit hospitals  
to “take into account input from…those with special knowledge of or expertise in public health”.79 
Schedule H form has seen some revisions over the years, for instance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 




community health”.122,123 Another change was a set of questions related to section 4959, which imposes 
an excise tax for failure to meet the CHNA requirements.23 
In the absence of a Federal and State regulatory framework for collaboration, changing the 
behavior of these institutions is likely to proceed in the historically slow pace that they’ve shown in the 
past. In some cases, it may not happen at all. However, before they can take further regulatory action, 
policymakers need more evidence that nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration translates into improved 
population health outcomes and larger community benefit spending on population health by nonprofit 
hospitals.  
More research on nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA and CHIP is needed. Our study 
seeks to make contributions to the types of questions mentioned in this section through the application 
of rigorous methods and evidence. This evidence can serve a key role in encouraging LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals to collaborate through Federal and/or State regulatory action, as well as through updates to 
PHAB accreditation requirements. It may also motivate LHDs and nonprofit hospitals to collaborate 















II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Our study sits on a set of central concepts and ideas: 1) collaboration between healthcare and 
public health sectors holds the potential to improve population health outcomes; 2) Federal and State 
regulatory action influences institutional behavior and their alignment is particularly powerful in 
accelerating nonprofit hospital-local health department (LHD) collaboration; 3) the closer relationship 
developed when a LHD and nonprofit hospital collaborate in community health needs assessment, 
planning and improvement influences the behavior of nonprofit hospitals, specifically in how they 
allocate community benefit dollars; 4) social capital, as other types of capital (i.e., financial, physical, 
human), is productive, and is particularly important in understanding how collaboration works; and 5) 
LHDs and nonprofit hospitals  are among the largest producers of health within the jurisdictions they 
serve. 
 We will describe the historical context and current state of the literature for each of these 
concepts in the sections that follow. The assumption that LHDs and nonprofit hospitals are among the 
largest producers of health within their jurisdictions will not be individually reviewed, but rather, will be 
embedded in the review and discussion of each of the other four main concepts and ideas. Nonprofit 
hospital and LHD collaboration of the specific type we have proposed to examine is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. As such, the sections that follow synthesize the findings from studies that are relevant to 
the concepts and activities mentioned above; however, many are not specific to nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration.  
Public Health and Healthcare Sector Collaboration: The Potential Benefits 





 The health production function has been of central importance to our understanding of the 
various factors that produce health. Inputs include: age, race, gender, socioeconomic (e.g., education, 
income, etc), lifestyle (diet, exercise, alcohol consumption, etc), environmental (air and water quality, 
etc), state of technology and medical care.124–127 A few findings are consistent across studies. One of them 
is that the provision of medical care contributes relatively less than other inputs to the production of 
health.128–137 Education, lifestyle and environment are among the largest contributors to health 
production.124,130,138–143 Finally, income has mixed effects on the production of health. Some have found 
that higher incomes are associated with lower health status which has been partially attributed to the 
stress associated with high-paying jobs, and potentially the poorer lifestyle choices (e.g., alcohol 
consumption, less exercise, etc).124,133,143 
 One particularly striking finding is that despite the United States’ (US) increasingly large 
investments in the healthcare sector, which is primarily responsible for medical care inputs, we still don’t 
observe any practically significant improvements in population health. We may be experiencing 
diminishing returns to medical care and may be operating in a mode of “flat-of-the-curve” medicine. To 
be precise, the US spent 17.9% of its gross domestic product (GDP) in healthcare in 2016.144 Government 
public health activities accounted for 2% of the $3.3 trillion dollars spent in 2016, despite its potential to 
contribute to lifestyle and environmental inputs of the health production function. 
The “public health system” described in Chapter 1, with its six key actors, is a reflection of the 
health production function. Each of the key actors in the public health system can provide the inputs 
necessary to create the conditions for health and move the populations they serve towards improved 
health.14,126,145,146 The public health system as envisioned by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), is only a 
“system” when these key actors work together. While this vision is widely accepted by most key 
stakeholders, the historical fragmentation within and among the various sectors has significantly slowed 




complementary and competing interests across actors have served to stall the move towards a true public 
health system. This fragmentation extends to how each sector is financed which may partially explain the 
inefficient allocation of resources as evidenced by the US healthcare expenditures budget. 
 The concept of population health has been around for a while but gained widespread recognition 
as centrally important to healthcare sector organizations after the enactment of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (ACA). It is embedded in most, if not all the provisions of the ACA. The concept 
effectively acknowledges the role of the various “producers of health”; the healthcare sector being only 
one among them. It expanded the institutional role of healthcare sector organizations from one of treating 
and curing disease to also include prevention and education. Finally, it seeks to modify the behavior of 
healthcare organizations through financial incentives and penalties that are tied to population health 
outcomes. 
This new concept may have implications for how resources are allocated among the various 
actors. One implication is that government financing will eventually catch up with this new concept and 
allocate more resources to sectors that have historically been underfunded. Some of these sectors provide 
the inputs that have been shown to have larger effects than medical care on the production of health. 
Another implication is that the resource-rich organizations in the healthcare sector may redirect some of 
their financial capital to other sectors. This transfer of resources would not happen in a vacuum, but rather 
through some type of collaboration with other sectors that are aligned in achieving similar goals of 
improved population health. 
In fact, the ACA’s Title IX (i.e., Revenue Provisions) describes the major financing mechanisms for 
the law’s provisions and efforts.25 Of relevance to our preceding discussion, is Section 9007 which sets 
additional requirements for nonprofit hospitals. It increases the level of nonprofit hospital transparency 
and accountability in how it contributes to population health efforts. This is an unprecedented 




Especially governmental public health agencies which are institutional experts in population health 
efforts. There is also the potential for sharing of other types of capital, such as human and social 
capital.43,72,150,73–76,146–149 To put this on perspective, in 2016, hospital care accounted for 32% of the total 
healthcare expenditures.144 Eighty-six percent of total health expenditures was on medical care, while 
only 2% was on government public health activities.144 Even relatively small transfers of resources from 
the hospital sector to governmental public health agencies have the potential to boost the historically 
cash-strapped sector and translate into improved population health outcomes. Likely more important, 
these new relationships between nonprofit hospitals and governmental public health agencies may yield 
other types of bidirectional resource transfers other than financial ones, such that both nonprofit 
hospitals and governmental public health agencies, and the populations they serve, have much to gain. 
Returning to the original focus of this section, the health production function, this would be a 
direct investment into the other inputs that have shown greater effects on population health. Namely, 
the lifestyle and environmental inputs that governmental public health agencies are especially expert in 
addressing. We wouldn’t expect governmental public health agencies to have any direct role in the 
education input, in its traditional sense (i.e., primary, secondary and higher education). However, among 
the two sectors, it is clear who has the institutional role of educating the population in prevention and 
health-related areas: governmental public health agencies. As hospitals become increasingly embedded 
in an environment in which population health is of utmost strategic importance, they are more likely to 
consider governmental public health agencies as key partners in improving population health. The 
hospitals that lag behind in embracing this relatively new direction, are still subject to the requirements 
and forces set by the ACA. Especially the potential financial gains and losses possible through the various 




Local Health Department-Healthcare Sector Collaboration: Potential for Improved Population Health 
 Hospitals and local health departments (LHD) have worked together for many years. An example 
of a long-standing collaboration is disease surveillance. Local health departments rely on healthcare 
providers and laboratories to share the necessary data for disease surveillance. This collaboration has 
obvious implications for population health. For instance, in 2001, the anthrax bioterrorist attack was 
identified after physicians reported the first cases of the disease, which set a series of actions by 
governmental public health agencies and other organizations to protect the public’s health.14 The 
reporting of sentinel and unusual cases helps LHDs identify newly emerging infections that may represent 
a special threat to the public’s health. Even in this more normalized type of collaboration, disease 
reporting by healthcare providers is not complete or timely.151,152 There are many factors to this problem, 
including: lack of understanding of the role of LHDs in disease monitoring and control; unawareness of 
reporting requirements; busy healthcare practices; complexity of reporting procedures; and lack of 
understanding of how data will be used and possible violations of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, among other barriers.153 Despite the challenges to joint disease reporting and 
surveillance, this is still a classical and successful example of collaboration between LHDs and healthcare 
providers, including hospitals. 
 One of the essential public health services is to assure the provision of healthcare to individuals 
when it’s not available in the community, in other words, to be safety net providers.14 At one point, LHDs 
played an important role as safety net providers. This placed an immense burden on their resources and 
weakened their ability to focus on population-based public health functions (e.g., community needs 
health assessment, outreach and education, environmental health services, epidemiology and 
surveillance, etc). In the late 1980’s, LHDs started collaborating with managed care organizations and 
other private providers to minimize the financial burden of direct healthcare service provision. As of 2016, 




However, some LHDs still play a large role as safety net providers, especially in rural areas.90 Currently, 
most of LHDs’ direct services involve immunization, health screening, treatment for communicable 
disease, and maternal and child health services. Collaboration between LHDs and managed care 
organizations held great promise to free up LHD resources that could be directed to previously neglected 
population-based public health functions. However, in some states the services provided by LHDs to 
Medicaid patients helped subsidize other agency programs.154 This is a particularly good example of the 
complexity involved in balancing the benefits and shortcomings of collaboration. LHDs whose programs 
relied on the subsidization by the direct provision of medical services, both encouraged the collaboration 
with the healthcare sector, while also competing with them for revenues for some of the services. To 
complicate the dynamics, many managed care plans sponsored by safety-net providers experienced 
financial losses which prompted them to withdraw from contracts with LHDs.155 
 Nonprofit hospitals are required by law to provide a community benefit to keep their tax-exempt 
status.23 One category that nonprofit hospitals  have consistently invested most of their community 
benefit dollars is charity care (i.e., financial assistance). As such, they can also be considered safety net 
providers (i.e., safety net providers “organize and deliver a significant level of health care and other 
related services to uninsured, Medicaid, and other vulnerable populations.”14,156 Nonprofit hospitals and 
LHDs can collaborate to better coordinate their resources and provision of safety net services to the 
communities they serve. More effective collaboration, coordination of roles and allocation of resources 
can be achieved through joint assessment of community health needs and development of a community 
health improvement plan. This collaborative process integrates localized factors, as well as organizational 
priorities into decision-making on the allocation of resources and implementation of activities. It presents 
a greater potential to achieve better alignment across the organizations involved, and to minimize the 




Nonprofit Hospital-Local Health Department Collaboration on Population Health Assessment, 
Planning and Improvement: Potential for Improved Population Health 
Nonprofit hospital-local health department (LHD) collaboration on community health needs 
assessment (CHNA) and community health improvement planning (CHIP) is a relatively new phenomenon. 
There has been nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on these activities in the past; however, the 
regulatory framework for this specific type of collaboration was mostly missing and thus it was not as 
prevalent as it is today. At the Federal level, Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) has effectively placed an unprecedented responsibility on nonprofit hospitals to play a key role 
in investing on population health. This role must start with a formal assessment of the community’s health 
needs (i.e., through the CHNA) which is then strategically addressed through their implementation 
strategy (i.e., CHIP). This exercise improves nonprofit hospitals’ understanding of the concept of 
population health which goes beyond the direct provision of healthcare services. It also facilitates more 
strategic decision-making on how to make investments towards improving formally identified community 
needs. The very same context of Section 9007, has encouraged some states to think about their role in 
incentivizing nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA and CHIP. The alignment of Federal and State 
regulation can be a powerful force to accelerate this type of collaboration, and some states are indeed 
engaging in aligning their regulatory and programmatic efforts with Section 9007. Furthermore, the 
framework for public health agency accreditation launched by the Public Health Accreditation Board 
(PHAB) in the Fall of 2011, has provided a concrete set of activities that states can use to improve the 
infrastructure and performance of their public health sector. Interestingly, CHNA and CHIP are key pre-
accreditation requirements set by the PHAB. 
 The relative recency of these set of events means that the literature on nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration on CHNA and CHIP is still in its infancy. Specifically, the literature on the effect of nonprofit 




spending is non-existent. There have been a handful of descriptive studies that are helpful in 
understanding the organizational aspects of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration. However, there have 
been no systematic studies that examined the long-standing expectation that nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration can improve population health and allocation of resources. We will first present the 
literature on nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration generally, and specifically on CHNA and CHIP. In the 
following section, we will present the literature on other types of cross-sectorial collaboration that have 
evaluated the effect of community partnerships and coalitions on health outcomes. 
One study examined 12 successful nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboratives most of which pre-dated 
the ACA and the push for LHD accreditation.95 The main goal of the study was to produce information and 
insights on the formation, organization and performance of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration, 
including other stakeholders, with a focus on improving community health. They found that most 
partnerships were of an “informal coalition” organizational model, and described the challenges 
associated with these less formal organizational forms, such as: keeping partners engaged, aligning 
partners’ priorities, lack of substantial resource investment by partners, measuring performance, securing 
funding and reliance on voluntary work. Many partnerships had one or more anchor institutions which 
helped with their sustainability. In most cases, LHDs and/or nonprofit hospitals served as the partnership’s 
anchor. Another finding was that nonprofit hospitals and health systems provided 70% of the total funding 
for the partnerships.95 The authors speculate that nonprofit hospitals invested their community benefit 
dollars to support the partnerships, and that they were primarily motivated by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) requirements imposed on tax-exempt hospitals. The leaders of these partnerships 
unanimously agreed that the collaborative assessment and prioritization of community health needs (i.e., 
CHNA and CHIP) were instrumental in shaping their focus and functions. These activities helped minimize 
the challenges associated with aligning the interests of various organizations because they involved formal 




a narrow set of priorities had less difficulty in setting objectives, developing interventions, and measuring 
progress.95 While very informative, the authors acknowledged the limitations of the study due to its focus 
on successful partnerships, small sample size and the inability to generalize findings to other nonprofit 
hospital-LHD collaboratives.  
Other insightful information and evidence have come from: single case studies of nonprofit 
hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA and CHIP; content analysis of a small number of hospital CHNAs to 
identify nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration from the perspective of a nonprofit hospital and compare it 
with the LHD perspective using survey instruments; qualitative studies of nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration from the LHD perspective; a study using national LHD data from the Profile Study by the 
National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) that examined the association of LHD 
engagement in PHAB accreditation activities and nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA; and 
studies that examined the impact of Federal (i.e., Section 9007) and State (i.e., PHAB accreditation, CHA 
and CHIP requirements, CHA-CHNA cycle alignment) on encouraging and accelerating nonprofit hospital-
LHD collaboration.92,93,109–113,157,94,95,98,100,105–108  
We have described the general findings of many of these studies in Chapter 1, Sections 1.1c and 
1.1d. Many studies describe the effectiveness of Federal (i.e., Section 9007), State and PHAB accreditation 
requirements in accelerating nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration, especially in CHNA and CHIP. All of 
them emphasized the central role that State governments play in synchronizing LHD CHNA cycle with that 
of nonprofit hospitals to encourage nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration. Three states are consistently 
identified as adopting a statewide plan to align CHNA cycles: New York, Maryland and North 
Carolina.95,98,157 They mostly encourage nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration through statewide health 
improvement programs that align with Federal regulation. States also use regulatory language that either 
requires or provides guidance for LHDs to conduct a CHNA and develop a CHIP, and aligns CHNA cycles for 




and programmatic efforts to achieve this goal. Our preliminary analysis of nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration in New York shows that close to 100% of nonprofit hospitals are collaborating with LHDs in 
CHNA, CHIP and have jointly selected two to three health priorities to focus on. Finally, all studies discuss 
the role that the concept of population health has had in encouraging hospitals to engage in collaboration 
with LHDs.  
Access to more robust clinical and population-level data was identified as a benefit of nonprofit 
hospital-LHD collaboration in producing more comprehensive CHNAs and CHIPs.98 Also, the role of LHDs 
as initiators and conveners of partnerships was a consistent theme, as well as their key role in inventory 
of community assets and resources that could be used by the collaborative to address identified needs. 
Some studies found that nonprofit hospitals committed substantial financial resources towards 
addressing the jointly identified community health needs when they were engaged in a collaboration with 
a LHD.98 
Another finding was the incongruence between nonprofit hospital and LHD perspectives in 
regards to cooperation and collaboration. There was more congruence in LHD and nonprofit hospital 
perspectives in what the authors described as lower levels of joint action, such as networking and 
coordination. The authors concluded that LHDs might overestimate the levels of joint action with 
nonprofit hospitals , while nonprofit hospitals  have a tendency to underestimate their collaboration with 
LHDs.105  
Another study performed content analysis of CHNAs to determine whether nonprofit hospitals 
were collaborating with LHDs to conduct CHNAs. It described the difficulty in determining the specific 
nature of the collaboration based on the CHNA narrative. Some CHNA reports were ambiguous and didn’t 
elaborate on what the collaboration actually involved and the role that each institution played. For 




group of hospitals and LHDs, however, this same hospital’s individual CHNA report did not mention their 
engagement in a collaborative assessment.112 
In a 1998 study of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA and CHIP, again the role of the 
State Health Department and the concept of population health are highlighted as the main drivers behind 
the successful collaboration of a community hospital and LHD in south central Ohio. Some of the same 
themes and findings described earlier were also identified in this in-depth case study. For instance, the 
hospital and LHD were the anchor institutions of the larger coalition; the hospital invested substantial 
resources in the CHNA process; the LHD and hospital led the efforts to prioritize identified community 
health needs and develop plans to address them; the collaboration on CHNA and CHIP seems to have 
improved the sustainability of collective efforts.107  
Finally, all the studies discuss the potential for nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration to improve 
population health and allocation of resources; however, none actually examine this relationship. It seems 
that the central motivation underlying the formation of these nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboratives is 
premised on its potential to improve population health through collective impact.158 Most, if not all, the 
studies end in a call-to-action for rigorous research to examine the effect of nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaboration on population health outcomes. 
Inter- and Intra-sectorial Collaboration and Coalitions: Impact on Health Outcomes  
We reviewed the literature on different types of inter- and intra-sectorial collaboration and 
coalitions that also had the goal to improve health outcomes. Some of these community partnerships 
included but were not specific to local health department (LHD) and nonprofit hospital collaboration. They 
examined the impact of organizational collaboration or integration on specific health outcomes.   
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Program on Chronic Mental Illness was launched in the 
late 1980’s and continued through the mid 1990’s. It was tested in nine cities and included the 




program was that better integration of systems of care with a Local Mental Health Authority at the center, 
would improve continuity of care, increase the availability of care, and would ultimately lead to better 
outcomes for people with severe mental illness and their families. There were several evaluations that 
examined the program’s impact on both organizational and health outcomes. They found that the systems 
in the program cities were less fragmented and more centralized.159 Organizations that were part of the 
system reported more contact with one another as the demonstration progressed, especially when 
compared to a non-test site that had no Local Mental Health Authority.159 Demonstration sites also 
showed higher levels of continuity of care for people discharged from 24-hour acute care settings.160  
Cohorts observed late in the demonstration, when systems were better integrated, were more likely to 
have a case manager and to stay with the same case manager throughout the follow-up period.160 
However, there were no significant differences in clinical, social and quality of life outcomes associated 
with the programiv.160  
Additionally, family members of clients that had a case manager found that it helped reduce their 
own burden.161 One study showed that clients experienced improved outcomes when they received case 
management services and HUD certificates to subsidize their rent.162 The program evaluators concluded 
that integration of the service system was necessary but not sufficient to improve individual outcomes. 
They emphasized the need to also focus on the quality of care and services. Despite the mixed findings of 
the program’s effectiveness, it played an important role in influencing a new generation of mental health 
service activities.159,160,162–164  
A Cochrane review of community coalition-driven interventions to improve health status and 
reduce disparities in racial minority populations covered studies during the period from 1990 through 
2014. They identified 58 community coalition studies addressing a wide range of health outcomes and risk 
                                                          




behaviors. These coalitions were composed of at least two community-based public or private 
organizations and a representative from a racial minority group. They found that coalitions adopting 
system-level strategies (e.g., targeting physical environments like housing, green spaces, and 
neighborhood safety) had small inconsistent effects. Coalitions adopting broad health and social care 
system strategies (e.g., accessibility of services, and technologies designed to improve quality of care) 
showed consistent and positive small effects. Interventions that used community health outreach workers 
or group-based health education led by professionals produced consistent positive effects, while health 
education led by peers showed inconsistent effects. The authors conclude that community coalitions may 
have an impact on individual health outcomes and behaviors, and care delivery systems by effectively 
connecting community members to health and human service providers. They point out that the review 
does not elucidate specific mechanisms through which outcomes are impacted.165 
Another review examined collaboration between local health and local government agencies with 
the goal of improving community health. These collaboratives focused on mental health, lifestyle 
improvements, chronic disease management and environmental improvements. They found mixed 
results, for instance, in the six studies that examined mental health initiatives, one showed a health 
benefit, four showed a modest improvement in some outcomes but no clear overall health gain, and one 
showed no evidence of a positive effect. None of the studies that focused on chronic disease management 
showed a significant effect. The effect of collaboratives focused on lifestyle behaviours ranged from short-
term improvements to no significant effect. Finally, the majority of studies that examined initiatives 
focused on environmental improvements showed some health improvements. The authors emphasize 
that some of these studies may have been biased and may not have accounted for important factors like 
additional funding or resources. They conclude that collaborative community partnerships can be 




community heath assessment, strategizing, planning and program evaluation to increase the potential for 
improved outcomes.166 
A study of a collaborative care approach to treat depression and anxiety found that this approach 
is associated with significantly improved outcomes, for up to two years, compared to routine care. 
Collaborative care was defined as care delivered by a group of health professionals including at a minimum 
a primary care physician, a case manager, and a mental health specialist. Patients that received 
collaborative care were more likely to: use medications as recommended by guidelines, experience 
improved mental health related quality of life, and be more satisfied with their treatment.167 Another 
study examined the effectiveness of collaborative care among people with severe mental illness. They 
found that collaborative care for US veterans with bipolar disorder reduced psychiatric admissions 
compared to standard care. It also found a significant improvement in mental health related quality of 
life, while physical health related quality of life was not significantly different among the groups. There 
was no significant difference in the cost of care at the three-year follow up between the two 
interventions.168 
One review identified 20 studies that focused on integration of HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment services with other services, such as: mothers, infants and children; nutrition; and family 
planning. The review covered the period 1990 to 2010, and found that integration of a mix of these 
services had a positive effect on contraceptive use, antiretroviral therapy initiation during pregnancy, HIV 
testing and quality of services. The authors explain that the risk of bias in the studies was relatively high. 
There was much heterogeneity across studies in intervention types, study design and reported 
outcomes.169 
 Finally, an evaluation of the Community Care Network (CCN) demonstration is also helpful in 
contributing to our understanding of how community-based health partnerships function and impact 




included an average of 10 organizations from the private and public sector including: health providers, 
public health departments, human service agencies, local government, educational institutions, health 
plans and managed care organizations, and business coalitions. The authors examined a wide range of 
indicators reflecting four intermediate outcome dimensions: access, cost, quality of service delivery, and 
health outcomes. On the dimension of access, the authors found that the majority of CCNs had expanded 
their provider network and nine CCNs reported reductions in barriers to access. Some CCNs expanded 
access to primary care services and the scope of service in their communities. This was mostly achieved 
by improvements in transportation, a focus on issues of literacy, income, and underinsurance. 
 On the quality of service delivery dimension, most of the CCNs (18) reported improved 
coordination and integration of health and human services. This helped improve the continuity of care in 
eight sites. In contrast, the CCNs were not as successful in containing the costs associated with the delivery 
of health, human, and social services. Interestingly, six CCNs documented reductions in emergency 
department utilization and hospital inpatient services, and four reported decreased service duplication. 
However, none of these sites experienced a significant decline in cost per capita, or a drop in the rate of 
increase in costs. 
 On the health outcomes dimension, most results were intermediate with some evidence of 
improvements in health status in a few CCNs. Intermediate outcomes were: increased patient and 
community health education programs; prevention and wellness initiative; and formal community health 
needs assessments. One CCN demonstrated some improvement in perceived health status and in the 
proportion of children receiving physical exams. Another CCN increased cancer screening rates, while a 
different CCN experienced a substantial reduction in the rate of premature birth. The authors examined 
other sets of indicators under each dimension. They conclude that “progress toward the CCN vision is 
directly related to intermediate-level outcome improvement”, especially in the areas of access to health 




necessarily based on health outcomes, but rather, it reflected the increased number of formalized 
community health needs assessments. 
 This study also included a review of other similar community-based partnerships for health, and 
developed a set of lessons learned from other similar partnerships. One of the lessons was that 
partnerships were more successful in producing measurable community health improvement, when they: 
implemented focused interventions targeting a well-defined population; and interventions were managed 
by a small number of organizations to improve accountability. Another lesson was that partnerships that 
addressed broader interventions and a more diverse population, required a higher level of integration of 
separate program components to achieve improved community health outcomes. They speculated that 
the key integrating mechanism for some of the partnerships seemed to be the investment in and 
maintenance of social capital in the community. Social capital was not actually operationalized in this 
study. However, the authors described it as “creating linkages, investing in volunteer training, driving 
decisions with scientific evidence, and making those decisions collaboratively, a web of integrated 
relationships (the collective equivalent of individual human capital) was developed between individuals 
and organizations”.170 Evaluations of other major community-based programs identified another three 
integrating mechanisms: availability of sufficient resources, strength of leadership, and focus on 
community needs.170,171 
As can be seen in these studies, the potential benefits of collaboration have motivated the 
formation of various types of partnerships, coalitions and other organizational forms. However, there are 
mixed results on their effectiveness. There seems to be a theme across these studies about the 
importance of formalized community health needs assessments, prioritization of identified needs, and 
limiting the number of identified needs to focus on. 
Federal Regulatory Landscape: Shaping Nonprofit Hospital and Local Health Department Institutional 




Nonprofit Hospital Community Benefit Spending on Population Health: What influences hospital 
behavior? 
 In line with the preceding sections, the literature is mostly missing in respect to the role that local 
health department (LHD) and nonprofit hospital collaboration may play in influencing nonprofit hospital 
behavior, specifically in how they allocate community benefit dollars. As previously noted, nonprofit 
hospitals that jointly conducted a community health needs assessment (CHNA) and community health 
improvement plan (CHIP) with a LHD seemed to dedicate more financial resources towards those 
activities. When nonprofit hospital(s) and LHD collaborated on these activities, about 70% of the 
partnerships’ budgets came from nonprofit hospitals However, these findings were not based on a 
systematic examination of nonprofit hospital community benefit spending in relation to nonprofit 
hospital-LHD collaboration. 
 Changing nonprofit hospital behavior and decision-making in how they allocate community 
benefit dollars has proven to be complex, challenging and slow. The sheer ambiguity around terms such 
as community benefit, uncompensated care, and charity care has caused great confusion among all 
involved (e.g., nonprofit hospitals, policymakers, government agencies, etc). This ambiguity perpetuates 
the lack of a formal framework for “counting” community benefit activities and has implications for the 
reliability and accuracy of data on community benefit spending. It may also serve as leverage for nonprofit 
hospitals in justifying the adequacy of their community benefit investment to keep their tax-exempt 
status. In other words, if there is no detailed definition for the various community benefit spending 
categories and how they should be counted and calculated, nonprofit hospitals may have much leeway in 
regards to accountability towards that requirement. This explains, in part, the interest that nonprofit 
hospitals may have in keeping the concept of community benefit somewhat elusive.  
The traditional institutional focus of hospitals on provision of acute care, along with the 




for community benefit spending. Traditionally, nonprofit hospitals have dedicated most of their 
community benefit dollars to charity care.80,81,101,114–116,118,119,121,172 Charity care is beneficial to the 
community; however, it represents only a partial fulfillment of their community benefit requirement. 
Nonprofit hospitals also have the responsibility to improve the conditions for health in the communities 
they serve, which involves other activities that go beyond the direct provision of acute care services. The 
accumulated institutional experience and knowledge surrounding charity care, by hospitals and 
government, may also mean that both are more “comfortable” with reporting community benefit 
spending in the charity care category (i.e., financial assistance). There are more specific guidelines on the 
calculation of spending in charity care. It is the least ambiguous of the community benefit categories.  
Over the course of many decades, the Federal and State governments have attempted to change 
hospital behavior specific to community benefit spending. The history of regulatory action specific to 
community benefit requirements has been well documented elsewhere.23,81,173–177 Tax regulations have 
ranged from narrow interpretations of the term “charitable” as “aid to the poor and suffering” in the early 
1950’s and the “financial ability standard” ruling in the late 1950’s, to the broader focus on promoting 
community health reflected in the “community benefit standard” adopted in 1969. There were many 
failed Federal regulatory attempts that sought to impose minimum thresholds on specific categories of 
community benefit spending. However, many states have enacted stricter community benefit regulations 
and some have imposed minimum thresholds.176  
The lack of sanctions (e.g., penalty, revocation of tax-exempt status) imposed on nonprofit 
hospitals for non-adherence to community benefit standards also hamper enforcement efforts. Some of 
these shortcomings have been addressed by Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA); however, minimum spending thresholds still do not exist at the Federal level and the fine 





 We identified two cases in 2017 in which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked a hospital’s 
tax-exempt status. One case involved the hospital’s failure to comply with Section 501(r), specifically, its 
failure to conduct a CHNA and adopt an implementation strategy (i.e., community health improvement 
plan).178 The other case was due to the hospital’s involvement in a joint venture with a for-profit entity.179 
It remains to be seen whether these cases are isolates, or whether the IRS is ramping up its efforts to 
investigate whether nonprofit hospitals are in compliance with Section 9007 of the ACA. The American 
Health Lawyers Association stated that the IRS is currently reviewing all nonprofit hospitals’ compliance 
with Section 501(r) and identifying cases where there is evidence of non-compliance. The American Health 
Lawyers Association described that this IRS investigation has identified over 300 nonprofit hospitals for 
further examination. 
Several studies that have compared the level of spending on charity care by nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals, did not find substantial differences in spending between the two groups.115,118,180,181 Some 
found that nonprofit hospitals  incurred greater costs associated with uncompensated care than their for-
profit counterparts.115 A study by the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission found that for-profit 
hospitals devoted 4.5% of their costs to charity care and bad debt, while nonprofit hospitals devoted 4.8%, 
which the authors found to be a practically insignificant difference.181 There were contradictory findings 
in some of the early studies. This was likely related to the lack of a standardized measurement of 
uncompensated care spending. However, the legitimacy and merit of nonprofit hospitals continue to be 
challenged to this day. 
Finally, some studies have examined the impact of some provisions of the ACA on community 
benefit spending. More specifically, Section 9007 and ACA provisions that effectively increased the 
proportion of insured population and consequently decreased the demand for charity care.182 A recent 
study examined nonprofit hospital community benefit spending post-ACA and found that nonprofit 




increasev.101 Most of this increase was driven by patient care benefits (i.e., financial assistance previously 
known as charity care).101 Spending on community benefit categories that reflect community health and 
population-based initiatives remained virtually flat.101 The authors also explored the influence of 
uninsurance rate on charity care and population health focused community benefit spending. Nonprofit 
hospitals operating in areas with a larger uninsured population reported larger charity care spending than 
nonprofit hospitals operating in areas with lower uninsurance rates.101 However, they found only 
minimally significant or no significant differences in population health focused spending in relation to 
uninsurance rate.101 The authors speculate that many nonprofit hospitals  may lack the expertise and 
resources (i.e., physical, human and social capital) necessary to effectively meet the population health 
goals set by the ACA. Individually, they may not be able to effectively allocate community benefit dollars 
across a portfolio of population health focused activities, even though provisions of the ACA have freed 
up dollars that were previously dedicated to charity care. They emphasized that nonprofit hospitals may 
be falling short of key objectives underlying the CHNA requirement, specifically in relation to collaboration 
with LHDs and other community stakeholders.101,116,117,120,182 
 Once again, there is a clear call-to-action for nonprofit hospitals to collaborate with the 
community, especially with LHDs. Consistent with what has been discussed in previous sections, the 
implicit assumption is that this collaboration can translate into improved population health outcomes and 
allocative efficiency, at least in relation to nonprofit hospital and LHD resources. 
Historically, nonprofit hospitals have generally opposed Federal legislation that would expand the 
concept of community benefit. Their main argument was that the community benefit standard was 
sufficient, and that decision on how to allocate community benefit dollars should be made at the local 
level by the hospital and the community.119 Local health departments are central to the production of 
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health in the communities they serve, and are a particularly important community stakeholder. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA and CHIP may 
influence the behavior of hospitals specific to how they allocate community benefit dollars. The behavior 
change could stem from the higher levels of reciprocity inherent in functional collaborative relationships 
of this type. Furthermore, “social sanctioning” (i.e., informal “oversight” by other organizations), even 
when subtle, might be a powerful mechanism through which nonprofit hospital behavior can change. 
However, norms and sanctions are more likely to be enforced, and to matter, when individuals and 
organizations are members of the same group, especially in closer types of relationships. We will 
elaborate on these concepts and ideas in Section 2.4. 
  A review of the history of the many successful and failed attempts to change the interpretation 
of the “Federal tax standard” for nonprofit hospitals, makes one fact clear; nonprofit hospitals have 
successfully invested substantial resources and political capital to postpone or deter stricter regulation 
and codification of community benefit requirements. It remains to be seen whether one of the central 
arguments used by nonprofit hospitals is indeed true, that is, can community needs and stakeholders 
actually influence how nonprofit hospitals allocate their community benefit dollars? 
Nonprofit Hospital Community Benefit Requirement: History 
Nonprofit hospitals are exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. This tax 
exemption comes with a community benefit requirement which obliges nonprofit hospitals to invest in 
the health and healthcare of the communities they serve. This community benefit requirement was first 
introduced in 1969 by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) but the agency never specified what community 
benefit meant and what it should entail. Prior to that, the IRS required hospitals to provide charity care 
(i.e., care for which no compensation could be expected) to the uninsured and underinsured. Hospitals 
had a relatively great degree of flexibility in determining the amount of charity care they would provide. 




limited to the direct provision of healthcare services but also included education, research and activities 
that promote community health.183 
It was not until decades later, in the 1990s and 2000s, that many government organizations and 
advocates started voicing their concerns about the practices of nonprofit hospitals in respect to this 
requirement. Their main concern was whether hospitals were making sufficient community benefits 
investments to justify their tax exemption.  
After hearings held by Congress in 2004 and 2006, the IRS introduced an addendum to Form 990 
which all non-profit institutions must file. The goal of this addendum, or Schedule H, was to improve 
transparency and standardize community benefit reporting across the country. Schedule H filing was 
optional in 2008 but became a requirement starting in 2009. 
Public concern was well justified considering the sizeable value of tax exemption for nonprofit 
hospitals. In 2002, in a report developed for Congress by the Joint Committee on Taxation, they estimated 
the federal value of the tax exemption at $12.6 billion.183 More recently, in 2011, it was estimated to be 
$24.6 billion.183 
These estimates may be significantly lower than the actual value of the community benefit tax-
exemption. There may be additional value added by state and local tax exemptions. Furthermore, the 
philanthropic value of hospitals’ tax-exempt status, which facilitates the generation of nonprofit 
contributions, was estimated at $5.3 billion in 2010, and this figure is not included in most estimates.183  
The requirement for Schedule H in 2009 was a clear improvement in increasing the accountability 
of nonprofit hospitals through reporting. However, it still fell short on providing a clear definition of what 
was entailed in each of the new community benefit spending categories as reflected in the form. It also 





There were three main categories of community benefit spending in the 2009 Schedule H form. 
The first was “charity care and means-tested government programs” which reflected the cost of care 
provided to the uninsured and the unreimbursed cost of Medicaid and other means-tested government 
programs. The second was “other benefits” which included community health improvement and 
community benefit operations, health professions education, subsidized health services, research and 
cash and in-kind contributions to community groups. These two categories fell under a broader category 
of “charity care and certain other community benefits at cost”. Finally, the third one was “community 
building activities” which included physical improvements and housing, economic development, 
community support, environmental improvements, leadership development and training for community 
members, coalition building, community health improvement advocacy, workforce development and 
other. These categories have mostly remained the same throughout the years, with a minor update in 
terminology from “charity care” to “financial assistance” starting in 2010, and from “community groups” 
to “community benefit” in 2011. 
It is particularly notable that some of these categories reflect the government’s recognition that 
nonprofit hospitals are expected to engage in population health focused activities to improve the health 
of the communities they serve. This goes beyond the more traditional institutional focus on direct 
provision of healthcare services through charity care (i.e., financial assistance). The IRS has defined 
concepts like “community health improvement services” as “activities or programs, subsidized by the 
health care organization, carried out or supported for the express purpose of improving community 
health.” They further clarify the concept by explaining that these “services do not generate inpatient or 
outpatient bills, although there may be nominal patient fee or sliding scale fee for these services.”79,184 
Another concept that further shapes the role nonprofit hospitals are expected to play in 
population health is “community building” which encompass activities that “protect and improve the 




coalitions and other collaborative efforts with the community, and advocacy of policies that safeguard or 
improve public health. All these definitions have remained the same over the years from 2008 to 2017. 
In 2010, the IRS introduced a series of questions to Schedule H about the hospital’s financial 
assistance policy, billing and collections policies and about hospitals’ completion of a community health 
needs assessment (CHNA). The CHNA set of questions were optional in 2010 and 2011. In 2012, these 
questions were optional only if the tax years began on or before March 23, 2012, when Section 9007 of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was enacted. The next section will describe further 
details of the ACA’s Section 9007 requirements. 
Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Continued Call on Nonprofit Hospitals 
to Collaborate with Governmental Public Health Agencies 
Section 9007 (Title IX, Subtitle A) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) further 
defines the role of nonprofit hospitals in improving population health through its requirements for a 
triennial community health needs assessment (CHNA) and implementation strategy (i.e., community 
health improvement plan); and further clarification of their financial assistance policies.23,185 Noteworthy, 
is the inclusion of this requirement under “Revenue Provisions” in the ACA, which highlights the role that 
nonprofit hospitals  are expected to play in funding some of the ACA programs.186 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the value of tax exemption was $24.6 billion in 2011 and 
represents the potential contribution that nonprofit hospitals can make to the communities they serve by 
reinvesting these dollars on population health activities.121 Furthermore, the combined effect of the 
individual mandate, Medicaid expansion, insurance subsidies, the “woodwork effect”vi, as well as other 
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ACA provisions, have effectively decreased the demand for charity care which potentially frees up 
community benefit dollars for population health focused activities.24,82,83,182 
While the ACA requirement for a CHNA increases accountability and transparency, it leaves 
hospitals to decide how to approach the actual implementation of the CHNA. The Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) instructions for Form 990 and Schedule H, which all nonprofit hospitals must complete, explain that 
“CHNA must take into account input from…those with special knowledge of or expertise in public 
health…”.79 The IRS only loosely suggests that hospitals should engage experts in public health but leaves 
room for wide variation across hospitals in how they obtain such input. 
In 2014, the ACA added section 4959, which imposes a $50,000 excise tax on a nonprofit hospital for 
failure to meet the CHNA requirements under section 501(r)(3). All these requirements and revisions were 
reflected in the Schedule H forms from 2012 forward.  
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Provisions for Governmental Public Health Agencies and 
Hospital-centric Provisions 
 In Chapter 1, Section 1.1c, we briefly discussed other provisions of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) that are of relevance to our study. Table 2.1 highlights the most relevant, but 
not all, the provisions of the ACA that translate into direct investments in governmental public health 
agencies. We also included other ACA provisions that are expected to influence hospital behavior due to 
their focus on population health (Table 2.2). The goal of these provisions is mainly achieved through 
delivery and payment reform that seek to move the healthcare sector from a volume to value-based 
approach. Hospitals seeking to benefit from the financial incentives and to avoid the penalties associated 





 We will not elaborate on these provisions as they are not the focus of our study. However, we 
believe they provide many relevant contextual factors that may very well influence some of the outcomes 
of interest in our study. We will strive to control for hospital and LHD-centric factors in our models. 
State Regulatory Landscape: Shaping Nonprofit Hospital and Local Health Department Institutional 
Behavior and Accelerating Nonprofit Hospital-LHD Collaboration 
State Regulatory Landscape: Alignment with Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Section 
9007 
 State-level efforts to align with Section 9007 and encourage local health department (LHD) and 
nonprofit hospital collaboration have been described in previous sections. We found it helpful to 
summarize these efforts and developed Table 2.3. This table helps identify states that rise to the top as 
providing a clear statewide regulatory and programmatic framework that aligns with Section 9007. This 
statewide framework has accelerated the formation of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on: 
community health needs assessment (CHNA), prioritization of identified community health needs and 
community health improvement planning (CHIP). Table 2.3 also includes information on state-specific 
community benefit requirements, some of which are stricter than their Federal counterpart. 
The State of New York “Prevention Agenda Towards the Healthiest State”: Aligning CHNA Cycles to 
Accelerate Nonprofit Hospital-Local Health Department Collaboration on Community Needs Health 
Assessment, Planning and Improvement 
As can be seen from Table 2.3, New York (NY) stands out as the state with a regulatory 
framework that has strategically aligned with Federal efforts (i.e., Section 9007). It has aligned the 
timelines of local health department (LHD) community health needs assessment (CHNA) with that of 
nonprofit hospitals’. In addition to aligning CHNA cycles, the NY Department of Health, through its NY 
State Prevention Agenda (Prevention Agenda) launched in 2008, requires nonprofit hospitals and LHDs 




100% compliance with this “strong recommendation” for nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on CHNA, 
CHIP and joint selection of health priorities.   
In fact, NY aims to align all three of its central health reform platforms to move the state towards 
achieving the Triple Aim.58,59,187 The three health reform initiatives are: Delivery System Reform Incentive 
Payment (DSRIP) Program, State Health Innovation Plan (SHIP), and the Prevention Agenda. The goal is to 
realign the financial incentives in the healthcare sector and to direct resources to community 
infrastructure that supports population health. The incentive alignment component is primarily achieved 
through the implementation of the DSRIP and SHIP programs. The SHIP is focused on strengthening 
primary care as the foundation for the statewide system.187,188 The DSRIP’s overarching goal is to reduce 
avoidable hospital utilization through community-level collaboration and system reforms.189 Finally, the 
Prevention Agenda provides a blueprint for action for all stakeholders. The health priorities were selected 
by an ad hoc committee of the NY State Public Health Council, chaired by the President of the New York 
Academy of Medicine, which has representation from multiple sectors. The committee solicited input 
from several stakeholders from various sectors in recommending the priorities. It was designed to address 
five health priorities (i.e., Prevention Agenda 2013-2018) that also align with the healthcare challenges 
identified under DSRIP.187 While the Prevention Agenda identifies numerous stakeholders expected to 
participate, it places LHDs and nonprofit hospitals at the center of local community health needs 
assessment, planning and prioritization.190  
We will first describe the Prevention Agenda in detail as it is the focus of our study (i.e., 
treatment). We will then describe the DSRIP and SHIP programs briefly. As emphasized in Section 2.2d 
and Table 2.2, these healthcare sector-centric initiatives focused on improving population health have 
implications for the design of our study. These initiatives are designed to influence many of the same 




New York State Prevention Agenda. The New York (NY) State Prevention Agenda (Prevention 
Agenda) was first launched in 2008 “as a call to action to local health departments, healthcare providers, 
health plans, schools, employers, and businesses to collaborate at the community level to improve the 
health status of New Yorkers through increased emphasis on prevention.” It is the blueprint for state 
and local action to improve health and reduce health disparities.190 The first Prevention Agenda plan 
covered the period from 2008 through 2012. The NY State Department of Health conducted a state 
health assessment and identified 10 health priorities for the Prevention Agenda 2008-2012. The 2013-
2018 Prevention Agenda included five health priorities also identified through the state health 
assessment. The overarching priorities are: prevent chronic diseases; promote a healthy and safe 
environment; promote healthy women, infants and children; promote mental health and prevent 
substance abuse; and prevent HIV, sexually transmitted diseases, vaccine-preventable diseases and 
healthcare-associated infections.190  
Dr. Jo Ivey Boufford, President of the NY Academy of Medicine, has led an ad hoc committee of 
the NY State Public Health Council that has helped the NY State Department of Health advance the 
Prevention Agenda. She described the State’s decision to narrow the focus of the Prevention Agenda from 
10 to five health priorities “to get [a] more concerted action to see the results at the community level.” 
The 2013-2018 Prevention Agenda integrated many “lessons learned” from its earlier version.191 The 
narrowing of priorities was one of them and collaboration was another important theme. Some challenges 
identified were: technical assistance on forming and sustaining partnerships, setting priorities, developing 
implementation plans and evaluation. 
 One of the cornerstones of the Prevention Agenda is its call on LHDs and nonprofit hospitals to 
collaborate on community health needs assessment (CHNA), jointly select two to three health priorities 
(i.e., from the Prevention Agenda-identified priorities) and to develop and implement a community health 




service plan”). Dr. Boufford, explained that the work of the Prevention Agenda “will be anchored by the 
[nonprofit hospitals] Community Service Plan and the Local Health Department Community Health 
Assessments.”191 In 2008, the NY Department of Health asked all 58 LHDs and more than 166 nonprofit 
hospitals to identify at least two of the Prevention Agenda priorities, and then work together with 
insurers, community‐based organizations and other stakeholders to address them. In 2009, LHDs 
submitted their CHNAs which summarized community needs. They also submitted CHIPs which identified 
health priorities and described the strategies they would implement to address them. Also in 2009, 
nonprofit hospitals submitted their Community Service Plans (i.e., equivalent to Section 9007 requirement 
for CHNA and implementation strategy) that described their resource and operational commitment to 
improve the health of the communities they serve and the implementation strategy to address their 
identified priorities. The goal was for these documents to be done collaboratively, especially in the 
priority-setting process. These plans indicated that a majority of the NY’s nonprofit hospitals had 
identified at least two Prevention Agenda priorities, had established partnerships with LHDs and 
community partners, and developed plans to address their chosen priorities. Local health departments 
were also asked to update their progress toward planning and implementing strategies described in their 
CHNAs. The top three priorities identified by nonprofit hospitals and LHDs were: 1) chronic disease; 2) 
access to care; and 3) physical activity and nutrition.96,187,192,193  
 During an interview prior to the launching of the Prevention Agenda 2013-2018, Dr. Boufford 
recognized the central role of governmental public health agencies, and characterized them as the 
“backbone of the public health system”. However, she emphasized the importance of using the Institute 
of Medicine’s (IOM) concept of the public health system, as discussed in Chapter 1. It acknowledges the 
critical role that other stakeholders, including the healthcare sector, play in producing health in a 
community, each contributing their own resources. In alignment with what has been identified previously 




interests of all these potential actors at the community level to really get the highest health results for 
individuals and for that community.”191 To address this challenge, the Prevention Agenda has taken an 
approach that aims to communicate the return on investment of local initiatives. They expect this 
communication approach to get more sectors motivated to participate. She explained that prior to the 
implementation of the Prevention Agenda 2008-2012, hospital and LHD leadership “had never really 
talked to each other. Sometimes they didn’t know who the other one was.” She believes that the 
Prevention Agenda 2008-2012 helped break down a lot of those barriers and “hopefully some of those 
relationships have been sustained and are going to make it much easier in the next round.”191 
Based on the lessons learned, prior to launching the Prevention Agenda 2013-2018, the former 
NY Health Commissioner Nirav Shah further solidified one of the Prevention Agenda’s pillars by directing 
nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to collaborate when developing CHNAs and CHIPs (i.e., community service 
plans). They were expected to identify two to three Prevention Agenda priorities, with one priority 
focused on addressing a health disparity.187,193 The expectation is that this partnership-building process of 
collaborative CHNA, joint selection of health priorities and CHIP facilitates sustainability so “it isn’t a one-
off exercise”.191  
The Prevention Agenda’s detailed blueprint reflects an extraordinary effort to provide a roadmap 
that can be more easily understood and used by LHDs, nonprofit hospitals and other community 
stakeholders. For each health priority, the blueprint identifies focus areas, goals, measurable objectives 
and interventions. It provides a set of interventions that can be used to address a particular focus area 
(i.e., focus areas fall under a health priority), by sector and by “Health Impact Pyramid”.194 Every plan for 
each of the five priorities has to include action at the five levels of the public health system, as depicted 
in the “Health Impact Pyramid” framework. The Prevention Agenda works closely with the Public Health 
Council and the Minority Health Council to tackle the complex issue of health disparities and to develop a 




This detailed blueprint makes it much easier for each stakeholder to understand their role and 
what they can implement to help address a selected priority. These suggested evidence-based 
interventions serve as a starting point and it is expected that LHDs, nonprofit hospitals and other local 
stakeholders will add to this list overtime.190,195   
The director of the Office of Public Health Practice in the State Department of Health, Sylvia Pirani, 
asserted that “measurement and accountability are at the heart of this effort [Prevention Agenda]”.191 In 
alignment with her observation, another key component of the Prevention Agenda is the detailed list of 
objectives and their targets for each focus area. Currently, there are 96 objectives being tracked annually, 
for which 68 objectives have county level indicators. Objectives were developed for the general 
population and also for reducing disparities for specific populations. Indicators represent process, short-
term and long-term outcomes. The targets for each objective were determined by reviewing historical 
data. On average, an improvement target of 10% was selected for the majority of the 5-year objectives. 
All this information is available on the NY Department of Health website which adds transparency to the 
Prevention Agenda.190 
In the context of limited resources, the NY Academy of Medicine identified the community benefit 
requirement for nonprofit hospitals as a potential source of financial support for population health 
improvement.187 The Academy sees it as an “important opportunity for hospitals to further advance New 
York State’s path towards the Triple Aim”.187 This is analogous to the inclusion of Section 9007 under Title 
IX (i.e., Revenue Provisions) in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The NY State Department of Health is interested in understanding the role that nonprofit hospitals 
play in terms of their community benefit investment in community health. More specifically, the 
Department is interested in the alignment between nonprofit hospitals’ community benefit expenditures 
and their community service plans and Prevention Agenda activities. In an effort to assess this 




directly to the Office of Primary Care and Health Systems Management. The Department and the NY 
Academy of Medicine are working together to track nonprofit hospitals’ community benefit expenditures 
and their alignment with the Prevention Agenda and the Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment 
Program (DSRIP). This oversight likely augments the accountability by nonprofit hospitals in relation to 
how they allocate community benefit dollars to population health focused initiatives.193 
Other important components of the Prevention Agenda include technical assistance trainings and 
webinars; promotion and media; outreach to statewide partner organizations to motivate local affiliate 
participation in prevention activities; and the Prevention Agenda website that houses current data on the 
health status of NY residents, tools for health planning and evaluation, evidence-based interventions and 
partner information and matrices in each county.  
The Prevention Agenda received $7.1 million to focus on community health planning (i.e., HEAL 9 
funds), that were granted to 18 communities across NY). There are several institutes and organizations 
that provide resources to support the implementation of the Prevention Agenda. One of them is the NY 
Academy of Medicine, which supports local-level implementation of the Prevention Agenda through its 
“Advancing Prevention Project”. The project is funded by the NY State Health Foundation and helps build 
capacity of LHDs and nonprofit hospitals to implement actionable Prevention Agenda plans.196 The 
Foundation has also awarded $50,000 grants to LHDs to support their implementation of the CHIPs. These 
grants were awarded to LHDs with the most promising CHIPs that were also able to raise matching funds 
from local investors.197  
The Healthcare Association of NY State, the state’s hospital and continuing care association, also 
provides a rich set of resources and technical assistance to help LHDs and nonprofit hospitals implement 
the Prevention Agenda. It supports local community health improvement activities and fosters multi-
stakeholder coalitions.198 The University at Albany School of Public Health’s Center for Public Health and 




community-based organizations that are engaged in Prevention Agenda collaborative efforts through the 
implementation of their CHIPs and community service plans.199 The NY Public Health Practice Based 
Research Network, led by the Office of Public Health Practice in the NY State Department of Health, also 
helps further the goals of the Prevention Agenda through its research agenda and dissemination of 
ongoing research and evidence. 
It is clear that NY has embraced a statewide approach to improving population health. One key 
component of this framework is the Prevention Agenda, which has aligned CHNA cycles for nonprofit 
hospitals and LHDs, has directed them to jointly select two to three health priorities, to develop a CHIP 
together, and implement activities to address their identified priorities. Other states have encouraged 
nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to collaborate on CHNA and CHIP, however, none have taken a systematic 
and statewide approach to facilitate nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration. 
New York’s Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Program. On April of 2014, the State of 
NY received approval, through an amendment, to reinvest $8 billion in federal savings generated by the 
state’s Medicare Redesign Team reforms. This was possible through a Section 1115 Medicaid waiver. 
The Medicare Redesign Team was implemented in two phases. Phase 1 resulted in 78 legislature-
approved recommendations to redesign and restructure the Medicaid program that sought to reduce 
spending by $2.3 billion in fiscal years 2011-12. Phase 2 involved the participation of additional 
stakeholders who came together to address additional issues and to monitor the implementation of 
recommendations from Phase 1. Phase 2 culminated in the report “A Plan to Transform the Empire 
State’s Medicaid Program: Better Care, Better Health, Lower Costs”, which serves as the blueprint for 
NY’s Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment Program (DSRIP).200 
The $8 billion were allocated to three focus areas: $6.42 billion to DSRIP; $1.08 billion for Medicaid 
Redesign areas (e.g., health home, long-term care, workforce, and behavioral health); and $500 million to 




DSRIP transformation without disruption). The DSRIP seeks to promote community-level collaborations 
and implement system reform; its primary goal is to achieve a 25 percent reduction in avoidable hospital 
utilization over five years.189 
Under DSRIP, safety net providers are required to collaborate to implement projects focusing on 
system transformation, clinical improvement and population health improvement. Providers receive 
financial incentives based on their performance in relation to the DSRIP’s project milestones. The DSRIP 
guidance integrates hospital and population health focused activities by requiring DSRIP applicants to 
include Prevention Agenda activities in their plans. Other ways that DSRIP initiative aligns with the 
Prevention Agenda are: encourage participation of LHDs in “performing provider systems” networks201; 
include 47 tracking indicators from the Prevention Agenda dashboard for tracking population health 
improvement in DSRIP at the “performing provider systems” networks, county and state levels; and 
review applications and implementation plans from “performing provider systems” networks to assess 
conformity with Prevention Agenda and provide suggestions for improvement.202 
New York’s State Health Innovation Plan. The New York (NY) State Health Innovation Plan 
(SHIP) is the state’s roadmap to achieve the “Triple Aim”.187,188 At its heart, is the advanced primary care 
model that integrates and coordinates patient care with all parts of the healthcare system, including 
behavioral health and community-based providers.203 As is the case with virtually all healthcare delivery 
reform models, the NY SHIP aligns payment and financial incentives (i.e., payment reform) with the 
advanced primary care model (i.e., delivery reform). In 2012, NY was initially awarded a Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) “Model Pre-Testing Assistance Award” to further develop 
and refine its State Health Innovation Plan. In late 2014, the state received $99.9 million in CMMI 
funding (i.e., State Innovation Models Initiative: Model Test Awards Round Two) to implement their 





Social Capital: Potential Mechanism for Influencing Nonprofit Hospital Behavior and Improving 
Population Health 
 In our study, we view two key mechanisms underlying each of our aims. The first mechanism is 
focused on how local health department (LHD) and nonprofit hospital collaboration influences nonprofit 
hospital behavior specific to its allocation of community benefit dollars. The second mechanism focuses 
on how nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration may improve population health outcomes. While these 
mechanisms are not completely separable, it is helpful to build our theoretical framework for each of 
these key mechanisms. In the first case, we conceptualize social capital as the obligations, expectations, 
norms and sanctions that emerge during the collaborative process when jointly conducting a community 
health needs assessment (CHNA), prioritizing health areas to focus on, and developing a community 
health improvement plan (CHIP). In the second case, we conceptualize social capital as the resources 
embedded in the nonprofit hospital-LHD social network which can be mobilized, accessed and used for 
addressing specific health priorities. 
 In the first case, we will primarily use social capital to provide a theoretically-logical explanation 
for why we would expect nonprofit hospitals to allocate more community benefit dollars towards 
population health focused activities when they’re engaged in collaboration with LHDs.  
 In the second case, we build on the first theoretical framework to operationalize indicators of 
social capital that are likely be drivers of improved population health outcomes. We will use social network 
methods to operationalize these indicators. Access to and utilization of these concrete embedded 
resources are still based on many assumptions underlying the first mechanism (i.e., obligations, 
expectations, norms and sanctions). The propensity to share and access these embedded resources rely 




Social Capital Theory and Social Network Methods: Studies in Healthcare and Public Health 
 Over several decades, researchers, policymakers and other public health and healthcare sector 
leaders have placed an increasing emphasis on using ecological models and methods in public health 
research. A 2001 National Institutes of Health (NIH) report laid out an ecological and multilevel national 
research agenda.204 The report’s recommendations called for increased measurement at the “group, 
network, neighborhood, and community levels”. It highlighted the gap that existed in research that relied 
on an ecological approach, but lacked the methods and tools for rigorously examining those research 
questions. In this context, social network analysis emerged as a methodological approach that was 
uniquely aligned with various research agenda items described in the NIH report.204–206  
 Social network analysis (SNA) has a long history dating back to the 18th century, and is the result 
of theoretical and methodological contributions by many disciplines. Sociology, mathematics, 
anthropology and social psychology are among the main contributors to the current state of SNA 
conceptual and methodological approaches.207 A review of the use of SNA in public health research 
described three broad categories: transmission networks, social networks, and organizational 
networks.205 Transmission networks include inquiries into both disease and information transmission. 
Many early studies focused on HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. Social network analysis 
has also been used to understand information transmission and diffusion of innovations.205,207 
 The social networks category is another major area for SNA in public health. In this category, the 
focus is not so much on the transmission of specific tangible elements, but more so on the effect of social 
structure and relationships in promoting and influencing health and health behavior. Researchers have 
examined the influence of social support and social capital on morbidity and mortality and other indicators 




 Finally, the other broad category of SNA is organizational network analysis. In this case, the 
networks are comprised of agencies and organizations rather than individuals. It has been used more 
extensively in business and political science, and only relatively recently in public health studies.205–208  
 The findings of public health research that used SNA methods have been well documented. Here 
we focus on the main findings of studies that used SNA methods to examine the impact of social capital 
on health outcomes.60,74,213–222,150,223,205–207,209–212  
 Many studies that have operationalized social capital to examine its relationship with health and 
well-being, have typically found that greater levels of social capital are associated with better health and 
well-being.224–227 However, it is worth emphasizing that social capital may also have negative effects.208 
Portes identified four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on 
group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms. A recent review of 
the “downside” of social capital, particularly in public health, identified another two main consequences: 
social contagion and cross-level interactions.211 One example of social capital as a facilitator of exclusion 
of outsiders was highlighted in a study of older people in Japan and their mental health status. The study 
found that residents who were not originally from a given community were more likely to be viewed as 
“outsiders” which prevented integration in the closely knit community. This increased their vulnerability 
to depression and poorer mental health status.228 One study sought to replicate previous findings on the 
effects of social capital and harmful alcohol outcomes in the college setting. It found that participation in 
some social activities and organizations were risk factors for harmful drinking outcomes at the individual 
level (i.e., Greek membership and varsity athletic participation). However, participation in community 
service or volunteer work, media organization (e.g., newspaper, radio) and religious group were not 
shown to be risk factors. This represents the behavioral social contagion effect of social capital. Network 




individual health.229 Many other studies illustrating the negative consequences of social capital were 
highlighted in the review mentioned above.211 
 The beneficial effects of social capital have been widely studied. One study found that higher 
levels of social capital as measured by trust, reciprocity and group membership, was associated with lower 
levels of mortality. This association persisted even after controlling for poverty rates and median 
income.225 Another study found that social capital, operationalized as social cohesion and trust, predicted 
lower rates of neighborhood violence. This study adjusted for neighborhood composition, prior history of 
violence and other confounders.226 In general, studies have shown that increased levels of social capital 
had a positive effect or association with physical and emotional health.  
 There is a wide range of ways in which social capital has been operationalized. Civic engagement 
has been widely used, examples include: Presidential voter turnout; number of people who voted in local 
government elections divided by the number of people who were entitled to vote; and community 
participation (e.g., volunteering, parents and teachers association, alumni associations, political campaign 
clubs, local committee participation, and other community associations and organized activity). Other 
examples include: level of trust (e.g., in government, in other people, and generalized trust); 501(c)(3) 
organizations per capita; religious market density; civic and social organizations per capita; and social 
control (i.e., norms, sanctions, obligations, expectations, and reciprocity).43 Finally, some studies have 
employed the concept of “structural holes”.74,75,230 
Social Capital: Potential Mechanism for Influencing Nonprofit Hospital Behavior  
 We found a handful of studies that examined the effect of social capital, hospital accountability 
to the community, and community-wide structure on hospital behavior. The types of hospital behavior 
studied included: hospital investment in community health improvement, improved access to care for 
vulnerable populations, and greater responsiveness to community standards of performance in cost and 




governance, as well as, community involvement in the generation, dissemination and utilization of 
community health information. We view the latter as analogous to activities involved in community health 
needs assessment (CHNA) and development of community health improvement plans (CHIP). Community-
wide structure reflects the community’s capacity to mobilize and organize coordinated efforts to promote 
hospital accountability.209,210,231 These concepts are interrelated, that is, it could be that communities with 
a larger stock of social capital may be more effective in coordinating efforts to increase hospital 
accountability for community health, or to advocate for provision of certain unprofitable services.  
 One study operationalized social capital as county-level measures of community participation and 
voting participation. Community participation was based on: number of club meetings attended in the 
last year, number of community projects worked on last year, and number of times participated in 
volunteer work in the last year. Voting participation was measured as the proportion of adults in each 
county who voted in the 1996 November general election. To examine the contingent effects of social 
capital on hospitals’ community accountability, the authors categorized hospitals by ownership type (i.e., 
nonprofit and for-profit), community representation on hospital governance board (percentage of board 
members from local community agencies and groups), and system affiliation status. Finally, the 
dependent variables were community accountability and provision of community-oriented services. The 
first one reflected a hospital’s organizational investment in generating, disseminating and using 
community input to address the health needs of the communities they served (i.e., CHNA and CHIP-like 
activities). The second one was measured based on the hospitals’ provision of 17 community-oriented 
services. The authors found no association between the two social capital indicators and community 
accountability in hospitals. They found that provision of community-oriented services was negatively 
associated with community participation and unrelated with voting participation. The authors found that 
the interaction of voting participation and community representation on hospital governance had a 




context of these findings, the authors highlight the importance of an active political culture in influencing 
hospital behavior, and suggest that community representation on hospital governance might be only 
symbolic in the absence of such active political culture. In other words, the politically active community 
members may influence the behavior or enhance the role of community representatives in the hospitals’ 
boards such that they better serve the health needs of the community.210 
 Another study examined the association of social capital with access to healthcare services. This 
study was focused on metropolitan statistical areas, and found that individuals living in metropolitan 
statistical areas with higher levels of social capital reported fewer problems accessing health care.209 Social 
capital was operationalized as a composite measure of six individual elements related to interpersonal 
trust, reciprocity sentiments, sense of personal efficacy and safety, voting behavior and civic engagement. 
Safety, for example, included statistics on crime reported to the police. Civic engagement was based on 
the level of activity of fraternal orders which was based on their number and membership size. The 
authors used the annual per capita contributions to the United Way as a proxy for reciprocity. The authors 
speculate that communities with higher levels of social capital may be more effective in improving 
mechanisms for community accountability which in turn facilitates better access to care.209 
 In yet another study, the authors examined the ability of various community actors to coordinate 
efforts to promote hospital accountability.231 Community actors may include local health departments, 
unions, businesses, coalitions of consumers, purchasers and public entities. The study found that 
communities that were more effective in coordinating such efforts were successful in influencing 
individual hospital behavior which translated into better access to care for vulnerable populations and 
greater accountability to standards of performance in cost and quality.231 These findings were based on a 
qualitative study of 12 randomly selected markets that were being monitored as part of the Community 
Tracking Study (Center for Studying Health System Change, sponsored by the Robert Wood Johnson 




motivating community actors to coordinate efforts to influence hospital decision-making, as well as 
central to the effectiveness of their efforts.231 Community accountability is defined as “the structures and 
processes communities use to make health system change consistent with local standards of behavior, 
shared values, or common goals.”231 Some factors associated with the extent of shared community values 
and accountability mechanisms included: a source of strong health leadership around health issues within 
either the public or the private sector, interdependencies between health and other sectors, among 
others. On the other hand, factors associated with less accountability and shared values included: state 
rather than local control over public health, geographic dispersion, racial or cultural divisiveness, large 
economic disparities, and a commuter culture.  
 The authors explored the role of hospital accountability in regards to protecting access to care. 
They gave an example of a local health department (LHD) that had traditionally played a central role in 
assessing health and health system problems and then convened the appropriate stakeholders to 
formulate solutions. This LHD sponsored a study on the distribution of the uncompensated care burden 
among area hospitals, which suggested that one hospital was not providing its fair share. This sparked a 
debate surrounding the hospital’s potential deal with a for-profit entity, and solutions were formulated. 
The authors also found that implicit norms and informal networks of decision-makers in specific areas 
seemed to govern behavior. While this study does not explicitly use a social capital theoretical framework, 
we believe that the emphasis on norms and community values are characteristics of social networks that 
have been conceptualized to be forms of social capital. This form of social capital is articulated in a 
groundbreaking paper by Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, which identified 
three forms of social capital: obligations and expectations, norms accompanied by sanctions, and 
information flow capability of the social structures.43 
 Finally, one study was primarily interested in examining the difference between free-standing 




categorized three main ways in which hospitals exercise community accountability: the presence and 
structure of a community-based hospital board (i.e., hospital governance); the existence of initiatives for 
monitoring and reporting information about community health and hospital performance (i.e., CHNA and 
CHIP-like activities); and collaboration with other local agencies to enhance community benefits. 
Traditionally, hospital governance has been the principal approach through which the community informs 
the hospital of local health needs and holds them accountable for meeting them. The interest in these 
questions was based on the expectation that system-affiliated hospitals would lose their connection to 
their local communities and this would negatively impact the traditional community accountability of 
hospitals. 
 The authors found that freestanding hospitals and system-affiliated hospitals differed significantly 
and systematically in how they expressed community accountability (i.e., the three categories mentioned 
above). Freestanding hospitals demonstrated community accountability through the more traditional 
hospital governance structure and composition. System-affiliated hospitals chose to have their boards 
monitor and gather information, and collaborate with other agencies in identifying and responding to 
community health needs. These system-affiliated hospitals showed a relative lack of the traditional 
community accountability (i.e., community representation in hospital governance); however, they still 
engaged in activities that reinforced their ties to the communities they served. This is a clear example that 
there are various ways in which hospitals and health systems can meet their legal, social, and institutional 
obligations to serve the broad interests of the communities they serve. These findings also challenged the 
belief that system-affiliated hospitals would demonstrate less community accountability than their 
freestanding counterparts.232 
 The authors speculate the possible reasons underlying the adoption of different approaches. They 
speculate that healthcare systems may consider the traditional forms of governance to be cumbersome 




time may also be larger. However, healthcare systems may still want to keep their hospitals connected 
with their local communities to remain competitive in those local markets and to assume risk under 
managed care. This may be the reason why they tend to move away from the traditional use of hospital 
governance for community accountability but still engage in other activities to demonstrate their 
accountability to the community. Another explanation considered the emphasis by healthcare systems on 
using data systems and information exchange because of their potential for more effectively and 
efficiently coordinating and controlling the different elements of the system.232 
 On the other hand, freestanding hospitals may be subject to strong and deeply embedded 
community values that favor local control and volunteerism. In response to the strong normative force 
exerted by these institutionalized values, hospitals seeking legitimacy adopt the more traditional 
governance structures. An important question comes up in this context: Is this traditional approach to 
community accountability through hospital governance only symbolic? Does it have any real effect in 
terms of reflecting the interests of the community and aligning hospital behavior and decision with those 
interests? Another question posed by the authors is: “Are community health monitoring, evaluation, and 
reporting enough, or does community health improvement occur only when hospitals also collaborate 
with other community organizations to identify healthcare needs and coordinate care?”232 
Summary of Literature Review 
 We have provided a thorough review of the main concepts on which our study sits and identified 
the gaps in the literature that our study seeks to contribute to. In fact, our review identified other gaps 
that can help inform the direction of research in this area of nonprofit hospital and local health 
department (LHD) collaboration. The key concepts of our study are: 1) collaboration between healthcare 
and public health sectors holds the potential to improve population health outcomes; 2) the closer 
relationship developed when LHD and nonprofit hospital collaborate in community health needs 




they allocate community benefit dollars; 3) social capital, as other types of capital (i.e., financial, physical, 
human), is productive, and is particularly important in understanding how collaboration works; 4) LHDs 
and nonprofit hospitals are among the largest producers of health within the jurisdictions they serve; and 
5) Federal and State regulatory action influences institutional behavior and their alignment is particularly 
powerful in accelerating nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration. 
 The New York Prevention Agenda presents us with a unique opportunity to examine policy-
relevant questions about nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration on community health needs assessment 
and community health improvement plan. The deliberate alignment of Federal and State regulation and 
statewide health improvement programs is a key component of our study. In the absence of such an 
alignment, and based on the historically low levels of collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals, 
we would expect the chronic low levels of collaboration to be perpetuated. We hope that our study will 
contribute knowledge, through rigorously-produced evidence, to a decades-long expectation that 
















III. NONPROFIT HOSPITAL INVESTMENT IN POPULATION HEALTH: LEVERAGING FEDERAL COMMUNITY 
BENEFIT REGULATION LOCALLY TO ENCOURAGE ALIGNMENT BETWEEN NONPROFIT HOSPITALS AND 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 
Abstract 
Objective  
New York requires collaboration between nonprofit hospitals (NFP) and local health departments (LHD) 
on local health planning. The purpose of this study was to estimate the incremental impact of the policy 
on NFP and LHD collaboration and on population health spending by nonprofit hospitals. 
Data Sources 
Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the New York Prevention Agenda. 
Data included the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income, American Hospital Association (AHA) 
Annual Survey, and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS). 
Study Design 
Difference-in-differences design using state fixed effects. 
Data Collection Methods 
IRS microdata was merged with data from the CMS healthcare cost report information system and AHA 
using Medicare provider identification number. Census county-level data were merged using Federal 
Information Processing Standard county codes. 
Principal Findings 
We found that a requirement for collaboration between NFPs and LHDs on local health planning was 
associated with an incremental increase in population health spending of approximately $260,000 per 






Our findings suggest that state policies that leverage the Federal requirement for NFPs to conduct a 
triennial community health assessment and implementation strategy by requiring NFPs to collaborate 
with LHDs in local health planning has the potential to increase NFP spending on population health. 
Introduction    
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is anchored on the Triple Aim to improve 
population health, enhance patient and provider experience, and reduce costs.58,59 The ACA seeks to move 
the healthcare system beyond the provision of individual acute care to embrace population-level primary 
prevention and social determinants of health. Collaboration between the clinical healthcare and public 
health sectors is embedded in several provisions of the ACA.25 Of particular relevance to our research is 
Section 9007, which further defines the role of nonprofit hospitals in improving population health through 
the requirements of a triennial community health needs assessment and implementation strategy, as well 
as clarification of financial assistance policies. Noteworthy is the inclusion of these requirements under 
“Revenue Provisions” in the ACA, which highlights the role that nonprofit hospitals are expected to play 
in funding some of the ACA’s triple aim initiatives. Section 9007 falls under the umbrella of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) community benefit requirement, which all nonprofit hospitals must provide in order 
to keep their tax-exempt status80. This tax exemption was valued at $24 billion in 2011.121 
The decreased demand for hospital-based charity care due to ACA insurance expansions was 
expected to lead hospitals to reallocate the freed up dollars to other areas of community benefit.101 Thus 
far, this has not been the case, and policymakers are still faced with the question of how to increase 
nonprofit hospital community accountability and investment on community health.101,120,233 One challenge 
is the fact that sanctions on hospitals failing to meet community benefit standards are weak and poorly 
reinforced.117 For instance, the ACA imposes an excise tax of $50,000 on hospitals that fail to meet Section 




cases in 2017 in which the IRS revoked a hospital’s tax-exempt status.178,179 One of the cases involved a 
hospital that entered in a joint venture with a for-profit entity, and the other involved a hospital that failed 
to conduct a community health needs assessment and adopt an implementation strategy. The latter 
hospital had dual status (i.e., governmental hospital that also held Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status) 
and it seems that the decision not to conduct the health assessment was deliberate.  It remains to be seen 
whether these are isolated cases, or whether the IRS is ramping up its enforcement of hospital compliance 
with Section 9007. Another potential reason for the lack of a higher level of community engagement and 
investment by nonprofit hospitals may be that boards of directors prioritize activities that ensure their 
financial viability, especially in highly competitive markets.117 Keeping hospitals open provides an 
undeniable social benefit; however, nonprofit hospitals are still required by law to invest in the health of 
their communities to justify their tax exemption.234,235  
It was generally expected that nonprofit hospitals would respond to Section 9007 by working with 
public health representatives to develop the health assessment and implement initiatives to address 
community needs.120 Hospitals and local health departments (LHD) are amongst the largest institutions 
dedicated to local public health, and a partnership between them is believed to lead to desirable 
outcomes.117 Collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs in conducting health assessments can 
avoid wasteful duplication of efforts and resources. More importantly, collaboration holds the potential 
for more efficient and effective allocation of resources, and perhaps greater motivation for nonprofit 
hospitals to financially invest in population health. There is evidence of some increase in collaboration 
between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs in recent years.113 However, there is still much unrealized potential 
as many jurisdictions across the United States have yet to witness engagement in this type of 
collaboration.  
A few states and counties have leveraged Section 9007 to encourage alignment between 




needs assessment with that of LHDs. Currently, only 10 states require their LHDs to conduct a health 
assessment; however, several LHDs outside of these 10 states have voluntarily conducted health 
assessments for several years.27 New York is the only state that has required nonprofit hospital and local 
health department collaboration on community health assessment, planning, and implementation. The 
NY Prevention Agenda was first implemented in 2008, but it was not until Section 9007 became a 
requirement in 2012 that the NY Prevention Agenda was able to effectively require hospitals and LHDs to 
jointly select and focus on two health priorities at the local level. In 2012, North Carolina amended its 
health assessment requirement for LHDs to align the timing of the assessments with that of nonprofit 
hospitals.94 The primary goal was to remove barriers for collaboration between the two institutions. While 
the NC policy change promotes collaboration between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals on local health 
assessments, it differs from the NY Prevention Agenda in that collaboration is not required. 
Leveraging the implementation of Section 9007, we examined whether the NY Prevention 
Agenda, through its requirement for nonprofit hospital and local health department collaboration, 
enhanced nonprofit hospital investment on population health after the implementation of Section 9007. 
We estimated a difference-in-differences specification, which compared the change in community benefit 
spending pre and post Section 9007 in NY to the changes in control states. We tested the hypothesis that 
the NY Prevention Agenda, through its requirement for nonprofit hospital and local health department 
collaboration on local health planning, would lead to larger investments on population health by nonprofit 
hospitals in NY relative to the investments by nonprofit hospitals in control states. Additionally, we 
examined whether collaboration needs to be an explicit requirement for changes in nonprofit hospital 
population health investment to occur by examining the NC policy change as another treatment state in 
our study. 
The main mechanism for this hypothesized outcome is the increase in hospital community 




between LHDs and peer hospitals that fall within the same jurisdiction. Through the collaborative process 
in local health planning, a set of expectations, obligations, norms, and sanctions emerge either formally 
or informally, that together act powerfully to influence the behavior of both institutions. We posit that 
this nonprofit hospital-LHD collaborative functions as an extra-hospital, community-based governance 
structure which may be less susceptible to the symbolic qualities associated with traditional hospital 
governance (i.e., board of directors) specific to community accountability.209,210,231,232 The joint health 
planning provides a more formalized approach to assess community health and develop strategies to 
address locally identified issues. Very importantly, it creates a platform for mutual monitoring by both 
nonprofit hospitals and LHDs. This more direct and tractable form of hospital community accountability 
can translate into larger investments in population health that are both more targeted and more effective. 
Further, it fills the gap created by the weak sanctions discussed above.  
Methods 
We tested our hypothesis using a difference-in-differences specification. Our model included a 
dichotomous NY treatment variable that equaled 1 if the hospital was in NY and 0 otherwise. We included 
a dichotomous NC treatment variable that was operationalized using the same approach. A “post” 
variable was defined to equal 1 for years 2013-2015 and 0 for years 2009-2011. The year 2012 was a 
“washout” period. The coefficient on the interaction between the NY treatment and post variable (i.e., 
NY*Post) is the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of the NY Prevention Agenda on the 
outcome. This coefficient measures the incremental change in community benefit spending by hospitals 
in NY relative to change in spending by hospitals in the control states.236 We used an analogous 
specification to estimate the impact of the NC policy. 
We also included state and year fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 




variable in the model because it would be collinear with the year fixed effects. We computed robust 
standard errors that were clustered by hospital.237  
We performed the Hausman test to determine which specification to use (i.e., state fixed or 
random effects). Under the null hypothesis, the random effects specification is preferred because it is 
both consistent and more efficient; while under the alternative hypothesis, the random effects 
specification is inconsistent (i.e., biased). Also, under the null hypothesis, the fixed effects model is 
consistent but less efficient.238 Based on the Hausman test, the fixed effects specification is consistent for 
all study outcomes, while the random effects specification is inconsistent for one of the outcomes (i.e., 
population health spending). Therefore, our main specification includes state fixed effects. 
The difference-in-differences results have a causal interpretation only when several key 
conditions are met. One of them is that pre-treatment linear trends between treatment and control 
groups must be parallel.236 If the trends were not parallel then the control group would not be an accurate 
representation of counterfactual spending, absent the laws. We tested for pre-period parallel trends by 
limiting the sample to the pre-period, 2009 to 2011, and tested the significance of the interaction between 
a trend variable and the NY and NC treatment variables, respectively. A significant p-value indicates that 
we reject the null hypothesis that the pre-treatment trends are parallel. 
Another condition for a causal interpretation is that hospitals were exposed to “common shocks”; 
that is, any time-varying shocks that affect hospitals in NY and NC also affect hospitals in the control 
group.236 Unfortunately, this is not empirically testable. However, we attempted to control for all relevant 
time-varying differences including state and hospital market confounders in the treatment and control 
states to minimize potential violations of this assumption. For example, we controlled for the timing of 
Medicaid expansion because we would expect hospitals in expansion states to be better financially 
positioned to make larger community benefit investments.239,240 We also controlled for participation in 




influence hospital population health spending.241 Median personal income, unemployment and 
uninsurance rates help control for differences in the local economy, defined as the county in which a 
hospital is located. Another consideration for a causal interpretation is whether there were spillovers of 
the treatment to the control states. We do not expect this to be the case given that our control group 
consists of hospitals in states with time-invariant state laws. We expect a minimal spillover effect on 
hospitals located in control states that border NY and NC. 
Conditional on the covariates, hospitals in the control group should be similar to hospitals in the 
treatment group in order to provide an estimate of what would have occurred if the NY Prevention 
Agenda, or the NC policy, had not been implemented.236 We provide the descriptive statistics for NY, NC, 
and control hospitals over the entire study period, and the mean for all covariates in the pre and post 
periods. We tested the significance of the changes in the covariates and the difference between the 
changes in control states versus NY and NC, respectively. 
Finally, we calculated the incremental spending in dollars by adjusting for state-level 
heteroskedastic smearing to convert the parameter estimates from the logged variable specification.242,243 
The standard errors of the smearing-transformed estimates were calculated using a bootstrap with 
hospital clustering and 500 repetitions.244 To obtain the spending in dollars we calculated the mean 
operating expenses for hospitals in NY and NC over the study period separately, and then multiplied the 
smearing-transformed estimates by the mean operating expenses.  
We performed sensitivity analyses by estimating alternative specifications that included: (a) state 
random effects; (b) rural and urban subsamples; (c) balanced sample; (d) subsample limited to states that 
require LHDs to conduct a community health assessment; (e) subsample limited to states that expanded 
Medicaid; (f) the washout period; (g) Maryland hospitals; (h) hospitals that were part of a system that 
submitted a consolidated Form 990 and Schedule H; and (i) state-year specific trends. We describe and 




As an additional robustness check we implemented permutation tests (or randomization tests) 
that compared our study’s main treatment effect to the null distribution of the treatment effect (i.e., 
distribution of treatment effect under the null hypothesis of no effect).245–248 Specifically, we limited the 
study sample to the control group and drew a random “treatment” group equivalent to the number of 
treatment units in the main specification (i.e., 126 nonprofit hospitals in NY and 28 nonprofit hospitals in 
NC). We obtained the “placebo” effect for the randomly drawn treatment group by re-estimating the main 
specification. We repeated this 2,000 times to obtain the null distribution of the treatment effect. In this 
case, the p-value of the main treatment estimates is calculated as the proportion of estimates from the 
null distribution that are larger in absolute value than the estimate obtained from our study’s main 
specification.246 This is a more conservative approach to inference and may be especially important in 
cases like our study in which the treatment units are geographically clustered to two states (i.e., NY and 
NC), and the treatment groups have considerably less observations than the control group.244,246,249–253  
All analyses were conducted using Stata, version 14.2. This study was deemed exempt from 
review by an Inter-Institutional Review Board. 
Data  
Sample Definition 
The primary data source was the IRS Statistics of Income database, Form 990 and Schedule H, 
which nonprofit hospitals must file in order to keep their tax-exempt status. Schedule H includes data on 
community benefit spending, while its parent Form 990 provides hospital financial information. On 
Schedule H, hospitals report net community benefit expenditures (cost minus offsetting revenues) for 
nine distinct categories which are described in the appendix. We also included variables collected from 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Healthcare Cost Report Information System, American 




Our study period was 2009-2015. Our specifications exclude a 2012 “washout” period (2,606 
hospital-years), when Section 9007 of the ACA was implemented, to allow for adjustment to the new 
requirement. Figure 1 displays the consort diagram related to the construction of our analytic sample. We 
limited the analysis to private, short-term, general nonprofit hospitals from which we excluded: (a) 
nonprofit hospitals that were part of a system that submitted a consolidated Form 990 and Schedule H at 
any point during the study period (3,887 hospital-years); (b) critical access hospitals (3,851 hospital years); 
and (c) Maryland hospitals (221 hospital-years). We excluded consolidated reporters because hospital 
facility-level spending was not reported in the IRS Statistics of Income database. We excluded critical 
access hospitals because these small rural hospitals face very different market circumstances and 
Medicare reimbursement which make them fundamentally different than the general hospitals in our 
study.254 Finally, we excluded Maryland hospitals because Maryland’s hospital market is unique due to 
the decades-old all-payer rate-setting system for hospital services.255 Additionally, in 2014, Maryland 
started implementation of its all-payer model which effectively places hospitals on a global budget.255 We 
expected hospitals in Maryland to have prioritized their efforts towards the transition to global budgets 
and to respond differently to community benefit regulations during our study period.256.   
There were 756 hospital-years in the NY study group from 2009-2015, excluding the washout year, 
which reflects an average of 126 hospitals per year. In the NC study group, there were 167 hospital-years 
during the same period, or an average of 28 hospitals per year. Finally, there were of 6,528 hospital-years 
in the control group during the study period, which reflects an average of 1,088 hospitals per year. Our 
study population was unbalanced because some hospitals may have merged, closed, opened, or did not 
report to the IRS during the study period. We re-estimated all specifications using the subset of hospitals 
for which we had data for every year during the study period. The balanced sample included 996 hospitals, 






The control group included hospitals in 47 states and the District of Columbia. Many states have 
implemented their own community benefit laws designed to influence nonprofit hospital community 
benefit spending.257 Generally, these state laws sought to improve accountability and transparency, and 
in some cases, set a minimum community benefit spending threshold.257 These state laws were in place 
prior to our sample period and there were no new laws in control states, apart from the nationwide 
implementation of Section 9007. The state-level efforts prior to 2009 were focused on increased 
accountability and transparency which were essentially the same as the 2009 Federal requirement for 
filing Form 990 Schedule H. Specifically, Schedule H initially became a requirement in 2009, which 
established a uniform reporting requirement for all nonprofit hospitals.233  
Outcomes 
The primary study outcomes were spending on population health and total community benefits. 
Population health spending was operationalized by combining the following categories from Schedule H: 
community health improvement, cash and in-kind contributions, and community building activities.101,172 
Total community benefit spending includes all categories from Schedule H.172 Secondary outcomes were: 
charity care (i.e., financial assistance at cost); shortfalls from Medicaid and other means-tested 
government programs; subsidized health services; and research and professions 
We divided each outcome by the hospital’s total operating expenses. Finally, we logged the 
outcome to account for the right skewed distribution of community benefit spending. The skewness of 
hospital community benefit spending levels has been well documented in the literature.101,258 We added 
0.01 before taking the log of each community benefit spending category to accommodate for hospitals 







Our specifications control for state, market, and hospital characteristics. State-level covariates 
included participation in State Innovation Models and Medicaid expansion status. Market characteristics 
included: median personal income, unemployment, and uninsurance rates from the US Census Bureau, 
and Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) computed based on discharges. Hospital characteristics included: 
rurality, major teaching status, sole community provider status, beds, disproportionate share status, 
contract managed status, system membership, and lagged total margin. More details on each covariate is 
reported in the appendix.  
Total margin was calculated as total net income (i.e., total net revenue minus total expenses) 
divided by total net revenue. We lagged this measure because community benefit spending lowers 
concurrent margins and thus concurrent margins suffer from reverse causality (i.e., endogeneity). 
Information from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation 
was used to define Medicaid expansion status and State Innovation Model participation, respectively.  
Results   
As reported in Table 1, the changes over time in most hospital and market characteristics were 
similar in NY and the control group. New York tended to have more hospitals with disproportionate share 
status (DSH), system-affiliated hospitals, and lower total margin. New York also had a higher rate of 
unemployment and a lower rate of uninsurance.  
In contrast, most of the NC hospital and market characteristics significantly differed from control 
states. The only characteristics that did not differ significantly were: large and medium hospital size, 
disproportionate share status, and uninsurance rate.  
We believe the increase in the number of hospitals with disproportionate share status in NY, NC, 
and control states is in part due to Medicaid expansion and the resulting increase in Medicaid days. In the 




has been well documented in the literature.82 Under the woodwork effect, people who were eligible for 
Medicaid prior to the ACA came out of the “woodworks” to apply for benefits due to the increased 
marketing and outreach efforts. 
The results of the difference-in-differences specification reveal that the NY Prevention Agenda 
was associated with an incremental increase in population health spending (0.057; CI: 0.003 to 0.111; 
p=0.04) (Table 2). The results from the permutation tests also support the main specification with an 
improvement in the p-value (p=0.02). The specification with hospital fixed effects was in the same positive 
direction but was of lower magnitude and became insignificant. The permutation test using this 
specification resulted in a lower p-value (0.14 compared to 0.45). All specifications for population health 
spending satisfied tests for pre-treatment parallel trends.  
There was also an incremental increase in total community benefit spending (0.235; CI: 0.148 to 
0.323; p<0.01) in NY relative to the control group. The results from the permutation tests also support the 
main specification for this outcome. The results for total community benefit spending were robust to all 
specifications. The specification for total community benefit spending using state fixed effects only 
marginally satisfied tests for pre-treatment parallel trends, while the one using hospital fixed effects did 
not. We found no evidence that the NC policy was associated with an incremental increase in population 
health spending (-0.031; CI:  p=0.62) or total community benefit spending (-0.048; CI:  p=0.58). All 
specifications satisfied tests for pre-treatment parallel trends between NC and the control group. 
The coefficients on the covariates related to hospital characteristics are consistent with the 
existing literature.101,258 For instance, rurality, system membership, and smaller hospital size are 
associated with lower total community benefit spending. On the other hand, teaching hospitals spend 
more on community benefits. The covariates on local market characteristics are also in line with current 
literature.101 The higher the unemployment and uninsurance rates, the higher the spending on total 




The coefficient on total margin suggests that hospitals that have larger margins in the preceding 
year spend more on community benefit. Using the non-lagged measure of total margin did not 
substantially change the results reported above (results not reported here, but available upon request). 
To minimize issues with endogeneity, we estimated a model that included a different operationalization 
of total margin. We interacted the total margin from 2009 with a dummy variable for each year from 2009 
to 2015. Using this version of total margin did not substantially change the results for the primary 
outcomes (Appendix Table J). 
The incremental change in population health spending by NY hospitals was $260,000 dollars or 
approximately 0.07% of mean operating expenses (Table 3). The mean operating expenses for hospitals 
in NY was approximately $371 million. The proportion of spending reported above is for the incremental 
spending, not total spending. The incremental total community benefit spending by NY hospitals was $4.8 
million dollars or approximately 1.3% of mean operating expenses. 
These findings were robust to all sensitivity analyses except for the more conservative 
specification that controls for state-year trends. All results for the sensitivity analyses are reported in 
Appendix Tables A-I. 
The findings were similar for secondary outcomes. Hospitals in NY spent more on charity care, 
government program shortfalls, subsidized health services, and research and professions compared to 
hospitals in control states. Hospitals in NC spent more on charity care, less on government program 
shortfalls, subsidized health services, and research and professions compared to hospitals in control 
states. All findings can be found in the online appendix. 
Discussion  
Our findings show that the NY Prevention Agenda was associated with significant incremental 
increases in population health and total community benefit spending by nonprofit hospitals. The NY 




collaborate on: community health assessment, community health improvement plan, and joint selection 
of two health priorities. By doing so, the NY State Department of Health aligned Federal and State health 
policy in an explicit way.   
One potential explanation for the relationship between the NY Prevention Agenda and larger 
community benefit spending by nonprofit hospitals is that the law led to increased hospital community 
accountability and transparency. The closer relationship between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs may have 
made nonprofit hospitals more accountable for their spending decisions. In the current regulatory 
environment of weak Federal sanctions related to community benefit, the NY state provision led to more 
direct accountability of nonprofit hospitals to LHDs. The potential for social sanction, even when subtle, 
may exert a powerful influence on how nonprofit hospitals decide to allocate their community benefit 
dollars. Furthermore, an environment that deliberately increases transparency makes it easier for 
nonprofit hospitals to know how much their neighboring peers are investing on community benefits which 
may, in turn, influence their own spending behavior. For example, a prior study found that hospital 
executives reported being embarrassed when comparing their community benefit expenditures with peer 
institutions, which prompted them to make adjustments.259 We posit that this nonprofit hospital-LHD 
collaborative functions as an extra-hospital, community-based governance structure which may be more 
effective in holding nonprofit hospitals accountable to their communities than traditional hospital 
governance. 
Another benefit of sustained collaborative health planning by both institutions is that it brings the 
issue of population health to the forefront coupled with a higher level of accountability. Commitments 
are made by each institution when they jointly select local health priorities, and progress is mutually 
monitored. This may be especially important for nonprofit hospitals with missions that do not have an a 
priori emphasis on community health.117 For those nonprofit hospitals, a policy such as the NY Prevention 




Finally, some experts in the field have posited that nonprofit hospitals lack the infrastructure and 
competencies for engaging in community health initiatives which hinders their ability to fulfill the 
expectations set forth by community benefit requirements, especially Section 9007.101 The NY Prevention 
Agenda addresses that gap by requiring nonprofit hospitals to work with LHDs which have complementary 
expertise to address community health. The increased effectiveness of community benefit spending that 
results from more appropriate coordination of institutional expertise may increase the return on 
community benefit investment. This may induce nonprofit hospitals to devote more resources to 
community health. 
A recent study found that many nonprofit hospitals have made limited progress in achieving key 
objectives of Section 9007 community health needs assessment.120 One key objective is to develop 
stronger collaborations with community stakeholders such as local public health departments. It seems 
that nonprofit hospitals are not naturally inclined to collaborate with LHDs, in many cases simply because 
it’s not the norm in their institutional environment and due to competing priorities. Therefore, a policy 
that requires this type of collaboration, such as the NY Prevention Agenda, may be necessary to move 
things along faster.117 This is further supported by the findings observed for NC’s policy. We found no 
evidence that this policy change was associated with larger population health spending. North Carolina’s 
intent was to promote collaboration between the two institutions by removing some barriers. However, 
it may be necessary to explicitly require collaboration, as is the case in NY. 
Limitations 
Our study had several limitations. First, we relied on hospitals’ community benefit reporting which 
may be subject to error. There may be heterogeneity in what activities are reported in specific Schedule 
H categories. This form of measurement error may lead to bias. If differences are random the estimates 
would be subject to attenuation bias and thereby conservative. However, if it was related to specific state 




is also susceptible to inconsistencies, given that charges for specific services have been shown to vary 
substantially between hospitals. Third, the common shock assumption is not testable and although we 
have strived to include all relevant confounders there is no way to test whether this is the case. Fourth, 
the main policy of interest was implemented in NY which may limit the generalizability of our results. For 
example, NY does not allow for-profit hospitals to operate in the state, which may influence the nature of 
hospital competition in local markets. Fifth, we’d like to point out that the pre-treatment trends between 
NY and control states for total community benefit spending were not parallel. Upon closer examination 
of the trend variables included in the model, we speculate that the findings reported for this outcome 
may have been an over estimate because the sign on the coefficients was positive. Interestingly, when we 
stratified the study sample into rural and urban areas, we found that all pre-treatment trends were 
parallel. 
Finally, the decision to implement the NY Prevention Agenda was not random and we cannot 
definitively assert causality. However, our models control for a rich set of confounding factors, and the 
testable assumptions for causal inference were satisfied. Despite these limitations, our results highlight 
the ability of the NY Prevention Agenda to influence nonprofit hospital investment on population health 
through a requirement for nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration on local health planning. 
Conclusion 
Our findings support the hypothesis that the NY Prevention Agenda, with its requirement for 
nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration and joint local health planning, is associated with larger 
population health spending. This finding is further supported by the non-significant findings in NC; that is, 
while NC aligned the cycles of LHD and nonprofit hospital health assessments to encourage collaboration, 
it did not require such collaboration. 
There have been many Federal, State, and Local regulations passed to increase nonprofit hospital 




effects, and when taken together, they have only minimally moved the needle on community benefit 
spending.80,101,260,261 Another challenge has been the wide variation in community benefit spending across 
the US, which can leave some nonprofit hospitals that make large investments on community health at a 
competitive disadvantage compared to their low-spending counterparts.80,258 In the current public policy 
environment of political stalemate at the higher levels of government, State policies may be the main 
avenue for continued policy changes. The NY Prevention Agenda is one example of how a state can 
leverage and continue the efforts of larger Federal policies with the goal of reaching the “parent” policy’s 
goals.  
At the Federal government level, adjustments could be made to the language in Schedule H form 
and instructions. It could require nonprofit hospitals to conduct a community health needs assessment 
jointly with their LHD, instead of the more ambiguous language included in the form’s instructions.    
It has been a decades-long regulatory effort to positively influence nonprofit hospitals’ 
community accountability and investment on community health. The Federal tax exemption is large; 
however, exemptions from State (e.g., corporate income tax and sales tax) and Local (e.g., property taxes) 
taxes are possibly just as large. State and local governments have considerable power to shape policies 



















Table 1. Summary statistics for study groups, by treatment status and period 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with state clustering. These statistics include observations from all years from 2009 to 2015 but excludes washout 
period (2012). + Change over time in NY and NC versus change in control states, respectively. ++ The formula for DSH takes into 
account: Medicaid and Medicare days, and supplemental security income. +++ Unadjusted mean spending as proportion of total 




Table 2. Difference-in-Differences: Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to Control States 
 
 
Total Population Health 
Spending  












0.057** 0.020 0.235*** 0.264*** 
(0.003 to 0.111) (-0.032 to 0.072) (0.148 to 0.323) (0.182 to 0.345) 
NC*Post 
-0.031 0.051 -0.048 0.009 
(-0.155 to 0.093) (-0.076 to 0.178) (-0.218 to 0.122) (-0.159 to 0.177) 
Hospital Characteristics 
  Rural 0.001 -0.050*** -0.079** 0.180*** 
  Teaching 0.037 0.006 0.320*** 0.056 
  Sole Community Provider -0.015 0.022 -0.005 0.027 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)++ -0.011 0.015 -0.014 -0.010 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.105*** -0.005 -0.037 0.044 
  Disproportionate Share Status -0.025 -0.012 0.010 0.011 
  Contract Managed -0.102*** -0.047 -0.002 -0.042 
  System membership -0.030* -0.032* -0.085*** -0.054* 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.126*** 0.022 0.044 0.005 
Local Market Characteristics 
  Median income 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.002 
  Unemployment rate -1.148** -0.077 0.702 1.347* 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.025 -0.304 -0.003 -0.827** 
  Uninsurance rate -0.430 -0.005 1.608*** 0.762* 
State-Level Characteristics  
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.047*** -0.037** -0.001 -0.023 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 0.018 -0.00005 -0.053 -0.056 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.010 -0.014 -0.009 -0.018 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.012 -0.009 -0.131*** -0.138*** 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.018 -0.021 -0.085** -0.059* 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.007 0.003 0.018 -0.003 
  SIM: Round 2 Test -0.004 -0.013 0.050 0.034 
Constant -4.153*** -4.175*** -3.334*** -2.801*** 
Test of pre-treatment linear trends+++ 
(NY Vs Control) p=0.445 p=0.846 p=0.051 p=0.01 
(NC Vs Control) p=0.312 p=0.192 p=0.100 p=0.10 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. Sample size: New York, n=126 hospitals per year; North Carolina, n=28 hospitals per year; and 
Control, n=1,083 hospitals per year. The washout period is 2012. + This is the study's main specification. ++ Reference category for 
hospital size is (>=281 beds or 75th percentile). +++ A non-significant p-value means that the pre-treatment linear trends were 














Incremental Spending in 
Dollars (in thousands)           




Population Health  0.057 0.0007* $260  
Total Community Benefit 0.235 0.013** $4,823 
North Carolina 
Population Health  -0.031 -0.0004 -$110 
Total Community Benefit -0.048 -0.002 -$552 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: + Adjusted for state-
level heteroskedastic smearing. ++ To calculate the incremental spending in dollars, the following steps were taken: a) we 
calculated the mean operating expenses for hospitals in NY ($371 million) and NC ($276 million) separately over the sample 
period; b) we multiplied the smearing-transformed estimate (i.e., ratio: spending in dollars ÷ operating expenses) by the mean 
operating expenses calculated in step a. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors were calculated using a bootstrap 



















IV. HOSPITAL COLLABORATION WITH LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS ON COMMUNITY HEALTH 
IMPROVEMENT ACTIVITIES: IS THE WHOLE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS? 
Abstract 
Nonprofit hospitals are required by the IRS to document the benefits that they provide to the 
community in order to justify their nonprofit tax exemption. A small but growing category of hospital 
community benefit spending is community health improvement activities.  In this paper, we test whether 
a New York State policy that requires collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and local health 
departments leads to larger reductions in drug-induced mortality than a control group of hospitals that 
are not required to collaborate with local health departments.  We estimated a difference-in-differences 
model using hospital and county data collected before and after hospitals targeted drug use in their 
community health improvement implementation strategy in 2013. We find that New York’s requirement 
to collaborate on all three key local health planning activities (community health needs assessment, joint 
selection of local priorities, and joint implementation of initiatives that target the priorities) leads to a 
decrease in drug-induced mortality of approximately 3 to 4 deaths per 100,000 population compared to 
hospitals that did not collaborate with local health departments. This represents an 18% decrease in drug-
induced mortality rate based on the 2016 rate of 19.8 deaths per 100,000 population in the United States. 
Introduction 
In order to qualify for tax exemptions, nonprofit hospitals must provide certain types of 
community benefit in the jurisdictions they serve. The IRS reported that nonprofit hospitals spent over 
$60 billion on community benefit activities in 2011.121 Despite the magnitude of spending, there is little 
evidence as to whether this spending leads to tangible improvements in population health and as to which 
strategies are most effective. The provision of population health improvement activities represents a 




care to include other community benefits can potentially lead to meaningful improvements in population 
health. Traditionally, nonprofit hospitals dedicated most of their community benefit dollars to charity care 
(e.g., uncompensated care for uninsured and underinsured patients, losses on Medicaid patients, 
subsidized services to provide local access), health professions education, and research.80,101,114–
116,118,119,121,172 While these areas of spending are beneficial to the community, they represent only a partial 
fulfillment of the community benefit requirement per the IRS.80,101,114–116,118,119,121,172 Nonprofit hospitals 
are also expected to improve the overall health of the communities they serve by providing health care 
and prevention activities outside its four walls.  
Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), part of the IRS community 
benefit requirement, is a regulatory approach that steers nonprofit hospitals towards providing 
community health activities that fall outside its acute care focus. It required nonprofit hospitals to submit 
a triennial community health needs assessment (CHNA) and an implementation strategy.23  
It was generally expected that nonprofit hospitals would respond to Section 9007 by working with 
public health departments and other community stakeholders to develop the CHNA and implement 
initiatives to address community needs.120 Hospitals and local health departments (LHD) are among the 
largest institutions dedicated to local public health.80,113 Collaboration between these organizations in 
local health planning may lead to a more efficient and effective allocation of resources through joint 
implementation of initiatives to address local issues.  
A few states have leveraged Section 9007 to encourage collaboration between nonprofit hospitals 
and LHDs.95,98 One strategy is to align the cycle of nonprofit hospital CHNA with that of LHDs. New York 
(NY) is the only state that has required nonprofit hospital and LHD to collaborate on all three of the 
following local health planning activities: CHNA, prioritization of community issues, and joint 
implementation of initiatives to address health priorities. New York was able to enforce these 




Other states are moving in a similar direction as the NY Prevention agenda. For instance, 
Maryland’s Local Health Improvement Coalitions, Maine’s Shared Community Health Needs Assessment, 
North Carolina’s Community Health Improvement Collaborative, and Texas’ Regional Healthcare 
Partnerships.262–265 A very similar example is Ohio which mandated all hospitals to collaborate with their 
local health departments on community health assessments and community health improvement plans 
by 2020.266 Despite this trend, rigorous research is mostly lacking to understand whether this approach 
leads to improved population health outcomes. This study examines the relationship between 
collaboration in local health planning and drug-induced mortality in the United States. 
Background on Prevention of Drug-induced Mortality 
In the US drug-induced mortality rates increased from 6.1 deaths per 100,000 population in 1999 
to 21.7 in 2017, a 250% increase.267 All age groups experienced increased drug-induced mortality; 
although, rates were significantly higher for age groups 25-24, 35-44, and 45-54.267 The primary 
contributor to this increase is the use of illicit and prescription opioids, with the majority of these opioid 
overdose deaths being unintentional.268 Three trends have been identified as drivers of this crisis: an 
increase of prescription opioid overdose deaths over the past two decades; a four-fold increase in heroin 
overdoses since 2010; and a tripling of synthetic opioid-induced mortality since 2013 (e.g., fentanyl).268,269 
This dramatic increase in opioid overdose deaths has contributed to the decrease in the average life 
expectancy in the US for the second year in a row in 2016 by about 1.2 months.269  
In response to this epidemic, the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control within the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed a set of guiding principles for organizations 
to implement locally.270 This document is considered the most comprehensive source of information and 
guidelines on prevention activities to address the opioid crisis and the drug crisis more generally. The four 
overarching principles are: (1) “know your epidemic, know your response”; (2) “make collaboration your 




principles are embedded in local health planning activities; more specifically, the CHNA, prioritization of 
community issues, and implementation of initiatives that target priorities. The second principal is directly 
related to the requirements of the NY Prevention Agenda.  
Several studies have examined the effectiveness of state laws to curb the drug crisis, and some 
have examined the association of community-based interventions on drug-induced mortality.271–279 For 
instance, prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP) are designed to reduce over prescribing of 
controlled-substances, drug diversion, and opioid-induced mortality. These PDMPs had limited impact 
early on; however, many states have implemented robust features starting in 2012 that have proven to 
be effective. Examples of robust PDMP features include, prescriber access to PDMPs, and a mandate for 
prescribers to both use and check the PDMP regularly. One study found that more robust PDMPs were 
associated with an approximately 18% decrease in opioid-related overdose deaths.272 Another study 
found that the implementation of a PDMP was associated with a reduction of 1.12 opioid-related 
overdose deaths per 100,000 population, and that PDMPs with more robust features experienced greater 
reductions.273 The combination of mandated use of PDMPs and pain clinic laws reduced opioid-related 
overdose deaths by 12%.274 One study did not find an association between mandated use of PDMPs and 
opioid poisoning-related emergency department visits and inpatient hospitalizations.277  
One study examined the impact of two national-level regulations: introduction of abuse-deterrent 
extended-release oxycodone hydrochloride and propoxyphene market withdrawal. This study found that 
the estimated overdose rate attributed to prescription opioids decreased by 20%; however, heroin-
related mortality increased by 23%.275 This finding highlights a prevalent concern that limiting the supply 
of prescription opioids may drive users to seek substitutes in the illicit drug market (e.g., heroin, fentanyl 
analogs).272,280–282 Findings on other types of interventions are mixed but there is a consensus among 
researchers and policymakers that a broad approach to curbing the drug crisis can potentially be effective 




fentanyl) unfolding at the local level.271–274,277,283,284 Along with primary prevention strategies, other 
approaches may include improving access to the overdose-reversal drug naloxone, enacting laws that 
protect bystanders who can help people who experience an overdose, improving access to medication-
assisted treatment, educating provider and patients, implementing drug take-back activities, and 
partnering with law enforcement. 
New York Prevention Agenda 
The cornerstone of the NY Prevention Agenda is its requirement for nonprofit hospitals and LHDs 
to: collaborate on assessing local needs, jointly select two health priorities, and jointly plan and implement 
initiatives to address selected priorities.190,191 The Prevention Agenda was first implemented in 2008; 
however, the requirement for nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration was enforced after the 
implementation of Section 9007 in 2012. Other states have encouraged nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to 
collaborate on CHNA; however, this guidance was not enforced as a requirement during our sample period 
in any state besides NY. 
We hypothesized that nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration on all three local health planning 
activities, as dictated under the NY Prevention Agenda, would result in improvements in the targeted 
priorities. We tested this hypothesis using nonprofit hospitals and LHDs outside of NY that targeted the 
same priorities as a control. We chose drug-induced mortality due to its status as a public health crisis and 
because we expected it to be responsive to targeted community initiatives within the study’s timeframe 
of 2009-2016. For example, the administration of naloxone to reverse drug overdoses can have an 
immediate impact on drug-induced mortality. In contrast, lifestyle changes may have a more distal impact 









Our study period was 2009-2016. Our specifications exclude a 2013 “washout” period to account 
for the implementation of the CHNA priorities because most nonprofit hospitals completed their CHNA 
and implementation strategies during 2013. The inclusion criteria were counties: (1) that had a 1:1 ratio 
of LHD to county; (2) that had one to five nonprofit hospitals; (3) in which at least one nonprofit hospital 
selected prescription or illicit drug use as a health priority (as part of the three-year implementation cycle 
that included 2013). We limited the study sample to counties served by a single LHD and at most five 
nonprofit hospitals to make counties comparable from a public health resource and capacity perspective.  
The treatment group includes counties in NY that met the inclusion criteria (“NY treatment 
group”). The control group consisted of counties that met the inclusion criteria but were not required to 
collaborate with LHDs on community health assessment, prioritization and implementation. Our study 
sample had a total of 220 counties of which 22 were in NY and 198 were control counties. Figure 1 shows 
the geographic distribution of these counties.  
 





We tested our hypothesis using a difference-in-differences specification. Our model included a 
dichotomous NY treatment variable that equaled 1 if the county was in NY and 0 otherwise. A “post” 
variable was created which equaled 1 for years 2014-2016 and 0 for years 2009-2012. The year 2013 was 
excluded as a “washout” period. The coefficient on the interaction between the NY treatment and post 
variable (i.e., NY Effect) is the difference-in-differences estimate of the impact of the NY Prevention 
Agenda on the outcome. This coefficient measures the incremental change in drug-induced mortality rate 
in NY relative to change in drug-induced mortality rate in the control counties.236  As previously described, 
all counties in the study sample met the inclusion criteria and selected substance abuse as a health 
priority. We included county and year fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics over the study period. Inclusion of county fixed effects was supported by the results of a 
Hausman specification test.238 We used robust standard errors clustered by county to calculate our 
standard errors.237  
Permutation inference is an alternative approach to obtain the standard errors which does not 
rely on asymptotic properties. We used this approach as a robustness check to the county-clustered 
robust standard errors. One concern with our study is that the treatment units are geographically 
clustered to one state, and there are considerably fewer treatment counties than in the control 
group.244,246–253 In other words, it is possible that the relatively small sample size in the treatment group 
violates asymptotic properties. We implemented permutation tests to obtain the null distribution of the 
treatment effect (i.e., distribution of treatment effect under the null hypothesis of no effect) and then 
compared our study’s main treatment effect estimate to this null distribution.245,246 Specifically, we limited 
the study sample to control group counties and drew a random “treatment” group sample equivalent to 
the number of treatment units in the main specification (i.e., 22 NY counties). We obtained the “placebo” 




2,000 times to obtain the null distribution of the treatment effect. The p-value was calculated as the 
proportion of estimates from the null distribution that were larger in absolute value than the estimate 
obtained from our study’s main specification.  
All analyses were conducted using Stata, version 14.2. This study was deemed exempt from 
review by an Inter-Institutional Review Board. 
Data Sources 
The data source for the outcome was the CDC’s Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic 
Research (WONDER) underlying cause-of-death files. We extracted county-level data from 2009 to 2016 
on drug-induced deaths. 
We used data from the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) Profile 
Study to identify counties that are served by one LHD only (i.e., 1:1 ratio of LHD to county). The NACCHO 
data includes a crosswalk that links LHDs to the geographic jurisdictions they serve. Approximately 70% 
of LHDs serve a single county, with the remainder serving multiple counties or sub-county jurisdictions. 
Data on hospital characteristics came from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Healthcare Cost 
Report Information System and the American Hospital Association Annual Survey. County-level 
demographic, socioeconomic, and labor market measures came from the 2009 to 2016 American 
Community Survey.  
For state-level covariates, we used information from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation to 
define Medicaid expansion status and the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System database to identify the 
implementation and timing of contemporaneous state-level opioid use and overdose laws. The 
Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System database was funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse to 
track key state laws related to prescription drug abuse and laws designed to curb drug overdoses. We 
provide detailed information about each of these laws and their state-specific timing of implementation 




Identification of Health Priorities Selected for Implementation by Nonprofit Hospitals 
To ascertain health priorities from CHNAs and implementation strategies for the quantitative 
analysis, we reviewed and coded (“quantitized”) CHNA and implementation strategy reports completed 
in 2012 and 2013 respectively. These were the first round of reports and plans prepared after the 
implementation of Section 9007 of the ACA. We also used these reports to define whether the nonprofit 
hospital collaborated with their LHD to produce a single CHNA. For counties in NY, we used a matrix 
prepared by the NY State Department of Health reflecting the jointly selected priorities by nonprofit 
hospitals and LHDs.190  
We primarily used the 2013 implementation strategy reports because these documents include 
information on the selected health priorities and their respective initiatives to be implemented by 
nonprofit hospitals over the three years following the CHNA. We used the 2012 CHNAs when the 
implementation strategy for 2013 could not be located. Some hospitals combine the CHNA and 
implementation strategy in one report, in which case, the selected priorities and implementation plan can 
be identified. For a few cases, we identified hospitals’ 2013 selected priorities and their respective 
implementation strategies using 2015/16 CHNA reports because the 2012 CHNAs were no longer 
available. 
The majority of hospitals for which we could not identify their selected 2013 health priorities 
included hospitals that closed during the study period, opened after 2013, or switched to for-profit or 
public status (23 hospitals in 5 counties). We could not identify the reason for the other five hospitals for 
which we could not find a CHNA or implementation strategy. We attempted to contact each of these 
hospitals to request a copy of their CHNAs and implementation strategies but did not get a response. 
We initially searched the implementation strategy reports for the following words: abuse, misuse, 
illicit, illegal, substance, prescription drug, prescription, drug, opioid, meth, methamphetamine, cocaine, 




strategy, we then examined the interventions proposed by hospitals to make sure that the hospital had 
an actual plan to address it. Table 1 lists examples of the interventions proposed by hospitals to address 
substance abuse as defined in this study. More examples of interventions are included in the appendix. 
We found that many hospitals that identified substance abuse as a health priority were targeting 
other substances such as tobacco, marijuana, and alcohol. These were coded as 0 for substance abuse.  
Finally, we created a dummy variable that equaled 1 if the CHNA documented that it was jointly 
developed by the nonprofit hospital and LHD. We coded 1,539 implementation strategy reports and 
CHNAs (i.e., all unique hospitals), which is approximately 52% of all nonprofit hospitals in the US. 
Outcome 
The primary study outcome was county-level drug-induced mortality rate. We categorized drug-
induced deaths using International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th 
Revision (ICD-10) codes, as any death that included an underlying cause of unintentional poisoning (X40-
X44), intentional self-poisoning (X60-X64), assault by drugs (X85), and poisoning of undetermined intent 
by exposure to drugs (Y10-Y14). We calculated county-level crude rates by dividing the number of deaths 
by the total population in each county. We used crude rates but adjusted for county-level age distribution 
in our models, using three age groups (i.e., 0-19, 20-64, and 65 and older) as reflected in the National 
Center for Health Statistics reports on drug overdose deaths in the US.267 The CDC does not report deaths 
in counties that experienced fewer than nine deaths in a given year.  
The analysis was at the county level because of our focus on LHD and nonprofit hospital 
collaboration in community health needs assessment, prioritization, and planning. Health planning and 
public health services are mostly organized on a county-level basis and has been used in previous research 
involving hospitals.285,286 Furthermore, local regulatory oversight of both institutions is most likely 




We also based this decision on our qualitative data collected from CHNAs. The vast majority of 
nonprofit hospitals defined their service area based on counties because most of the time the majority of 
their patients come from a single county. Importantly, most of the data used for CHNAs are at the county 
level which steers hospitals to define their service area at that level. 
Covariates 
We controlled for state, county, and hospital-level factors. A recent study found that both state 
and county level factors were strongly associated with drug-induced mortality.287 Specifically, after 
controlling for a robust set of county-level covariates (i.e., demographics, socioeconomic, occupational 
and industry composition, and supply of healthcare services), state-level differences accounted for 
approximately a third of the between-county variation in drug-induced mortality rates.287 Much of this 
variation may come from state-specific laws that target the prescription and illicit drug 
crisis.272,274,277,283,284,288–290 For example, state prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP) are designed 
to reduce over prescribing of controlled-substances and drug diversion.288 Naloxone Overdose Prevention 
laws are another example; these laws provide varying levels of civil and criminal immunity for 
administration of the overdose-reversal drug naloxone.288  Finally, Good Samaritan laws provide civil and 
criminal immunity for people who call for help when witnessing an overdose.288  The type of law enacted 
and their timing of implementation vary across states.288   
State-level covariates included prescription and illicit drug laws as follows: Good Samaritan, 
naloxone overdose prevention, and PDMP (i.e., access for prescribers and a use mandate). We created 
dummy variables for each of these four laws and set the reference category to be the most prevalent 
group in the post-period. We also controlled for Medicaid expansion status. The coding of the dummy 
variables accounted for the different timing of implementation. 
County-level covariates included demographic, socioeconomic and labor market characteristics. 




CHNA in 2012 or later years. The latter covariate was operationalized using data collected from the coding 
of nonprofit hospital implementation strategy reports previously described. 
Hospital-level covariates included teaching status, system membership, critical access hospital 
status, a binary indicator for hospitals that offer alcohol and drug use services, and hospital size (number 
of beds). These hospital-level covariates were included because they may have implications for the supply 
of substance abuse services, the capacity of hospitals to address the drug use crisis, and a hospital’s 
likelihood to collaborate with their LHD. More detail about each covariate can be found in the Appendix.  
Sensitivity Analyses and Falsification Tests 
We performed sensitivity analyses by estimating alternative specifications that included: (a) 
balanced sample; (b) a placebo test using only counties that did not select substance abuse as a health 
priority in both study groups; (c) a placebo test using counties in NY that did not select substance abuse 
as a priority compared to counties outside of NY that selected substance abuse; (d) controls for state-year 
specific trends; (e) alternative treatment start years (2012 and 2015; (f) a sample limited to counties 
located in states that implemented a PDMP use mandate, (g) a sample limited to counties located in states 
that implemented Good Samaritan laws; and (h) a sample limited to counties located in states that 
implemented naloxone overdose prevention laws. 
We also estimated specifications using outcomes that were most likely to have been determined 
prior to the treatment, or highly unlikely to be associated with the treatment as additional falsification 
tests. The outcomes used in these models were all-transport-related mortality rate and percentage of 
vacant housing units in a county. We used the CDC definition for all-transport-related deaths (ICD-10 
codes V01 to V99, and Y85). We provided a rationale for each sensitivity analysis and falsification test in 





Parameters estimated using a difference-in-differences specification have a causal interpretation 
only when several key conditions are met. One of them is that pre-treatment linear trends between 
treatment and control groups must be parallel.236 If the trends were not parallel then the control group 
would not be an accurate representation of counterfactual drug-induced mortality (i.e., if the NY 
Prevention Agenda not been implemented). We tested for pre-period parallel trends by limiting the 
sample to the pre-period, 2009 to 2012, and tested the significance of the interaction between a trend 
variable and the treatment variable (i.e, NY treatment group). The null hypothesis is that the pre-
treatment trends were parallel. Therefore, a non-significant p-value indicates that pre-treatment trends 
were parallel. 
Another condition for a causal interpretation is that counties were exposed to “common 
shocks”.236 Unfortunately, this is not empirically testable. However, we attempted to control for all 
relevant time-varying differences including state, county, and hospital confounders in the treatment and 
control counties to minimize potential violations of this assumption. For example, we controlled for the 
timing of state prescription drug and opioid overdose laws, because they have been shown to be 
associated with lower drug-induced mortality rates.272,274,277,283,284,289 We also controlled for Medicaid 
expansion status, which very likely influences access to substance abuse services and pain management 
care. 
At the county level, we controlled for employment restructuring and labor market composition 
which may have changed differentially across the study counties (e.g., reliance on service industry) and 
have been shown to be associated with drug-induced mortality.287,291,292 Median income, unemployment, 
and uninsurance rates help control for differences in the local economy which have also been shown to 
be associated with drug-induced mortality.287,291 Finally, we controlled for differences in educational level. 
Another consideration for a causal interpretation is whether there were spillovers of the 




attenuated if control counties benefitted from the initiatives implemented in the treatment counties. This 
would only be a concern for control counties immediately bordering NY counties.   
Conditional on the covariates, counties in the control group should be comparable to counties in 
the treatment group in order to provide an estimate of the counterfactual of what would have occurred 
if the NY Prevention Agenda had not been implemented.236 In our descriptive statistics, we provide the 
mean for all covariates in the pre and post periods for each study group. We also test the significance of 
these changes between the two groups. 
Results  
As reported in Table 2, the changes over time in most county and hospital characteristics were 
similar in the NY treatment and the control group. On average, counties in NY had a slightly smaller 
population size. The age distribution was very similar in NY counties compared to control counties with 
the exception of small differences in the age groups 0-19 and 20-64. Next, most of the labor market 
covariates were comparable across the treatment groups with the exception that control counties 
experienced a slightly larger decrease in the percentage of workers in the “natural resources, 
construction, and maintenance” category. New York treatment counties had lower uninsurance rate over 
the study period. In terms of hospital characteristics, NY counties had a lower percentage of medium-size 
hospitals and a higher percentage of small-size hospitals. Also, NY counties had less hospitals that were 
part of a system but more teaching hospitals. Based on these findings, we feel confident that controlling 
for these factors improves our model specification and estimates. 
Table 3 (Column B) reports the results of our main differences-in-differences specification. The 
results reveal that the NY Prevention Agenda was associated with an incremental decrease in drug-
induced mortality of approximately three to four deaths per 100,000 residents (-3.61 drug-induced 
deaths/100,000; p=0.05). The p-value calculated using the permutation inference approach described 




the empirical distribution of the null hypothesis from the permutation tests. Only one of the placebo 
estimates was larger in absolute value than the main treatment effect estimate. 
When we limited the sample to counties for which there was mortality data for all years in the 
study period (Table 3 Column C), we observed an incremental decrease in drug-induced mortality of 
approximately eight deaths per 100,000 residents (-8.81 drug-induced deaths/100,000; p=0.021). Figure 
2b shows the empirical distribution of the null hypothesis from the permutation tests for the balanced 
sample. None of the placebo estimates were larger in absolute value than the main treatment effect 
estimate. This specification addresses concerns related to potential sample bias and internal validity 
because some counties come in and out of the sample due to mortality data suppression. There were 220 
counties (1,276 county-years) in the full sample (22 NY treatment and 198 control counties), and 126 
counties (882 county-years) in the balanced sample (5 NY treatment and 121 control counties).  
Finally, the treatment effect was similar in the specification that controlled for state-year specific 
trends, albeit with a slight decrease in the significance (-8.51 drug-induced deaths; p= 0.074) (Table 3 
Column D).   
Falsification Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
In Table 4, Columns A and B, we report the results of two falsification tests. In the first, we limited 
the study sample to counties that did not select substance abuse and did not find a significant treatment 
effect in NY treatment counties (2.19 drug-induced deaths/100,000, p=0.146). This supports our 
hypothesis that collaboration on all three local health planning activities, as well as joint prioritization and 
implementation of substance abuse initiatives are necessary for counties to experience changes in drug-
induced mortality. The NY counties included in this specification collaborated on all three local health 
planning activities but did not jointly prioritize substance abuse and implement activities to address it. 
In the second one, we compared counties in NY that did not jointly select substance abuse to all 




induced deaths; p=0.161) (Table 4 Column B). We estimated this specification to address concerns that 
the observed treatment effect might have been due to other unobserved trends in NY. The non-significant 
result gives us confidence that our models did not fail to account for other trends in NY that might have 
driven the observed decrease in drug-induced mortality.  
When we examined the impact of the study treatment on all-transport related mortality we did 
not observe a treatment effect (Table 4 Column C). The joint prioritization of substance abuse and the 
implementation of targeted activities to address it were not expected have an effect on all-transport 
related mortality. This serves to further support the main study findings, and importantly, that the findings 
are not merely due to spurious correlations. The findings from these falsification tests and sensitivity 
analyses further support the main treatment effect estimates reported earlier. All these specifications 
satisfied tests for pre-treatment parallel trends.  
In the Appendix, we included the full estimation results for other sensitivity analyses. Moving the 
treatment date had the expected effect (Appendix Table B). When we set the treatment start year at 2012 
(i.e., post-treatment period 2012-16 as opposed to the main specification of 2014-16), we did not observe 
a treatment effect in NY treatment counties (-0.163 drug-induced deaths/100,000; p=0.919). When 
treatment start year was set at 2015 (i.e., post-treatment period 2015-16), findings were non-significant 
for NY treatment counties (-1.76 drug-induced deaths/100,000; p=0.271). One reason that we did not 
observe a treatment effect with the earlier treatment start year is that all nonprofit hospitals in the study 
sample completed their implementation strategy in 2013, and started actual implementation of their 
plans in early 2014. The post period covering 2012-16 includes two years during which nonprofit hospitals 
were in the planning phase (i.e., 2012 and 2013) and we would not expect planning to have an effect on 
drug-induced mortality. These results give us confidence that our main specification which includes a 2013 
washout period more accurately reflects the timing of the planning and implementation phases 




Limiting the study sample to counties located in states that implemented a PDMP mandate also 
showed an incremental decrease in drug-induced mortality in NY treatment counties (-4.07 drug-induced 
deaths/100,000; p=0.066) (Appendix Table C). The rationale for this sensitivity analysis was to make all 
study groups as comparable as possible from the perspective of a state law that has been shown to be 
associated with reductions in prescribing rates and drug-induced mortality.284 Next, we limited the sample 
to counties located in states that have implemented Good Samaritan laws and found a similar treatment 
effect (-4.46 drug-induced deaths/100,000; p=0.036) (Appendix Table C). Finally, we limited the sample to 
states that have implemented naloxone overdose prevention laws and again found a similar treatment 
effect (-3.82 drug-induced deaths/100,000; p=0.044) (Appendix Table C). All these specifications satisfied 
tests for pre-treatment parallel trends.      
Limitations 
 Our study has some limitations. One concern is the generalizability of our findings, because we do 
not know whether drug-induced mortality rates in the counties with suppressed mortality data are higher 
or lower than the counties included in our study. The results using the balanced and unbalanced samples 
were similar but this does not take into account counties for which the CDC never reported drug-induced 
mortality during the sample period. To address this concern, we compared county-level characteristics for 
counties with and without suppressed mortality data (Appendix Table E). We found that counties with 
suppressed data had substantially smaller populations. The age distribution was similar across counties 
with and without suppressed data except that counties with suppressed data had a higher percentage of 
people aged 65 or older. Counties with suppressed data tended to be slightly less educated. Also, counties 
with suppressed data had a higher percentage of workers in the natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance category. Finally, counties with suppressed data had a slightly higher uninsurance rate, but 
lower unemployment rate and median income. The findings were very similar when we compared NY 




Due to the heterogeneity of county-level factors and their differential association with drug-
induced mortality, it is challenging to predict whether the counties with suppressed mortality data 
experience higher or lower mortality rates based on the differences reported above.287,293,294 For example, 
a recent study found that drug-induced mortality rates overall are higher in counties that experience 
higher economic disadvantage, and have a higher percentage of blue-collar and service employment.291 
However, another study found that heroin-induced overdoses were higher in more urban counties that 
had larger concentrations of professional workers, and were less economically disadvantaged.291  
  Second, the common shock assumption is not testable and although we have strived to include 
all relevant confounders there is no way to test whether this is the case. For instance, one reason of 
undercounting of drug-induced deaths is misclassification, which has been especially prevalent in drug-
related suicides.287 Reporting in death certificates may misclassify causes of death which can bias our 
results.287 We minimized the impact of heterogeneity in county-level reporting by controlling for county 
fixed effects. Also, by controlling for county fixed effects we also accounted for heterogeneity in state 
programs and initiatives that may affect drug-induced mortality. Additionally, we controlled for a robust 
set of state-level prescription and illicit opioid use laws that have been shown to be associated with drug-
induced mortality.272,274,277,283,284,289,290 
Finally, the decision to implement the NY Prevention Agenda was not random and we cannot 
definitively assert causality. However, our models control for a rich set of confounding factors, and the 
testable assumptions for causal inference were satisfied. Despite these limitations, our results highlight 
the ability of the NY Prevention Agenda to reduce drug-induced mortality through a requirement for 
nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to collaborate on all three local health planning activities. 
Discussion  
Community benefit by nonprofit hospitals has historically focused on the provision of acute care 




it represents a partial fulfillment of the community benefit requirement per the IRS. Nonprofit hospitals 
are also expected to improve community health in addition to providing health care services within the 
hospital setting. Section 9007 of the ACA is a regulatory approach that steers nonprofit hospitals towards 
providing community health activities beyond its four walls. It required nonprofit hospitals to submit a 
triennial community health needs assessment and an implementation strategy. 
New York leveraged Section 9007 to provide the regulatory framework for more effective local-
level collaboration. In NY, all nonprofit hospitals and LHDs are required to collaborate on three local health 
planning activities: (1) CHNA, (2) prioritization of community issues, and (3) joint implementation of 
initiatives to address jointly selected local priorities. The joint local health planning enables the two 
institutions to better allocate resources and coordinate institutional expertise, which can translate into 
improved population health outcomes. Indeed, our findings suggest that NY’s approach is effective in 
reducing drug-induced mortality. These health planning activities in NY also happen to fulfill all four CDC 
principles for local governments to address the drug crisis.  
There is a recent trend in which state governments are beginning to either require or encourage 
nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to collaborate on community health needs assessment and implementation 
planning. Some examples include Ohio, Maryland’s Local Health Improvement Coalitions, Maine’s Shared 
Community Health Needs Assessment, North Carolina’s Community Health Improvement Collaborative, 
and Texas’ Regional Healthcare Partnerships.262–266 Despite this trend, rigorous research is mostly lacking 
to understand whether this approach leads to improved population health outcomes. The evidence from 
our study is promising and can serve to encourage these and other states to require the same level of 
collaboration as reflected in NY. Future research could explore other population health outcomes and 
health priorities to further explore the mechanisms through which hospital and LHD collaboration in 




Collaboration could be challenging for counties that do not have their own LHD or a nonprofit 
hospital; however, regional collaboration may be a viable alternative for these counties. For instance, 
some LHDs serve multiple counties and usually one of these counties has a nonprofit hospital. In these 
cases, a regional health planning collaborative could be implemented similar to the county-level health 
planning in NY. One challenge exists for jurisdictions that only have for-profit hospitals, as these hospitals 
are not required to conduct a CHNA and implementation strategy. For-profit hospitals have an interest in 
improving population health due to many ACA provisions that focus on value-based reimbursement 
approaches.25 The financial incentives and penalties may be strong enough to encourage for-profit 
hospitals to keep their patient population healthy. This common goal between for-profit hospitals and 
LHDs could be the basis for collaborative local health planning. 
Specific to the drug crisis, studies have shown that drug-induced mortality is not randomly 
distributed across the US, and that there is substantial geographic variation in county-level factors that 
are associated with drug-induced mortality. Researchers and policymakers agree that a broad approach 
to curbing the drug crisis can be more effective in addressing the multiple concurrent or sequential opioid 
epidemics (e.g., prescription, heroin, synthetic, fentanyl) unfolding at the local level.271–274,277,283,284 Due to 
the great variation in county-level factors that underlie the drug crisis, it is unreasonable to expect that 
Federal and State laws can accommodate this level of heterogeneity.287,291 
The NY Prevention Agenda is one promising way for county governments to leverage Federal and 
State laws to design locally-tailored initiatives that are more likely to successfully address the drug crisis. 
In NY, the first step was to require collaboration between two of the largest local institutions for public 
health (i.e., hospitals and LHDs), with ongoing efforts to include other important stakeholders including 
law enforcement, to more comprehensively address the epidemic. Through this approach, local 




develop new ones as a result of the collaboration and the unique combination of expertise. This may 
ultimately translate into further reductions in drug-induced mortality. 
Conclusion 
 To our knowledge, our study is among the first to explore the effect of nonprofit hospital 
community health improvement activities on a population health outcome. It is also among the first to 
examine whether collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and local health departments leads to 
improved community health. Our findings support the hypothesis that the NY Prevention Agenda, with its 
requirement for nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration, was associated with a decrease in drug-induced 
mortality rate when substance abuse is jointly prioritized. The NY Prevention Agenda provides the 
regulatory framework that aligns Federal, State and Local level policies that enabled a more effective 
response to the prescription and illicit drug crisis.  
The requirement for nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration is critical to the success of the NY 
Prevention Agenda. Collaboration in local health planning integrated organizational priorities into 
decision-making to improve community health, which may also improve long-term institutional 
engagement. It created an opportunity to achieve better alignment across the organizations involved, 
better coordination of resources, and to improve population health. As other states move in the same 
direction as NY, evidence from rigorously designed studies will continue to emerge and we will better 
understand if collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and local health departments is an effective 









Table 1. Initiatives Implemented by Nonprofit Hospitals: Prescription and/or Illicit Drug Use 
Initiative Category Example of Initiative 
Prescription Opioids: 
Prescribing practices 
and drug diversion 
Patients at the Medical Center’s rural health clinic who are managing chronic pain and 
prescribed potentially addictive medications to treat it, must sign a Medication 
Agreement. This contract is shared with the Medical Center’s emergency department 
(ED) and prompt care clinics to prevent patients from attempting to obtain additional 
medications.  
 
The hospital’s pharmacists have presented to community groups about the importance 
of keeping track of their medications and disposing of any that aren’t being used 
 
Work with dentists from the mobile dental clinic and other local dentists regarding 
the over prescribing of medications, and its effects.  
Overdose Reversal 
The hospital supplies emergency response teams in the hospital service area with the 
overdose reversing medication Narcan 
Neonatal Abstinence 
Syndrome (NAS) 
Facilitate and coordinate the “Moms on Meds” Coalition to address the substance 
abuse issues of pregnant women and reduce the number of NAS births in Sevier County 
 
Work together with the ED, medical staff and local medical community, to identify 
women who can benefit from the “Mothers and Infants Sober Together” program, 
addressing the incidence of NAS 
Access to care 
ED Physicians program for patients on pain medication to spell out an agreement on 
pain management.  Mid-level providers in the ED document acute pain patients and 
strive to work with the patient and the patient’s primary provider on documenting the 
pain plan including ED pain management appropriateness of scheduled narcotics 
dispensing 
Law Enforcement and 
Public Safety 
Collaboration 
The hospital’s detox Center accepts admissions from law enforcement agency 
 
Permanent, medication collection boxes are available at the County Sheriff’s Office and 
Police Department 
 
The hospital participates in the Drug Task Force of the County Sheriff’s Department 
which is also developing a convocation program for the schools 
 
Heroin Is Here: this heroin-focused committee was established by hospital and more 
than 60 people representing health, law enforcement, education, elected officials, 
treatment centers and others 
Drug Take Back 
Initiatives 
Drug Take Back Days are planned throughout the year by the Medical Center’s 
pharmacy department, providing a safe way to dispose of unused prescription drugs 
that could otherwise wind up in the hands of someone who wishes to sell, trade or 
otherwise use the drugs illegally 
Screening 
The hospital will conduct a Screening, Brief Intervention and Referral to Treatment 
(SBIRT) for appropriate ED and trauma patients.  
 





Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Study Sample  
 NEW YORK CONTROL 
NY vs 
CONTROL1 
 Pre2 Post3 Pre Post  
Drug-Induced Mortality Rate (per 100,000) 10.9 16.6* 4 16.8 21.5* . 
TOTAL POPULATION 203,437 205,663* 251,650 262,401* ** 
Metropolitan Status (%) 63.6 63.6 76.7 76.6 . 
AGE DISTRIBUTION (%)  
0-19 25.3 23.9* 26.4 25.3* ** 
20-64 60.5 60.4* 59.6 59.1* ** 
65 and over 14.1 15.7* 14.0 15.6* . 
EDUCATION (%)  
High School or Less 43.8 41.3* 43.6 41.3* . 
Some College 28.0 28.9* 29.9 30.7* . 
Bachelor or More 28.3 29.8* 26.5 28.0* . 
LABOR MARKET (%)  
Management, business, science, and arts 36.8 37.8* 34.1 35.2* . 
Service 18.0 18.7* 17.5 18.3* . 
Sales and office 24.0 23.0* 24.8 23.8* . 
Production, transp, and material moving 11.5 11.2* 13.4 13.4 . 
Natural resources, construction, and maint. 9.7 9.3* 10.1 9.3* ** 
RACE/ETHNICITY (%)  
White 88.2 87.2* 83.8 83.2* . 
Black 5.1 5.3* 7.0 7.2* . 
Other 4.7 5.0* 6.8 6.8 . 
Hispanic/Latino 5.2 6.0* 8.7 9.6* . 
OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC (%)  
Uninsurance 11.1 6.6* 15.8 10.1* ** 
Unemployment 8.0 5.3* 9.2 5.5* ** 
Median Income ($) 52,172 57,033* 51,146 56,358* . 
COUNTY HOSPITAL RESOURCES (%)  
Large 22.4 22.2 22.8 20.6* . 
Medium  43.6 40.1* 51.8 53.1 . 
Small  34.0 37.7* 25.4 26.2* . 
Teaching  8.0 8.0 4.1 3.7 . 
System Membership 28.8 47.3* 63.8 71.2* ** 
Critical Access  9.6 15.3* 11.6 11.9* . 
Hospital Offers Alcohol/SA Services  35.2 32.3 29.4 26.6* . 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. 1) Asterisk indicates whether the 
change pre and post periods between the study groups was significant; 2) Pre-period is 2009-2012; 3) Post-period is 
2014-2016; 4) Asterisk indicates whether the change pre and post periods within the study group was significant. 
Standard errors were calculated with county clustering. These statistics include observations from all years from 






Table 3. Treatment Effects (County-Level Drug-Induced Mortality per 100,000) 
(New York counties versus all other counties) 
 





 A B C D  
NY Effect 0.866 -3.608* -8.815** -8.515* 
(standard error)4 (1.359)  (1.868) (3.783) (4.735) 
AGE (ref. category is 20-64) 
  0-19   0.481 -0.432 0.576 
  65 and Over   -0.006 0.161 -0.180 
EDUCATION (ref. category is High School or Less) 
  Some College   0.531    1.016** -0.176 
  Bachelor of Higher   0.471 0.664 -0.026 
LABOR MARKET (ref. category is Management, business, science, and arts) 
  Service   -0.403 -0.859 -0.227 
  Sales and office   -0.321 -0.642 -0.076 
  Production, transp., material moving   -0.748 -1.032 -0.571 
  Natural res., const., maint.   -0.471 -0.410 -0.183 
RACE (ref. category is White) 
  Black   -0.402 -0.588  -1.159* 
  Other   -0.108 0.125 -0.240 
OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC 
  Uninsurance   0.335       0.551*** -0.011 
  Unemployment   0.261 0.139 -0.195 
  Median Income        -0.0003***    -0.0002*      -0.0002** 
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
  Teaching   0.561 -0.112 1.695 
  System Membership   0.010    1.102** -0.483 
  Critical Access    0.426 1.049 -0.065 
  Provision of Alcohol/SA Services   -0.195  -0.0454 0.106 
  Number of Large Hospitals        -2.742***    -2.249** -0.899 
  Number of Medium Hospitals            -0.745      -1.323 0.268 
  Number of Small Hospitals         -2.125*** -1.280*    -1.819** 
Constant 15.90  19.49 29.52  89.69* 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models control for Medicaid 
expansion, Good Samaritan laws, naloxone overdose prevention laws, and Prescription Drug Monitoring Program 
(see text for more detail). Models include county and year fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered on county. 1) Full sample (n=220): 22 NY counties and 198 control counties; 2) Balanced 
sample (n=126): 5 NY counties and 121 control counties; 3) Study sample (n=220): 22 NY counties and 198 control 
counties; 4) Standard errors and full estimation results can be found in Appendix Tables A, B, and C. *** p<0.01, ** 











Figure 2b. Empirical Distribution of the Null Hypothesis from Permutation Tests (Balanced Sample) 
 
Notes: 1- We limited the sample to control group counties and drew a random “treatment” group sample equivalent 
to the number of treatment units in the main specification (i.e., 22 NY counties). The “placebo” effect was obtained 
by estimating the main specification. We repeated this 2,000 times to obtain the null distribution of the treatment 
effect. Only one of the placebo estimates were larger in absolute value than the main treatment effect estimate of 
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 A B C 
NY Effect 2.191 -2.475 -0.379 
(standard error)4 (1.504) (1.761) (0.736) 
AGE (ref. category is 20-64) 
  0-19 -0.294 0.689 0.236 
  65 and Over 0.021 -0.026 -0.078 
EDUCATION (ref. category is High School or Less) 
  Some College 0.331 0.661* 0.006 
  Bachelor of Higher       1.009*** 0.511 -0.039 
LABOR MARKET (ref. category is Management, business, science, and arts) 
  Service 0.207 -0.329 -0.074 
  Sales and office -0.227 -0.330 0.112 
  Production, transp., material moving   0.686* -0.876 0.031 
  Natural res., const., maint. 0.561 -0.358 0.206 
RACE (ref. category is White) 
  Black 0.010 -0.184 0.068 
  Other 0.139 -0.111 -0.092 
OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC 
  Uninsurance 0.054   0.417* -0.121 
  Unemployment -0.301 0.360       -0.434*** 
  Median Income -5.02-6        -0.0003*** 5.61-5 
HOSPITAL CHARACTERISTICS 
  Teaching -0.833* -0.350 -0.230 
  System Membership 0.554 0.090 -0.032 
  Critical Access  -0.232 -0.961 -0.584 
  Provision of Alcohol/SA Services 0.136  -0.687* -0.317 
  Number of Large Hospitals -0.130    -1.702** -0.098 
  Number of Medium Hospitals 0.433 -0.323 -0.161 
  Number of Small Hospitals 0.452      -2.260*** 0.091 
Constant -22.57 3.978 9.586 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models control for Medicaid 
expansion, Good Samaritan, access to naloxone, Prescription Drug Monitoring Program, and pain management clinic 
laws (see text for more detail). Models include county and year fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered on county; 1) Study sample (n=404): 34 NY counties and 370 control counties. This sample 
is limited to counties that did not prioritize substance abuse; 2) Study sample (n=232): 34 NY counties and 198 
control counties. This sample is limited to counties in NY that did not prioritize substance abuse (NY control counties) 
and counties outside of NY that prioritized substance abuse; 3) Study sample (n=220): 22 NY counties and 198 control 






V. USING SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS TO UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOCAL HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ALL-CAUSE MORTALITY 
Introduction  
The Health and Medicine Division (HMD) of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine (previously known as the Institute of Medicine) has long advocated for increased collaboration 
between the healthcare and public health sectors.13–15,17–19,21,35,47 This is based on the premise that each 
sector can work individually to improve population health, but through collaboration they can be more 
effective and efficient in improving the public’s health. In a 1988 report the HMD first introduced the 
concept of the public health system and acknowledged the important role of the various actors in this 
public health system: governmental, public and private sectors. They emphasized that states and their 
local subdivisions retain the primary responsibility for health under the U.S. Constitution. Local health 
departments (LHD), as described in the report “serve as the governmental presence of public health and 
as the most frequent conveners and implementers of efforts to improve population health in the 
community.”13 
Local health departments are conveners and expert practitioners in population health efforts, 
especially within the jurisdictions they serve (e.g., county level). They possess the necessary knowledge 
and resources to assess a community’s health needs, priorities and assets, and to evaluate program 
initiatives that seek to improve the conditions for health in their communities.13,14 It is because of this rich 
set of capabilities that communities may rely on LHDs for technical assistance on: inventory of resources, 
assessment of needs, formulation of collaborative responses, program evaluation, and elimination of 
health disparities.14 In this sense, LHDs are well positioned within the larger social network of the 




may play a key role in connecting the various actors in the public health system and other community 
actors to one another based on the resources required to achieve particular goals. 
Collaboration and better coordination between LHDs and nonprofit hospitals has long been 
believed to hold great potential for better performance of the public health system. Policymakers, the 
healthcare and public health sectors, and other stakeholders have been greatly concerned with the 
trajectory of US population health indicators. The US continues to experience poor health outcomes 
compared to similar countries, despite its trend of increasing healthcare expenditures and growing share 
of the gross domestic product (GDP).53 In this context, the need for population-based strategies that are 
well coordinated within the public health system is of even greater importance. Closer collaboration and 
integration between governmental public health agencies and the health care delivery system may 
enhance the capacities of both to improve population health and may support the efforts of other public 
health system actors.14,16,18 
In response to a long-standing recommendation by the HMD, some states have aligned their 
policies to encourage collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and LHDs in local health planning.13,14 
Specifically, states have leveraged Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
which requires nonprofit hospitals to conduct a triennial community health needs assessment (CHNA) and 
an implementation strategy.23 For instance, the New York Prevention Agenda requires nonprofit hospitals 
and LHDs to: collaborate on assessing local needs, jointly select two health priorities, and jointly plan and 
implement initiatives to address selected priorities.190,191 Other state policies that are moving in a similar 
direction include Maryland’s Local Health Improvement Coalitions, Maine’s Shared Community Health 
Needs Assessment, North Carolina’s Community Health Improvement Collaborative, and Texas’ Regional 
Healthcare Partnerships.262–265 Ohio recently mandated all its nonprofit hospitals to collaborate with their 




The state policies mentioned above reflect a common belief that collaboration between LHDs and 
nonprofit hospitals may be especially important in improving community health. Studies have found that 
LHDs and nonprofit hospitals are often the anchor institutions in collaborative efforts to improve 
community health.105,107 Based on our previous study of CHNAs by more than 1,700 nonprofit hospitals, it 
is clear that collaboration with LHDs to produce CHNAs and implementation strategies is not the norm. 
Only about 24% of nonprofit hospitals in our sample collaborated with a LHD to produce a single CHNA 
for their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the National Association for County and City Health Officials Profile 
Study shows that LHD collaboration with hospitals decreased by about 22 percentage points from 2008 
to 2016.90 These findings indicate that a requirement may need to be in place for LHDs and hospitals to 
work together. During our study period, only NY required collaboration in local health planning by the two 
institutions. Due to the special nature of nonprofit hospital and LHD collaboration in local health planning, 
we formulated some hypotheses based on this specific type of collaboration 
 More broadly, cross-sectorial collaboration is believed to improve the efficiency of collaborative 
systems by focusing resources where they’re needed without duplicative efforts, which can translate into 
a better allocation of scarce resources. It holds the potential to improve effectiveness of programs 
because actors in collaborative systems work together towards a common set of overarching goals. This 
helps each actor to optimize the use of their financial, human, and social capital towards aspects of a goal 
in which they’re more likely to be effective instead of overstretching their resources by attending to all 
goals.29,30  
The synergistic potential of collaboration is also central to understanding how cross-sectorial 
collaboration can impact population health. This is usually a more complex concept to identify and 
measure but potentially an important mechanism through which collaboration can have a positive impact. 




important in understanding how collaboration works. The premise behind social capital is straightforward, 
it is the “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace.”38  
In this study, we used social capital theory to motivate the conceptualization of LHD social capital, 
and used egocentric network methods to operationalize LHD social capital indicators. We emphasized two 
key dimensions of social capital: the strength of ties (i.e., collaboration intensity) and the breadth of 
resources embedded in the LHD organizational network (i.e., cross-sectorial quality of LHD networks). We 
hypothesized that LHD social capital would be negatively associated with mortality outcomes (diabetes, 
heart disease, infant), smoking prevalence, and low birth weight prevalence. We also hypothesized that 
LHD social capital would be positively associated with diabetes monitoring. 
Our second set of hypotheses was based on the specific type of collaboration as required in NY. 
We hypothesized that the combination of LHD social capital and collaboration between LHDs and 
nonprofit hospitals in local health planning would be negatively associated with mortality outcomes, 
smoking prevalence, and low birth weight prevalence; and positively associated with diabetes monitoring. 
Social Capital 
Nan Lin’s definition of social capital is that “social capital consists of resources embedded in social 
relations and social structure (i.e., social networks), which can be mobilized when an actor wishes to 
increase the likelihood of success in a purposive action”.38,295 The propensity of actors to share their 
resources to help others in their social network depends on how connected they are.43 We posit that the 
productive power of social capital is the product of availability of resources contained in a social network 
and the strength of the connections between partners which enhances the propensity of network partners 
to share resources.39–42  
Many studies that examined the relationship between social capital and health have typically 
found that greater levels of social capital are associated with better health and well-being.224–227,296 




group members, and restrictions on individual freedoms.208,211 A recent study examined the impact of 
multisector contributions to population health activities and their impact on mortality rates.296,297 Overall, 
it found that mortality that is amenable to population health initiatives decreased overtime in 
communities with “comprehensive system capital”.297 The authors found the largest differences in 
mortality rates for deaths related to heart disease, diabetes, and infant mortality.297 They also found that 
cancer-related deaths and all-cause mortality were lower in communities with comprehensive system 
capital but these findings did not reach conventional significance thresholds.297 The communities with 
comprehensive system capital  were characterized by provision of a broad scope of population health 
activities supported through dense networks of contributing organizations spanning many sectors.296,297 
This may be indication that social capital may be more successfully accessed and utilized through better 
established relationships between partners. 
Synergistic Effect of Collaboration 
Organizations can access and create resources through formal and informal relationships, direct 
and indirect ties. The structural and relational characteristics of the social network may encourage or 
discourage collaborative engagement, and has implications for an organization’s ability to: 1) access 
existing resources; and 2) create value and innovation with other organizations in the social network. The 
latter is what we consider to be the synergistic effect of collaboration, which has been emphasized as an 
important source for economic performance, productivity, effectiveness and efficiency.298–300 This is 
usually a more complex concept to identify and measure but potentially an important mechanism through 
which collaboration can have a positive impact on community health.  
The resources embedded in an organizational network can be tangible (e.g., materials, financial, 
staffing) or intangible (e.g., information, tacit knowledge, introductions to other organizations, 
etc).38,43,301,302 The tangible resources potentially add value by improving the breadth of resources 




which network expertise and resources are combined to facilitate the generation of new forms of 
resources, innovation, and value creation.73,303 This innovation would likely not occur if it were not for the 
interactions assumed to exist in collaborative relationships.  
Data 
Sample Definition 
 Counties were included in our sample if they were served by a single LHD. Our sample was further 
limited by the availability of data on LHD community partnerships obtained from the National Association 
of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) Profile Study. The set of questions from the NACCHO survey 
that were used to operationalize social capital measures are only administered to a statistical sample of 
LHDs completing the full survey. Furthermore, we limited the NACCHO data to 2008 and 2016 because 
these were the only surveys that asked the same set of questions on LHD community partnerships. Our 
final sample includes 618 county-years (280 in 2008 and 338 in 2016). 
Data 
The data source for the mortality outcomes was the CDC’s Wide-Ranging Online Data for 
Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) underlying cause-of-death files. We extracted county-level data from 
2009 and 2017 on diabetes-related mortality, heart disease-related mortality, and infant mortality. The 
data source for the intermediate outcomes was the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation County Health 
Rankings database. The County Health Rankings data was available starting in 2010; therefore, we used 
data from 2010 and 2017 for the intermediate outcomes. 
County-level population size, age and race distribution, and median income came from the 2008 
to 2016 American Community Survey. Uninsurance rate came from the US Census Bureau Small Area 
Health Insurance Estimates and unemployment rate came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area 
Unemployment. Local health department characteristics were drawn from the NACCHO Profile Study. The 




partnerships, programs, and practice. The response rates were 83% in 2008 and 76% in 2016 of all LHDs 
in the US. Only a subset of these LHDs that completed the survey answered the questions on LHD 
“Partnership and Collaboration” (19% in 2008 and 34% in 2016). The NACCHO data also includes a 
crosswalk that links LHDs to the geographic jurisdictions they serve. Approximately 70% of LHDs serve a 
single county, with the remainder serving multiple counties or sub-county jurisdictions. All these datasets 
were linked using the five-digit Federal Information Processing Standards code which uniquely identifies 
counties. 
Methods 
 We used a cross-sectional design using state fixed effects to determine the association between 
each of the outcomes with measures of LHD social capital. We estimated separate models for 2008 and 
2016. We used 1-year lagged outcomes (e.g, 2009 outcome for 2008 social capital measures and county 
characteristics). The only exception was that we used 2-year lagged intermediate outcomes for the 2008 
cross-sectional models because data was only available starting in 2010. 
Our models controlled for county-level population size, age and racial composition, median 
income, unemployment and uninsurance rate. We also included covariates to account for the presence 
of a local board of health, LHD completion of a CHNA and community health improvement plan. We 
provided descriptive statistics and results from bivariate analyses of each social capital measure and all 
covariates to examine their relationship with the outcomes.  
 To understand the relationship among the social capital measures and potential issues of 
collinearity in our models, we conducted bivariate analyses for each of the four measures (results not 
presented here but available upon request). The pair of social capital measures that had the highest level 
of correlation was network size and cross-sectorial networks (approximately 0.70). As a result, we 
estimated multivariate models by introducing each social capital measure individually, and a model that 




(VIF) for each independent variable in our full model to formally evaluate the effect of multi-collinearity 
among independent variables.304 This was accomplished by regressing each independent variable on all 
other independent variables included in the model.304–306 The formula for the VIF is:  
1 / 1 – R2 (x1) 
in which R2 is obtained from each regression of the independent variable on all other variables. A VIF 
higher than 10 means that a particular independent variable has high multi-collinearity.304–306  
Outcome  
The mortality outcomes included diabetes-related causes, heart disease-related causes, and 
infant mortality. We calculated county-level crude rates by dividing the number of deaths by the total 
population in each county and multiplying by 100,000. We used crude rates but adjusted for county-level 
age distribution in our models, using three age groups (i.e., 0-19, 19-64, and 65 and older).267  We allowed 
for a one-year lag between the independent variables and mortality rates. We used International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10) to identify each 
of the three causes of mortality. The ICD-10 codes used for diabetes-related mortality were E10-E14. The 
ICD-10 codes used for heart disease-related mortality were I00 to I78. Finally, we used all causes of 
mortality for people under the age of 1 to identify infant mortality. 
The intermediate outcomes were: (a) diabetes monitoring (percentage of diabetic Medicare 
enrollees ages 65-75 that receive HbA1c monitoring); (b) smoking (percentage of adults 18 and older who 
are current smokers); and (c) low Birth weight (percentage of live births with low birthweight <2,500 
grams). 
Our selection of outcomes related to diabetes, cardiovascular health, and maternal and child 
health was based on whether they were reasonably expected to be influenced by LHD interventions and 
more likely to succeed with higher levels of cross-sectorial collaboration. Additionally, we focused on 




health priorities have traditionally aligned with key Federal funding and programs. Specifically, the ACA’s 
Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Winnable 
Battles, and the US Department of Health and Human Services Healthy People program. At the center of 
each of these programs is the understanding that cross-sectorial collaboration is necessary to achieve 
program goals.307–309 We discuss each of the programs in the following paragraphs. 
The goal of the PPHF is “to provide expanded and sustained national investments in prevention 
and public health, to improve health outcomes, and to enhance health care quality”.307 Since its inception 
in fiscal year 2010, Federal agencies have received approximately $1 billion annually to reduce the leading 
causes of death and disability, support early detection of and response to health conditions, and expand 
evidence-based strategies.307,310 Most of this funding is redirected to states and local jurisdictions which 
are primarily responsible for implementing locally-tailored programs. Since its start, the PPHF has 
consistently funded the three areas reflected by our outcomes.311 One mechanism for funding state LHDs 
is the Preventive Health & Health Services Block Grant which funds all 50 states, Washington DC, American 
Indian tribes, and eight US territories. This particular funding source has made $160 million available each 
year.312  
The CDC Winnable Battles initiative started in 2010 and are “public health priorities where the 
CDC and its partners can make significant progress in a relatively short timeframe”.313 State and local 
public health professionals, policy makers, and health care professionals have integrated the Winnable 
Battles process in how they identify, prioritize and take action to improve health outcomes in their 
jurisdictions.308 At the local level, it has facilitated an environment where partners from various sectors 
work together to improve public health through the creation of Winnable Battles State Action Plans. Our 
study outcomes were also aligned with the Winnable Battles priorities.313 
Finally, Healthy People “provides science-based, 10-year national objectives for improving the 




been four Healthy People initiatives, with the first launched in 1979 (Healthy People 1990) and Healthy 
People 2030 currently in development.314 Again, our study outcomes aligned with the goals prioritized by 
Healthy People 2020 which covers both years examined in our analyses (i.e., 2009 and 2017) 315 In fact, 
diabetes, cardiovascular health and infant mortality were priorities in earlier Healthy People initiatives.316    
It is important to highlight the fact that LHDs often lead the efforts to address the priorities 
targeted by Federal initiatives. They often serve as the anchor institution but are expected to form 
partnerships with other local stakeholders to address specific priorities. Polk County in Wisconsin is one 
example of an established collaboration between the LHD, nonprofit hospitals and other stakeholders.92 
Their Chronic Care Plus Program used a “free clinic” model in which patients were screened by the LHD 
and then referred to one of the three local nonprofit hospitals for additional follow up.92 In another 
collaborative effort, two of the nonprofit hospitals worked with the LHD on the Wisconsin Initiative to 
Promote Healthy Lifestyles project.92 The project housed a LHD health educator in clinic settings who 
provided care coordination for patients.92  
There are several other examples of how these formal and informal partnerships work to improve 
community health. For instance, a LHD organizes a health fair and provides free diabetes screening to 
attendees. These free screenings are usually made available through collaborations with local medical 
institutions or business partners (e.g, community health center and local business). The people whose test 
is abnormal are referred to a local community health center for further testing and follow up. Another 
classical example includes efforts to decrease smoking with a focus on prevention and treatment. From 
the prevention perspective, the LHD and other advocacy groups coordinate efforts to check whether 
convenience stores are selling tobacco products to minors without asking for identification. The LHD can 
also collaborate with public schools to educate youth about the harms of using tobacco products. From 
the treatment perspective, the LHD and other community organizations can refer residents who are 




many other examples in which the LHD serves as the anchor institution in public health interventions and 
relies on the participation by other local stakeholders to successfully achieve improved community health. 
Explanatory Variables 
Social Capital 
 We used a set of questions from the 2008 and 2016 NACCHO survey to operationalize measures 
of social capital. Specifically, the NACCHO survey asks LHDs to indicate whether they maintain a 
relationship with certain organizations in the community. There are 21 organizations listed in the survey 
and four types of relationships that the LHD can check to indicate if and how they are connected to each 
of the 21 organizations. The four types of relationships are: (1) shared personnel and resources; (2) written 
agreement; (3) regularly scheduled meetings; and (4) exchange information. If the LHD does not maintain 
any type of relationship with a specific organization, they select “no relationship”. If the organization does 
not exist in the LHD jurisdiction, then the LHD checks “N/A”. The actual wording of the question is “We 
are interested in knowing about your LHD’s collaborations with other organizations.  Check each way that 
your LHD has worked with each organization in the past year.  For each organization, check all that apply.  
If the organization does not exist within your community service area, check N/A.”  
A key dimension of social capital measured was the strength of ties embedded in the LHD 
organizational network (i.e., multiplex networks). The other dimension measured the breadth of 
resources in the LHD organizational network (i.e., network size, sub-network, and cross-sectorial 
indicator). The operationalization of each of these measures is described below. 
Social Capital: Network Size. Network size was calculated by counting the number of 
organizations to which the LHD was connected through any type of relationship. We also created a 
network size variable that required the presence of all four relationship types (i.e., multiplex networks). 
In this case, the LHD was considered to be connected to the organization only if it maintained all four 




partially captures the organizations that may be available in the community. The second one, referred to 
as “multiplex networks”, reflects a higher intensity of collaboration between the LHD-organization dyad. 
Based on our theoretical framework, we predicted that these organizations would have a higher 
propensity to share their resources with LHD and vice-versa because of the multiplexity embedded in the 
network. 
Social Capital: Sub-Networks. We operationalized a social capital measure based on the most 
prevalent sub-network configuration that existed across all LHD networks. We created these social capital 
measures because they may provide a more uniform comparison of how LHD relationships and the 
resulting access to resources may be associated with the outcome. Also, there may be cases in which an 
organization does not exist in the LHD jurisdiction which may have direct implications for measures such 
as network size. In these cases, the LHD may have a smaller network size simply because of the 
unavailability of certain types of organizations in the community. 
To create this social capital measure, we first identified the five organizations that were most 
prevalent across all LHDs. We then created a dummy variable that equaled 1 if the LHD maintained a sub-
network that contained all top five organizations connect through any type of relationship (i.e., 5-top-
organization sub-network). 
 To identify the top five organizations, we created dummy variables that equaled one for each 
LHD-organization-relationship configuration. For instance, the dyad LHD-community health center (CHC) 
could have the four following configurations: LHD-CHC-shared personnel/resources; LHD-CHC-written 
agreement, LHD-CHC-regular meetings, and LHD-CHC-exchange information. We then examined the 
distribution of these LHD-organization-relationship configurations to identify the top five organizations to 
which LHDs were connected. The top five organizations identified were: hospitals, public schools, 




Social Capital: Cross-Sectorial Networks. We operationalized a variable that ranged from 0 to 4 
to measure the number of sectors embedded in the LHD organizational network. To do this, we combined 
the definitions used by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Systems for Action and NACCHO.317,318 
Specifically, we defined four sectors: medical care, social services, governmental, and criminal justice. 
Table 1 lists the organizations grouped by sector. 
Nonprofit Hospital and Local Health Department Collaboration. In order to test our second set 
of hypotheses, we created a dummy variable that equaled 1 if the counties were located in NY and 0 
otherwise. This variable serves as a proxy for LHD-nonprofit hospital collaboration. As previously 
mentioned, NY is the only state that has required LHDs and nonprofit hospitals to collaborate on all three 
health planning activities: community health needs assessment, joint selection of local priorities, and joint 
implementation of initiatives that target the priorities. We interacted this dummy variable with the LHD 
social capital indicator that measured the range of sectors embedded in the LHD organizational network 
(i.e., cross-sectorial). 
Covariates 
 We created three age groups to include in our models (0-19, 20-64, 65 and older) and three race 
categories (White, Black, and Other). We included continuous variables for uninsurance and 
unemployment rate, and median income. All three LHD characteristics entered our model as dummy 
variables (i.e., local board of health, LHD completion of a CHNA and community health improvement plan).  
 Some of the covariates were excluded from the model that used 2009 outcomes because they 
involved activities that happened after 2009. These covariates included LHD completion of CHNA and 
improvement plan.  
Limitations 
 Our study has many limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. First, 




on collaboration and partnerships. This limits the generalizability of study findings to counties that have 
similar characteristics as the ones included in our study sample. There is a possibility that the associations 
observed in our study sample look very different in other counties because of the different dynamics that 
underlie the creation and maintenance of the LHD’s social capital, as well as different county-level drivers 
of the outcomes used in our study. 
 Also, we may not have controlled for other important county characteristics that influence the 
outcomes in our study which could bias our results. Furthermore, we cannot infer causality based on our 
cross-sectional study design. It could be that the LHDs in counties that experience higher rates of mortality 
deliberately form more multiplex relationships with other organizations in order to improve community 
health and reduce mortality. This type of reverse causality could mean that our measures of social capital 
are endogenous which would bias our results. 
Results 
Descriptives and Bivariate Analysis 
 Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for all counties by year. Most of the characteristics were 
very similar across the two years of data. Diabetes and heart disease-related mortality rates were higher 
in 2016 compared to 2009, while infant mortality was lower in 2016. As expected, uninsurance rate was 
substantially lower in 2016 due to the ACA insurance expansions. Unemployment rate was lower and 
median income was higher in 2016. The counties included in the 2016 sample had less local boards of 
health. Finally, most social capital measures were comparable across both years of data. 
The results from the bivariate analysis revealed that all LHD social capital measures were 
significantly negatively associated with mortality outcomes in both years, except for infant mortality 
which was negatively associated but not significant. Generally, diabetes monitoring was positively 




with social capital measures. Finally, low birth weight was mostly negatively associated with social capital 
measures except for a few instances. 
Some of the demographic characteristics were positively associated with diabetes and heart disease-
related mortality in both years, including the 65 and older group, whites, and uninsurance rate. Having a 
local board of health was mostly positively associated with the outcomes except for low birth weight in 
2017. The two other LHD activities (i.e, CHA and CHIP) were negatively associated with mortality outcomes 
but positively associated with diabetes monitoring. These bivariate relationships are all in the expected 
direction. 
Regression Results  
 We estimated nine different multivariate models for each year and outcome. All models 
controlled for the county-by-year covariates and state fixed effects. Model 1 only included the county-by-
year controls and state fixed effects. For Models 2 to 5, we added each of the social capital measures 
individually to examine their association with the outcome. In Model 6, we added both network size 
variables; that is, network size defined based on the presence of any type of relationship between the 
LHD and organization, and network size defined based on the simultaneous presence of all types of 
relationships (i.e., strength of tie dimension). Building on the previous model, we added the cross-sectorial 
organizational network measure (i.e., breadth of resources dimension) in Model 7. Finally, in Model 8 we 
added the LHD sub-network indicator for networks that contain all five top organizations. The full estimate 
results for Models 1-9 can be found in the Appendix.  
 We present the results for the full model, or Model 9, which included all county-by-year 
covariates, state fixed effects, all four social capital measures and the interaction of the LHD-nonprofit 
hospital collaboration dummy variable with the cross-sectorial variable (i.e., New York * Cross-Sectorial). 
Generally, the coefficients on the social capital indicators were consistent (i.e., same direction) across all 




All VIFs were below 10, with the vast majority of VIFs at or below 5. This gives us confidence that multi-
collinearity is not an issue with our full model. 
 Table 4 displays the results for heart disease-related mortality and smoking percentage for 2009 
and 2017. Network size was negatively associated with heart disease-related mortality in 2009 (-3.234 
deaths/100,000; p<0.10), but not in 2016. The network size measure that takes into account the strength 
of the relationship between the LHD and other organizations, was positively associated with heart disease-
related mortality in 2009 (2.837 deaths/100,000; p<0.10), but not in 2016. The latter finding could be due 
to the fact that this network size measure likely includes fewer organizations, consequently reflecting a 
smaller network size. The cross-sectorial network measure was positively associated with smoking 
percentage in 2009 (1.6%; p<0.05), but not in 2016. When all top five organizations exist in the LHD 
organizational network, smoking percentage was lower in 2009 (-1.8%; p<0.05), but this association was 
not significant in 2016. Finally, the coefficient on the interaction of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration 
in local health planning and cross-sectorial networks was negatively associated with heart disease-related 
mortality in 2017 (-55.48 deaths/100,000; p<0.05). The coefficients on all other covariates are in the 
expected direction, except for an unexpected negative association between uninsurance rate and 
mortality in 2017. This could be due to the fact that we used a 1-year lagged mortality outcome. That is, 
insurance is likely to have a more distal impact on heart disease-related mortality which is not being 
captured by our cross-sectional design. We estimated a model without a control for uninsurance and the 
results reported above remained virtually the same. 
 Table 5 displays the results for diabetes-related mortality and diabetes monitoring for 2009 and 
2017. None of the coefficients on the social capital measures were significant, except for a positive 
association between network size and diabetes monitoring in 2009 (0.31%; p<0.10).  
 Table 6 displays the results for infant mortality and low birth weight percentage for 2009 and 




was the network size variable that reflects a higher level of collaboration intensity which was negatively 
associated with infant mortality in 2009 (-26.94 deaths/100,000; p<0.05). Also, the presence of all five top 
organizations was positively associated with the percentage of low birth weight in 2009 (0.3%; p<0.10). 
Interestingly, the interaction of nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration in local health planning with cross-
sectorial networks was negatively associated with both infant mortality and percentage of low birth 
weight (-991.7 deaths/100,000; p<0.10; and -2.3%; p<0.10 respectively). 
Discussion 
In this study we sought to understand whether cross-sectorial collaboration facilitates improved 
community health outcomes using social capital theory to motivate the conceptualization of LHD social 
capital. Our first hypothesis was that LHD social capital would be negatively associated with mortality 
outcomes, smoking and low birth weight percentage, but positively associated with diabetes monitoring 
percentage. We further explored the role of LHD social capital in the context of LHD-nonprofit hospital 
collaboration in local health planning. Our second hypothesis was that we would observe a similar pattern 
of association between LHD social capital and study outcomes in counties where nonprofit hospitals were 
required to collaborate with LHDs in local health planning.  
 Our findings do not support the first hypothesis except for a few instances including heart disease-
related mortality, smoking, and diabetes monitoring, and infant mortality in 2009. None of the coefficients 
on the social capital measures were significant in 2017. We also did not observe any obvious patterns in 
the association between social capital measures and the study outcomes, as was the case for the bivariate 
analyses. One finding was in the opposite direction from our hypothesis, we found that counties in which 
LHDs that have more cross-sectorial networks had a slightly higher percentage of smokers in the 
population.  
 An interesting finding was that counties in which LHDs and nonprofit hospitals collaborated in 




mortality in 2017. This finding supports our second hypothesis, albeit this is the only significant association 
for this specific characteristic. Collaboration and better coordination between LHDs and nonprofit 
hospitals has long been believed to hold great potential for better performance of the public health 
system. Closer collaboration and integration between governmental public health agencies and the health 
care delivery system may enhance the capacities of both to improve population health and may support 
the efforts of other public health system actors.14,16,18 
Conclusion 
Using a social capital theoretical framework we sought to understand whether the resources 
embedded in the LHD organizational network may be productive in improving community health. The two 
dimensions of social capital captured in our measures of LHD social capital included the strength of ties 
(i.e., collaboration intensity) and the breadth of resources (i.e., cross-sectorial quality of LHD networks). 
We did not find strong evidence that these measures were significantly associated with mortality or 
intermediate outcomes. However, in the context of a requirement for collaboration in local health 
planning between two of the largest producers of community health (i.e., LHD and nonprofit hospitals), 
counties that also had more cross-sectorial LHD organizational networks experienced lower heart disease-
related mortality. This latter finding may indicate that the productive power of LHD social capital is more 
likely to be realized when partners collaborate in targeted local health planning efforts as is the case in 
NY. 
Social capital has been framed within the social determinants of health and identified as an 
“ecological-level influence” that has role in producing health.14 We found some evidence that social 
capital was associated with mortality and intermediate outcomes and strongly encourage other 
population health researchers to use social capital theory in future research for a more comprehensive 





Table 1. Organizations Grouped by Sector 
Medical Care Social Services Governmental Criminal Justice 
Hospital 
Comm. Health Centers 
Physician practice  
Other health providers 









Cooperative extensions  
Local planning agency  
Parks and recreations  
Economic and 
community 
development agencies  
Tribal gov’t agencies  
Transportation 























Table 2. Descriptives for All Counties 
 2009 2016 
 (n=280) (n=338) 
Diabetes Related Mortality per 100,000 27.10 31.87 
 (12.25) (15.56) 
Diabetes Monitoring (%) 1 80.10 85.24 
 (7.7) (4.97) 
Heart Disease Related Mortality per 100,000 236.86 249.54 
 (87.91) (92.77) 
Smoking (%) 2 22.39 17.71 
 (5.74) (3.48) 
Infant Mortality per 100,000 714.75 673.86 
 (253.90) (397.06) 
Low Birth Weight (%)3 7.70 8.17 
 (1.50) (1.89) 
Preventable Hospital Stays per 100,000 4 89.06 58.01 
 (38.36) (22.66) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population 240,971 227,380 
 (734,519) (470,520) 
Metropolitan Status (%) 51.8 53.9 
Age (%)   
   0-19 26.8 25.1 
   20-64 58.7 58.0 
   65+ 14.5 16.9 
Race (%)   
   White 84.6 82.5 
   Black 7.4 9.3 
   Other 6.1 5.6 
Uninsurance (%) 16.6 10.1 
Unemployment (%) 9.5 5.1 
Median Income ($) 46,565 51,506 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT (%)  
Local Board of Health 76.8 66.5 
Conducted CHA . 82.0 
Conducted CHIP . 68.3 
Social Capital Measures 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie 16.76 15.9 
Multiplex 1.5 0.6 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  3.68 3.6 
Sub-Networks (% of counties in which LHD was connected through any relationship) 





Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from the American Community Survey, National Association of County and City 
Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Mortality outcomes are defined in the text. 
1) Percentage of diabetic Medicare enrollees ages 65-75 that receive HbA1c monitoring; 2) Percentage of adults who 
are current smokers (18 and older); 3) Percentage of live births with low birthweight (< 2,500 grams); 4) Rate of 
hospital stays for ambulatory-care sensitive conditions per 100,000 Medicare enrollees; 5) Top five organizations 
were: hospitals, public schools, community based organizations, emergency responders, and universities (see text 



























Table 3a. Bivariate Analysis: Heart Disease Mortality Rate and Smoking Percentage 










 (n=280) (n=338) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population -0.1989* -0.2247* -0.3254* -0.3293 
Metropolitan Status -0.4765* -0.1799* -0.4530* -0.2524* 
Age      
   0-19 -0.5141* -0.0211 -0.4157* -0.0123 
   20-64 -0.4657* -0.0418 -0.5212*  -0.0737 
   65+ 0.7441* 0.0440 0.6380* 0.0602 
Race      
   White 0.2712* 0.0688 0.2005* -0.0965 
   Black -0.0479 0.0065 -0.0174  0.1891* 
   Other -0.3619* -0.1338* -0.3666* -0.1444* 
Uninsurance  0.0468 0.1127 0.0994  0.2663* 
Unemployment  -0.0342 0.1788*  0.1890* 0.2984* 
Median Income  -0.5028* -0.4735* -0.5463* -0.6662* 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT  
Local Board of Health  0.1837* 0.3027* -0.0154 0.0056 
Conducted CHA3     -0.1044  -0.1094* 
Conducted CHIP4     -0.1601* -0.1356* 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie -0.2312*  -0.1297* -0.2584* -0.1381* 
Multiplex  -0.1744* -0.0761  -0.1868* -0.2390* 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  -0.2042* 0.003 -0.2109* -0.1177* 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations5 -0.2195* -0.1739* -0.3353*  -0.1736* 
 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1) 
Rate per 100,000 residents. Defined using ICD-10 codes I00 to I78. We used 1-year lagged mortality rates (2009 
mortality for 2008 covariates and 2017 mortality for 2016 covariates); 2) Percentage of adults 18 and older who are 
current smokers. We used 2010 smoking percentage for 2008 covariates (2-year lag) and 2017 smoking percentage 
for 2016 covariates (1-year lag); 3) Community health assessment conducted in 2012 or later years; 4) Community 
health improvement plan conducted in 2012 or later years; 5) Top five organizations were: hospitals, public schools, 
community based organizations, emergency responders, and universities (see text for more details) *** p<0.01; ** 





Table 3b. Bivariate Analysis: Diabetes-Related Mortality Rate and Diabetes Monitoring Percentage 













 (n=280) (n=338) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population -0.2015* -0.0906 -0.2988* -0.056 
Metropolitan Status -0.4288* 0.0682 -0.4666* 0.1263* 
Age      
   0-19 -0.2421*  -0.2565* -0.2634* -0.0994 
   20-64 -0.3033* 0.1219* -0.3017* -0.1081* 
   65+ 0.4608* 0.0907 0.3823*  0.1393* 
Race      
   White 0.1422 0.4067* 0.0152 0.2755* 
   Black -0.0649 -0.1103 0.0957 -0.0068 
   Other -0.1858* -0.4947 -0.1915* -0.5110* 
Uninsurance  0.3195* -0.3952* 0.2375* -0.3256* 
Unemployment  0.1370 -0.0617 0.2905* -0.1194* 
Median Income  -0.5873*  0.1924* -0.5608*  0.0479 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT  
Local Board of Health 0.1120 0.0402 -0.0648 0.1394* 
Conducted CHA3     -0.0896 0.1190* 
Conducted CHIP4     -0.0601 0.1064 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie  -0.2502* 0.2140* -0.2137* 0.0364 
Multiplex  -0.1724*  0.0502 -0.1769* -0.0979 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  -0.1605* 0.0932 -0.1828* 0.0043 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations5 -0.2207* 0.1839* -0.2997* -0.0012 
 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1) 
Rate per 100,000 residents. Defined using ICD-10 codes E10-E14. We used 1-year lagged mortality rates (2009 
mortality for 2008 covariates and 2017 mortality for 2016 covariates); 2) Percentage of diabetic Medicare enrollees 
ages 65-75 that receive HbA1c monitoring. We used 2010 diabetes monitoring percentage for 2008 covariates (2-
year lag) and 2017 diabetes monitoring percentage for 2016 covariates (1-year lag); 3) Community health assessment 
conducted in 2012 or later years; 4) Community health improvement plan conducted in 2012 or later years; 5) Top 
five organizations were: hospitals, public schools, community based organizations, emergency responders, and 




Table 3c. Bivariate Analysis: Infant Mortality Rate and Low Birth Weight Rate 












 (n=280) (n=338) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population -0.1492 -0.0135 -0.1917*  0.0192 
Metropolitan Status -0.3759* 0.0410 -0.1228 0.0405 
Age      
   0-19 -0.1401 -0.1477* -0.0928 -0.0685 
   20-64 0.0089  0.2536* 0.0949 0.1409* 
   65+ 0.1249 -0.0927 0.0075 -0.0506 
Race      
   White -0.1567 -0.4017* -0.2735* -0.4509* 
   Black  0.3999* 0.6670* 0.4033* 0.5978* 
   Other -0.2334* -0.1273* -0.1707 -0.1209* 
Uninsurance  0.1615 0.1727* -0.0094 0.2104* 
Unemployment  0.1832 0.0650 0.3013* 0.2127* 
Median Income  -0.5173* -0.2932* -0.3520* -0.3483* 
LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT  
Local Board of Health 0.1705 0.0287 0.1416 -0.1250* 
Conducted CHA3     -0.0186 -0.1053 
Conducted CHIP4     -0.0338 -0.0547 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie -0.1017 0.0291 -0.0083 -0.1119* 
Multiplex  -0.1588 -0.0183 -0.0874 -0.0620 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  -0.1293 -0.0633 0.0072 -0.0785 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations5 -0.2391* 0.0926 -0.0341 -0.1138* 
 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1) 
Rate per 100,000 population under age 1. We used all causes of mortality for people under the age of 1 to identify 
infant mortality. We used 1-year lagged mortality rates (2009 mortality for 2008 covariates and 2017 mortality for 
2016 covariates); 2) Percentage of live births with low birthweight (<2,500 grams). We used 2010 low birth weight 
percentage for 2008 covariates (2-year lag) and 2017 low birth weight percentage for 2016 covariates (1-year lag); 
3) Community health assessment conducted in 2012 or later years; 4) Community health improvement plan 
conducted in 2012 or later years; 5) Top five organizations were: hospitals, public schools, community based 




Table 4. Multivariate Regression Results for 2009 and 2017: Heart-Disease Mortality and Smoking 
Percentage 








  (n=280) (n=338) 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie -3.234* -0.0736 0.0354 -0.0165 
  (1.909) (0.146) (1.929) (0.0372) 
Multiplex  2.837* -0.0477 0.239 0.0126 
  (1.630) (0.113) (2.039) (0.0817) 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  0.213 1.648** -2.973 0.182 
  (8.414) (0.778) (10.92) (0.197) 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations 13.44 -1.851** 0.148 -0.121 
  (9.567) (0.781) (11.20) (0.248) 
Collaboration in Local Health Planning 
New York*Cross Sectorial 4.920 -2.490 -55.48*** -3.319 
  (21.61) (1.928) (19.99) (2.091) 
New York 12.04 11.61* 155.6** 0.437 
  (74.56) (6.753) (72.84) (0.526) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population 5.70-7 1.41-7 5.63-7       -1.06-6*** 
Metropolitan Status     -24.52*** 0.484   -20.25** -0.029 
AGE (ref. group is 20-64) 
   0-19  -3.381** -0.002 0.216 0.040 
   65+  12.20*** -0.210      9.410***      -0.120*** 
RACE (ref. group is White) 
   Black  0.945**     -0.089** -0.043 0.022** 
   Other -0.0230 0.096 -0.395 0.095** 
Other County Factors 
Uninsurance  0.938   -0.336** -5.139** -0.017 
Unemployment  0.696 0.237 5.547** 0.109 
Median Income  -0.001*      -0.0002***  -0.002***        -0.0001*** 
LHD CHARACTERISTICS 
Local Board of Health 32.42*** 2.727*** -2.160 0.243 
Conducted CHA     9.021 0.259 
Conducted CHIP   12.53 -0.013 
Constant 205.1*** 33.70*** 270.8*** 24.59*** 
 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our 
models included state fixed effects and used robust standard errors (in parentheses). Outcomes are defined in the 
text. 1) We used 1-year lagged heart disease related mortality (i.e., 2009 mortality for 2008 covariates). 2) We used 




Table 5. Multivariate Regression Results for 2009 and 2017: Diabetes-Related Mortality and Diabetes 
Monitoring 










  (n=280) (n=338) 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie -0.631 0.311* -0.0129 0.0688 
  (0.471) (0.182) (0.570) (0.120) 
Multiplex  0.0929 -0.240 -0.519 -0.128 
  (0.292) (0.159) (0.545) (0.134) 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  2.752 -0.907 -0.186 -0.884 
  (3.310) (0.952) (3.173) (0.659) 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations -1.517 1.297 -5.507 0.300 
  (2.762) (1.054) (4.848) (0.676) 
Collaboration in Local Health Planning 
New York*Cross Sectorial 5.271 1.711 8.982 3.560 
  (17.57) (6.587) (26.27) (4.654) 
New York -0.751 0.196 -3.149 0.0778 
  (4.629) (1.886) (6.475) (1.259) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population   -1.09-6* 3.61-7 -3.76-6* 6.67-7 
Metropolitan Status -2.622 0.328    -8.211***   1.233** 
AGE (ref. group is 20-64) 
   0-19 -0.040 -0.150 -0.504 0.208 
   65+      1.059** -0.173 0.511 0.104 
RACE (ref. group is White) 
   Black 0.084 -0.088**       0.371*** -0.014 
   Other 0.209  -0.511*** 0.151       -0.272*** 
Other County Factors 
Uninsurance  0.604 0.228 -0.197 0.200 
Unemployment  -0.017 0.001 -0.0249 0.151 
Median Income          -0.0003***      0.0002***       -0.0004***       6.16-5*** 
LHD CHARACTERISTICS 
Local Board of Health -0.737 -1.783 0.558 -0.311 
Conducted CHA     -0.036    1.269** 
Conducted CHIP     2.952 -0.523 
Constant 16.55 77.26***   60.71**      73.71*** 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our 
models included state fixed effects and used robust standard errors (in parentheses). Outcomes are defined in the 
text. 1) We used 1-year lagged diabetes-related related mortality (i.e., 2009 mortality for 2008 covariates). 2) We 
used 2-year lagged diabetes monitoring percentage. 3) We used 1-year lagged diabetes monitoring percentage. *** 




Table 6. Multivariate Regression Results for 2009 and 2017: Infant Mortality and Low Birth Weight 
Percentage 










  (n=280) (n=338) 
NETWORK SIZE 
Any tie 17.28 0.020 -7.945 -0.028 
  (15.11) (0.0228) (17.70) (0.0361) 
Multiplex  -26.94** -0.009 -25.98 0.00158 
  (12.22) (0.0243) (27.52) (0.0489) 
ALTER HETEROGENEITY 
Cross-Sectorial Networks  39.81 -0.174 -203.6 0.076 
  (86.30) (0.135) (146.8) (0.189) 
SUB-NETWORK 
ALL 5 top organizations -166.2 0.311* 429.6 -0.142 
  (119.0) (0.160) (296.6) (0.228) 
Collaboration in Local Health Planning 
New York*Cross Sectorial -991.7* -2.335* 1,530 -1.587 
  (569.1) (1.263) (1,791) (2.663) 
New York 175.2 0.166 -516.8 -0.174 
  (152.5) (0.350) (489.9) (0.684) 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
Total Population -5.66-7 8.95-8 -2.94-5  2.74-7* 
Metropolitan Status -94.61 -0.0431 -643.3** 0.090 
AGE (ref. group is 20-64) 
   0-19 -9.297 -0.066 -60.73 0.027 
   65+ -19.07    -0.061** -24.47 0.029 
RACE (ref. group is White) 
   Black  2.040   0.067***  6.090      0.069*** 
   Other -2.025 0.022** -18.18 0.012 
Other County Factors 
Uninsurance  7.782 -0.033 16.17    -0.099** 
Unemployment  10.29   0.0003 153.1 0.090 
Median Income   -0.005*       -3.22-5*** -0.007        -3.28-5*** 
LHD CHARACTERISTICS 
Local Board of Health 120.0* 0.036 33.53 0.023 
Conducted CHA     219.5 -0.038 
Conducted CHIP     117.7 0.022 
Constant 1,176** 13.31*** 3,480*      9.802*** 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our 
models included state fixed effects and used robust standard errors (in parentheses). Outcomes are defined in the 
text. 1) We used 1-year lagged infant mortality (i.e., 2009 mortality for 2008 covariates). 2) We used 2-year lagged 






VI. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 In our first two studies, we found that collaboration between nonprofit hospitals and local health 
departments (LHD) in key local health planning activities (community health needs assessment, joint 
selection of local priorities, and joint implementation of initiatives that target the priorities) led to 
increased investment in population health by nonprofit hospitals and a decrease in drug-induced 
mortality. In the first study, nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration in local health planning led to an 
incremental increase in investment on community health activities by approximately 0.07% of hospital 
operating expenses, or about $265,000 per nonprofit hospital. In our second study, we found that 
collaboration in local health planning by the two institutions, combined with joint prioritization of 
substance abuse and collaborative implementation of interventions to target substance abuse, led to an 
incremental decrease in drug-induced mortality of approximately 3 to 4 deaths per 100,000 residents. 
This represents a 18% decrease in drug-induced mortality based on the 2016 national rate. 
Finally, in our third study, we did not find consistent evidence that LHD social capital was 
associated with mortality (diabetes, heart disease, and infant) and intermediate outcomes (diabetes 
monitoring, smoking, and low birth weight). We found some evidence that supported our hypotheses in 
2009, but none of the results were significant in 2017. There were no obvious patterns in the association 
between social capital measures and the study outcomes. One finding was in the opposite direction from 
our hypothesis, we found that counties in which LHDs that have more cross-sectorial networks had a 
slightly higher percentage of smokers in the population. 
However, in the context of a requirement for collaboration in local health planning between LHDs 
and nonprofit hospitals, counties that also had more cross-sectorial LHD organizational networks 
experienced lower heart disease-related mortality in 2017. While this finding supports our hypothesis, it 




 The policy implications of these findings are applicable to all levels of government. At the Federal 
level, Section 9007 regulatory language can be updated to require nonprofit hospitals to collaborate with 
LHDs. Currently, Section 9007 provides general guidance to nonprofit hospitals on the requirement for a 
community health needs assessment (CHNA) and implementation strategy. It states that nonprofit 
hospitals need to obtain the input from “public health representatives”, but it does not explicitly require 
collaboration which leaves room for multiple interpretations and approaches. From our thorough 
qualitative review of health assessments and implementation strategies, it is clear that there is great 
variation in how nonprofit hospitals have obtained input from public health representatives and “who” 
they defined as “public health representatives”. A few nonprofit hospitals have partnered with LHDs to 
produce a single CHNA for their jurisdictions. However, most nonprofit hospitals have incorporated the 
input from “public health representatives” through the formation of a temporary community committee 
specifically created to gather input for the CHNA. The membership of these community committees vary 
widely but do not always include the participation of LHD representatives. Furthermore, the involvement 
of “public health representatives” in the development of the implementation strategy to address selected 
health priorities is close to non-existent. In other words, nonprofit hospitals are deciding on which 
interventions will be implemented over the next three years after the CHNA is completed without 
deliberately coordinating efforts with other community institutions. One way to address this 
heterogeneity of approaches would be to update the language in Section 9007 to require nonprofit 
hospitals to collaborate with LHDs in completing both the CHNA and implementation strategy.  
 At the State level, a similar approach to the NY Prevention Agenda can be used to require 
nonprofit hospital-LHD collaboration in local health planning. In fact, some states have ongoing efforts to 
better align hospitals and LHDs in health planning (e.g, Maryland, North Carolina, Maine, etc). For 




focus on requiring the two institutions to jointly select health priorities and collaboratively implement 
interventions to address the priorities. 
 Finally, local governments can play a role in influencing hospital community benefit activities. The 
tax exemptions from local tax properties are large and may be leveraged by local governments to 
influence hospital investment in community health and collaboration with LHDs in local health planning. 
 From the LHD’s perspective, as more LHDs seek accreditation from the Public Health Accreditation 
Board (PHAB) updates can be made to the pre-requisites for public health department accreditation. 
Among the pre-requisites is the completion of a CHNA and community health improvement plan. The 
PHAB can require LHDs to collaborate with nonprofit hospitals in meeting those pre-requisites. We expect 
that a combination of strategies that steer the two institutions to work together may prove to be 
especially effective. 
 As more states move in the same direction as NY by requiring nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to 
collaborate in local health planning, evidence from rigorously designed studies will emerge to shed light 
on whether such collaboration is indeed effective in improving population health investment and 
community health. Our findings indicate that this was an effective strategy in NY in relation to population 
health investment by nonprofit hospitals. We also found that the joint prioritization of substance abuse 
was effective in reducing drug-induced mortality, but these findings are generalizable to the 200 
jurisdictions included in our study. 
 Future work can build on the framework of our second study to examine other health priorities 
and community health outcomes. We are currently working on an analysis to examine the effect of joint 
prioritization of substance abuse on drug-related hospitalizations. The hypothesized outcome is more 
nuanced in this case. On the one hand, drug-related hospitalizations may increase because the community 
is better able to identify and bring individuals to the hospital who experience a drug overdose. In the long 




effective in decreasing drug addiction in the community and/or because people have better access to 
medication-assisted therapy and behavioral health treatment. 
 Some of the work related to this dissertation is being applied to ongoing efforts in Colorado and 
nationally. We are currently working with the Office of the Dean at the Colorado School of Public Health 
to build an online platform that will house information on local health planning by nonprofit hospitals and 
LHDs. We will track the priorities selected over time by the two institutions, as well as community health 
outcomes related to the top health priorities. This will help elucidate the current state of alignment in 
local health planning and help practitioners make adjustments accordingly. Interestingly, some 
jurisdictions in Colorado have aligned the cycles of CHNA and improvement plan for nonprofit hospitals 
and LHDs with the sole intent to have the two institutions collaborate in these activities. Understanding 
whether this approach leads to improved outcomes will be key moving forward. 
 We are also working on a national online platform that will house similar information for all US 
nonprofit hospitals with plans to include LHD information in the future. The goal is to set a baseline for 
hospital-based community health planning and prioritization, and to track it over time by gathering 
information from subsequent CHNA and implementation strategy. Another key element of this platform 
will be to share all the data with other researchers interested in this area of health policy. 
 These are some examples of how we plan to build on this initial research as reflected in each of 
our studies. We are confident that other innovative research approaches and ideas will emerge to help 
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APPENDIX A: APPENDIX FOR AIM 1 (CHAPTER III) 
Part 1. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
I. State Random Effects (Appendix Table A) 
The estimates including state random effects are slightly different than those using state fixed effects. 
This is likely due to the fact that the state random effects specification assumes that unobserved time-
invariant state-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables in our model. While this 
may be true for some of the covariates, this assumption may not hold true and bias the results with 
random effects. We performed the Hausman test to determine which specification to use (i.e., fixed or 
random effects). Under the null hypothesis, the random effects specification is preferred because it is 
both consistent and more efficient; while under the alternative hypothesis, the random effects 
specification is inconsistent (i.e., biased). Also, under the null hypothesis, the fixed effects model is also 
consistent but less efficient. 
The Hausman test for the specification using population health spending as the outcome rejected the null 
hypothesis (p=0.01); while the Hausman test for the specification using total community benefit spending 
as the outcome failed to reject the null hypothesis (p=0.24). In both cases the fixed effects speficification 
is consistent, and in the case of population health spending, the random effects specification is 
inconsistent. Therefore, our main specification includes state fixed effects. 
II. Urban and Rural Hospital Samples (Appendix Table B.) 
There was a larger impact on total community benefit spending in rural markets than urban markets. 
However, the estimate of the impact on population health spending was only significant in urban markets.   
II. Balanced Sample (Appendix Table C) 
The results reported in the main text were based on an unbalanced sample. The results in Appendix Table 
C based on a balanced sample are virtually identical to those reported in Table 2. This makes us less 
concerned about selection bias related to hospitals entering and leaving the sample. Hospitals may leave 
the sample for a variety of reasons. Some hospitals do not report community benefit spending in every 
year, other hospitals may drop out of the sample because they closed, merged, or began filing IRS Form 
990 and Schedule H in a consolidated format with other hospitals.  
III. Subsample limited to states that require local health departments to conduct a community health 
assessment (Appendix Table D) 
As discussed in the main text, NY and NC require their local health departments (LHD) to conduct a 
community health assessment (CHA) and require (NY) or encourage (NC) collaboration with local 
hospitals. There is also a subset of states in the control group that require LHDs to conducts a CHA 
(Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin). This is subsumed in the state fixed effects in the main analysis. Appendix Table D reports 
the results using only control states that require their LHDs to complete a CHA. The results of this 
estimation can be interpreted as the effect of the NY and NC policy changes, conditional on states 
requiring their LHDs to complete a CHA. The results in Appendix Table D show that the estimates of the 
impact on total community benefit spending are similar to those with the full sample. However, the 




IV. Subsample limited to states that expanded Medicaid (Appendix Table E) 
Similar to the preceding subsample (i.e., states that require their LHDs to conduct CHAs), we wanted to 
estimate our models conditional on Medicaid expansion status. While we controlled for the Medicaid 
Expansion in the main results there could be time-varying confounders correlated with collaboration 
between hospitals and LHDs and the decision to expand Medicaid. The results reported in Table E are 
virtually identical to the main results. We included states that had expanded Medicaid by 2016: Alaska, 
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. 
V. Inclusion of the Washout Period (Appendix Table F) 
The results without a washout period are quantitatively smaller than the results with the washout period. 
However, the magnitude of the change does not affect the interpretation or conclusions in the main text. 
During the first year of implementation, hospitals and local health departments are more likely to be 
getting acquainted with one another and making some initial plans for future collaboration. In other 
words, we would expect to see a smaller treatment effect when the washout period is included. 
VI. Inclusion of Maryland Hospitals (Appendix Table G) 
We estimated a specification that includes Maryland as a robustness check. As shown in Appendix Table 
G the results are robust. 
VII. Inclusion of Consolidated Reporters (Appendix Table H) 
 
Several hospitals in a multi-hospital system report community benefit spending at the system-level. The 
results in Appendix Table H reveal that inclusion of system hospitals attenuates the estimate for 
population health spending but it remains significant.  
 
VIII. Inclusion of State-year Specific Trends (Appendix Table I) 
We also estimated a specification that included state-specific trends. This is the most conservative 
specification. We would expect our estimates to attenuate because the state-specific trends will control 
away a portion of pre-post difference. The results in Appendix Table I become insignificant when state-
specific trends are included.  
 
IX. Alternative specification of Total Margin.  (Appendix Table J) 
We estimated a specification that included Total Margin measured in 2009 interacted with year fixed 
effects.  The main results were robust to this specification.  
 
X. Secondary Outcomes (Appendix Table K) 
Appendix Table K reports the results of other categories of community benefit spending estimated using 
the main specification. In each case there was a significant increase in spending in NY but NC remained 






Appendix Table A. Sensitivity Analysis Using State Random Effects: Difference-in-Differences of Total 
Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to control states  
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
NY*Post 
0.233*** 0.0435 
(0.167 to 0.300) (-0.023 to 0.110) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?+  
p<0.01 YES (p=0.227) 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0505** -0.0141 
(-0.097 to -0.004) (-0.049 to 0.0207) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.196 YES (p=0.227) 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0787** 0.00109 
  Teaching 0.321*** 0.0344 
  Sole Community Provider -0.00397 -0.00711 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)++  -0.0124 -0.0113 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0369 -0.104*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00967 -0.0260 
  Contract Managed -0.00133 -0.0957*** 
  System membership -0.0857*** -0.0305 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0433 0.130** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income 0.000116 0.000276 
  Unemployment rate 0.622 -1.209** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.0122 -0.0203 
  Uninsurance rate 1.510** -0.243 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.00149 -0.0402* 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.0551 0.0171 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.00410 -0.00791 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.124*** 0.00217 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0761* -0.0269 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0240 0.00630 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0565** -0.00134 
Constant -2.894*** -4.039*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. Sample size: New York, n=126 hospitals per year; North Carolina, n=28 hospitals per year; and 
Control, n=1,083 hospitals per year. The washout period is 2012. + A non-significant p-value means that the pre-treatment linear 





Appendix Table B. Sensitivity Analysis for Urban and Rural Study Populations: Difference-in-
Differences of Total Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to 




as Proportion of 
Operating 
Expenses Urban  
Total Population 
Health Spending 





as Proportion of 
Operating 
Expenses Rural  
Total Population 
Health Spending 




0.170*** 0.0577* 0.591*** 0.0316 
(0.080 to 0.259) (-0.005 to 0.121) (0.335 to 0.846) (-0.059 to 0.122) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.127 p=0.203 p=0.103 p=0.266 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
0.0280 -0.0361 -0.221 -0.0315 
(-0.121 to 0.177) (-0.138 to 0.066) (-0.704 to 0.261) (-0.414 to 0.351) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.067 p=0.344 p=0.602 p=0.353 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics         
  Teaching 0.310*** 0.0344 0.300*** -0.270*** 
  Sole Community Provider -0.0540 -0.0305 0.0565 0.00712 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)+  -0.0234 -0.00328 -0.116** -0.0407 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0616 -0.101*** -0.0587 -0.111*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.0108 -0.0176 -0.00647 -0.0697*** 
  Contract Managed 0.0437 -0.0732* -0.0608 -0.124*** 
  System membership -0.0845*** -0.0328* -0.0705 0.00103 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0757 0.114*** -0.137 0.0334 
Local market characteristics         
  Median income 0.00003 -0.000566 -0.00275 0.00797** 
  Unemployment rate 1.013 -0.748 0.284 -1.866** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.0165 -0.0521 -0.0220 -0.0708 
  Uninsurance rate 1.179** -0.680** 3.227*** 0.0722 
State-level characteristics          
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 0.0300 -0.0520*** -0.0730 -0.0292 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 0.0115 0.0108 -0.214 0.0338 
  SIM: Round 1 Design 0.00829 -0.00247 -0.0439 -0.0227 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.0990** -0.0100 -0.231** -0.00146 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0549 -0.0158 -0.167** -0.0230 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0310 -0.0108 -0.0414 0.0404 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0963** -0.00291 -0.0901 -0.0190 
Constant -3.159*** -4.140*** -3.772*** -4.411*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. In the urban sample, there was an average of: 108 hospitals per 
year in NY; 20 hospitals per year in NC; and 836 hospitals per year in the control group. In the rural sample, there was an average 
of: 18 hospitals per year in NY; 7 hospitals per year in NC; and 246 hospitals per year in the control group. + Reference category 
for hospital size in the urban sample is (>=316 beds or 75th percentile). Reference category for hospital size in the rural sample 




Appendix Table C. Sensitivity Analysis for Balanced Sample: Difference-in-Differences of Total 
Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to control states (State 
fixed effects specification) 
 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
NY*Post 
0.258*** 0.0538* 
(0.170 to 0.345) (-0.003 to 0.110) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.012 p=0.458 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
0.00622 -0.0265 
(-0.182 to 0.194) (-0.125 to 0.072) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.036 p=0.415 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.103*** -0.0104 
  Teaching 0.322*** 0.0534* 
  Sole Community Provider 0.0216 -0.0172 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  0.000723 0.000667 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0502 -0.0921*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00961 -0.0465*** 
  Contract Managed -0.00386 -0.0951** 
  System membership -0.0822*** -0.0355* 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0562 0.0912** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.000507 -0.000140 
  Unemployment rate 0.427 -1.077* 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.0112 -0.00641 
  Uninsurance rate 1.772*** -0.199 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.0288 -0.0349** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.0856 0.00588 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.0152 -0.0139 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.135*** -0.00871 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0865** -0.0159 
  SIM: Round 2 Design -0.0197 -0.00188 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.00621 -0.0165 
Constant -3.290*** -4.174*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. Hospitals in NY=112; hospitals in NC=19; hospitals in control 





Appendix Table D. Sensitivity Analysis Limited to States That Require Local Health Departments to 
Conduct a Community Health Assessment: Difference-in-Differences of Total Community Benefit and 
Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to control states (State fixed effects specification) 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.144 to 0.353) (-0.020 to 0.136) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.036 p=0.726 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0402 -0.0176 
(-0.212 to 0.132) (-0.158 to 0.123) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.262 p=0.538 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0522 0.0373 
  Teaching 0.336*** 0.0829* 
  Sole Community Provider 0.0160 -0.0231 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.0158 0.0457 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.113* -0.0142 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.0458 0.0441 
  Contract Managed 0.0131 -0.169*** 
  System membership -0.0463 -0.00372 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0719 0.120** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.00105 -0.00103 
  Unemployment rate 1.991 -2.696** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.0469 -0.0308 
  Uninsurance rate 1.975*** -0.516 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.0587 -0.0171 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 - - 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.0831 0.0189 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.128*** 0.0379 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.121* 0.0119 
  SIM: Round 2 Design -0.105** -0.00290 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0134 -0.00200 
Constant -2.562*** -3.367*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. Hospitals in NY=126; hospitals in NC=28; hospitals in control 





Appendix Table E. Sensitivity Analysis that Includes only states that expanded Medicaid: Difference-in-
Differences of Total Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to 
control states (State fixed effects specification) 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.145 to 0.324) (0.002 to 0.115) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.013 p=0.368 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post -- -- 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
-- -- 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.118*** 0.0105 
  Teaching 0.319*** 0.0413 
  Sole Community Provider 0.00722 0.00522 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.0290 0.0174 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0543 -0.0807*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00685 -0.0399** 
  Contract Managed 0.0158 -0.125*** 
  System membership -0.0951*** -0.0246 
  Total Margin (lagged) -0.147* 0.152** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.000148 -0.000659 
  Unemployment rate -0.216 -1.888*** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.00126 -0.0280 
  Uninsurance rate 2.186*** 0.0160 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 0.0816 -0.0474** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 0.0221 0.0162 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.0612* -0.0230 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.167*** -0.0155 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0617 -0.0166 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0681 0.00883 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0855 -0.00310 
Constant -3.551*** -4.027*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. Hospitals in NY=126; hospitals in control state=694. North 
Carolina did not expand Medicaid and is not included in this limited sample. Reference category for hospital size is (>=284 beds 




Appendix Table F. Sensitivity Analysis that Includes Washout Period: Difference-in-Differences of Total 
Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to control states (State 
fixed effects specification) 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.127 to 0.285) (-0.006 to 0.097) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.051 p=0.455 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0130 -0.0227 
(-0.168 to 0.142) (-0.135 to 0.090) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.100 p=0.312 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0780** 0.00240 
  Teaching 0.318*** 0.0386 
  Sole Community Provider -0.0176 -0.0149 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.0175 -0.0116 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0410 -0.107*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.0140 -0.0199 
  Contract Managed -0.0291 -0.108*** 
  System membership -0.0833*** -0.0344** 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0140 0.0705* 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income 0.0008 0.0007 
  Unemployment rate 0.795 -1.204** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 0.0246 -0.0295 
  Uninsurance rate 1.461*** -0.390 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.00253 -0.0477*** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.0449 0.0191 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.00629 -0.00802 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.132*** -0.00825 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0793** -0.0151 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0206 0.00844 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0522 -0.00191 
Constant -3.323*** -4.155*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. There was an average of 126 hospitals per year in New York. There was an average of 28 
hospitals per year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,082 hospitals per year in the control group. Reference category 







Appendix Table G. Sensitivity Analysis that Includes Maryland: Difference-in-Differences of Total 




Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.151 to 0.324) (-0.0005 to 0.107) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.065 p=0.478 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0454 -0.0272 
(-0.215 to 0.125) (-0.152 to 0.097) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.096 p=0.306 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0759** 0.00739 
  Teaching 0.318*** 0.0463 
  Sole Community Provider -0.00333 -0.0134 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.00813 0.00166 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0435 -0.0974*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00811 -0.0235 
  Contract Managed -0.00933 -0.106*** 
  System membership -0.0780*** -0.0241 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.0416 0.124*** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income 0.0002 0.000713 
  Unemployment rate 0.811 -1.011** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.0247 -0.0186 
  Uninsurance rate 1.484*** -0.367 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.00389 -0.0446*** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.0508 0.0171 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.00458 -0.0118 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.132*** -0.0109 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0824** -0.0207 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0148 0.00657 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0521 -0.00526 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. There was an average of 126 hospitals per year in New York. 
There was an average of 28 hospitals per year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,119 hospitals per year in the control 






Appendix Table H. Sensitivity Analysis that Includes Consolidated Reporters: Difference-in-Differences 
of Total Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to control states 
(State fixed effects specification) 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.196 to 0.351) (-0.005 to 0.089) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.049 p=0.964 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0798 -0.125** 
(-0.193 to 0.033) (-0.222 to -0.027) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.288 p=0.077 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Consolidated Reporter 0.0493** 0.0396** 
  Rural -0.0799*** -0.0117 
  Teaching 0.249*** 0.0297 
  Sole Community Provider 0.0148 -0.0217 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  0.00790 -0.00165 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0348 -0.0831*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.0111 -0.00486 
  Contract Managed -0.0585 -0.0994*** 
  System membership -0.0668*** -0.0431*** 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.178 0.242** 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.000416 0.000147 
  Unemployment rate 0.996* -0.621 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.0182 -0.0502 
  Uninsurance rate 0.987*** -0.311 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.0343 -0.0819*** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.103** -0.0141 
  SIM: Round 1 Design 0.0197 -0.0139 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.111*** -0.0254 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0532* -0.0306* 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.00144 -0.000626 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0129 -0.00611 
Constant -3.172*** -4.251*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. There was an average of 135 hospitals every year in New York. There was an average of 48 
hospitals every year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,699 hospitals every year in the control group. The washout 
period is 2012. Reference category for hospital size is (>=296 beds or 75th percentile). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Allocation method: Some multi-hospital systems submit a consolidated Form 990 and Schedule H to the IRS. In order to include 
hospital-level community benefit spending for these consolidated reporters, we used an allocation approached developed by 




(CMS). Using CMS Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) data for 2009 to 2015, the IRS data were allocated 
proportionally to hospital facilities using their operating expenses. Community Benefit expenditures were allocated proportional 
to operating expenditures. For this allocation approach, an assumption was made that relative operating expenses are 
representative of community benefit spending (i.e., hospital with larger operating expenses spend more on community benefit). 
To test the validity of these assumptions, we performed the same allocation process using gross Medicaid expenses which is 
available in both the IRS Form 990 and the HCRIS data. We found that our estimated value and the true value correlated well 
among short term acute care hospitals (r=0.77).  
Leider JP, Tung GJ, Lindrooth RC, Johnson EK, Hardy R, Castrucci BC. Establishing a Baseline: Community Benefit Spending by Not-
for-Profit Hospitals Prior to Implementation of the Affordable Care Act. J Public Heal Manag Pract. 2017;23(6):e1-e9. 
doi:10.1097/PHH.0000000000000493 
Johnson EK, Hardy R, Santos T, Leider JP, Lindrooth RC, Tung GJ. State Laws and Nonprofit Hospital Community Benefit Spending. 

























Appendix Table I. Sensitivity Analysis that Includes Controls for State-Year Trends: Difference-in-
Differences of Total Community Benefit and Population Health Spending, NY and NC compared to 
control states (State fixed effects specification) 
  
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
NY*Post 
0.0384 -0.0177 
(-0.131 to 0.208) (-0.105 to 0.070) 
NC*Post 
0.0275 -0.131 
(-0.328 to 0.383) (-0.317 to 0.054) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0925*** 0.00226 
  Teaching 0.322*** 0.0377 
  Sole Community Provider 0.00870 -0.0160 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.00640 -0.0123 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0237 -0.101*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00671 -0.0275* 
  Contract Managed -0.00976 -0.106*** 
  System membership -0.0832*** -0.0306* 
  Total Margin (lagged) 0.200 0.139 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.000275 -0.000253 
  Unemployment rate 0.575 -1.443*** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.00323 -0.0152 
  Uninsurance rate 1.861*** -0.275 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.0330 -0.0513*** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 0.00642 -0.00614 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.0142 -0.0223* 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.0688 -0.0124 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0114 -0.0494* 
  SIM: Round 2 Design 0.0118 -0.0119 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0136 -0.0401*** 
Constant -237.2*** -22.74 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors 
were calculated with hospital clustering. There was an average of 126 hospitals per year in New York. There was an average of 
28 hospitals per year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,119 hospitals per year in the control group. Reference category 












Appendix Table J. Sensitivity Analysis Alternative Specification of Total Margin 
 
 
Total Community Benefit 
Spending as Proportion of 
Operating Expenses  
Total Population Health 




(0.164 to 0.338) (0.004 to 0.114) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.037 p=0.643 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.0473 0.00435 
(-0.226 to 0.131) (-0.121 to 0.130) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.149 p=0.069 
(NC Vs Control) 
Hospital Characteristics     
  Rural -0.0924*** 0.00181 
  Teaching 0.319*** 0.0367 
  Sole Community Provider 0.00796 -0.0148 
  Size (25th-75th percentile)  -0.00876 -0.0135 
  Size (25th percentile) -0.0268 -0.103*** 
  Disproportionate Share Status 0.00956 -0.0355** 
  Contract Managed -0.00535 -0.108*** 
  System membership -0.0840*** -0.0295* 
  Total Margin (2009)  0.164 0.218** 
     Total Margin * 2010 -0.0857 0.0715 
     Total Margin * 2011 0.224 0.00380 
     Total Margin * 2013 0.186 -0.0670 
     Total Margin * 2014 0.729 0.0809 
     Total Margin * 2015 0.0585 0.0459 
Local market characteristics     
  Median income -0.000256 -0.000140 
  Unemployment rate 0.660 -1.203** 
  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index -0.00605 -0.0152 
  Uninsurance rate 1.784*** -0.312 
State-level characteristics      
  Expanded Medicaid in 2014 -0.000460 -0.0455*** 
  Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -0.0675 0.00518 
  SIM: Round 1 Design -0.0160 -0.0138 
  SIM: Round 1 Pre-Test -0.125*** -0.0242 
  SIM: Round 1 Test -0.0898** -0.0167 
  SIM: Round 2 Design -0.00740 0.00905 
  SIM: Round 2 Test 0.0229 -0.0130 
Constant -3.293*** -4.155*** 
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors were 
calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. There was an average of 126 hospitals per year in New York. 
There was an average of 28 hospitals per year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,119 hospitals per year in the control 
group. Reference category for hospital size is (>=281 beds or 75th percentile). Total margin from 2009 was used. We interacted 
the total margin from 2009 with a dummy variable for each year from 2009 to 2015. Reference year is 2009. *** p<0.01, ** 




Appendix Table K. Difference-in-Differences: Secondary Outcomes, NY and NC compared to control 
states 
 Charity Care as Proportion of Operating Expenses 
NY*Post 
0.091* 
(-0.008 to 0.190) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.006 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
0.261*** 
(0.086 to 0.436) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.453 
(NC Vs Control) 
  
Shortfalls as Proportion of Operating Expenses                      
(Medicaid and means-tested government programs) 
NY*Post 
0.248*** 
(0.143 to 0.353) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.051 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.185 
(-0.460 to 0.091) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.156 
(NC Vs Control) 
  
Subsidized Health Services as Proportion of Operating Expenses 
NY*Post 
0.099* 
(-0.009 to 0.207) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.863 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.013 
(-0.184 to 0.159) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.199 
(NC Vs Control) 
  Research and Professions as Proportion of Operating Expenses 
NY*Post 
0.120*** 
(0.042 to 0.197) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel?  
p=0.036 
(NY Vs Control) 
NC*Post 
-0.066 
(-0.189 to 0.056) 
Pre-treatment trends parallel? 
p=0.941 








Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the Internal Revenue Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and the Census Bureau. Notes: Standard errors 
were calculated with hospital clustering. The washout period is 2012. There was an average of 126 hospitals per year in New York. 
There was an average of 28 hospitals per year in North Carolina. There was an average of 1,088 hospitals per year in the control 
group. Reference category for hospital size is (>=281 beds or 75th percentile). We controlled for the following state-level factors: 
status and timing of Medicaid expansion; and participation and timing in the CMMI State Innovation Model. *** p<0.01, ** 












































Part 2. Covariates: Description and Rationale 
 
I. Hospital characteristics 
 
Rural: The Federal Office of Rural Health Policy accepts all non-Metro counties as rural and uses an 
additional method of determining rurality called the Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes.  
Like the metropolitan statistical area, these are based on Census data that is used to assign a code to each 
Census Tract. The omitted reference group comprised urban hospitals. We used the definition by the Rural 
Health Research Center (i.e., Categorization C): 
(http://depts.washington.edu/uwruca/ruca-uses.php) 
 
 Urban: 1.0, 1.1, 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 4.1, 5.1, 7.1, 8.1, and 10.1  
 Rural: 4.0, 4.2, 5.0, 5.2, 6.0, 6.1, 7.0, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 8.0, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 9.0, 9.1, 9.2, 10.0, 10.2, 10.3, 
10.4, 10.5, and 10.6 
 
Rationale: Hospitals located in rural areas may be at a financial disadvantaged position to invest in 
community benefits. They usually have lower margins than their urban counterparts. 
 
Teaching: Hospitals classified as teaching are those institutions that were members of the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals. The omitted reference group comprised non-teaching hospitals.  
 
Rationale: The literature provides evidence that teaching hospitals usually spend more on community 
benefits. There are many potential reasons for this, such as better financial position. 
 
Sole community provider: In 1983, Congress created the Sole Community Hospital (SCH) program to 
support small rural hospitals for which “by reason of factors such as isolated location, weather conditions, 
travel conditions, or absence of other hospitals, is the sole source of inpatient hospital services reasonably 
available in a geographic area to Medicare beneficiaries.” The omitted reference group comprised 
hospitals without this designation.  
 
Rationale: Same reason as rural hospitals. 
 
Hospital size: number of staffed beds. We categorized hospital size based on in-sample percentiles. 
 Large (>=281 beds - 75th percentile) 
 Medium (280-84 beds - 25th to 75th percentile) 
 Small Hospital size (<=83 beds - 25th percentile) 
 
Rationale: Hospital size has been shown to be associated with community benefit spending. On average, 
smaller hospitals spend less on community benefits. 
 
Disproportionate share status (DSH): refers to hospitals with Medicaid disproportionate share status.  
Hospitals with this status receive additional Medicaid payments. The omitted reference group comprised 
hospitals that do not have DSH status.  
The formula for DSH is: 





Hospitals whose DSH patient percentage exceeds 15 percent are eligible for a DSH payment adjustment 
based on another statutory formula. 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/dsh.html  
 
Rationale: The impact of DSH status on community benefit spending may vary. On the one hand, hospitals 
with this status serve a larger share of patients eligible for both Medicare Part A and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), which may impact a hospital’s margin due to the higher complexity and need of 
older patients. This could translate into lower community benefit spending. On the other hand, it also 
takes into account the number of Medicaid inpatient days, which can lead to larger community benefit 
spending through Medicaid shortfalls. 
 
Contract managed: refers to a hospital that had in place a contractual relationship with an outside 
company to manage its operations.  The omitted reference group comprised hospitals that do not have 
such a contract.  
 
Rationale: These hospitals tend to be located in rural areas, and have been associated with decreases in 
service offerings. Both of these factors may result in decreased community benefit spending. 
 
System membership: refers to hospitals that were members of a corporate entity that owns two or more 
hospitals.  The omitted reference group comprised independent hospitals.  
 
Rationale: The literature has shown mixed effects of system membership on community benefit spending. 
However, on average, hospitals that are part of a system tend to spend less on community benefits.  
 
Total margin: computed by subtracting a hospital’s operating costs from its total income (i.e., operating 
and non-operating revenue) and dividing the result by the total revenue.  
 
Rationale: The total margin of hospital partially reflects the financial health of hospitals and the efficient 
of hospital management. In the case of nonprofit hospitals, total margin may not fully reflect the financial 
efficiency of the hospital, because management may choose to allocate surpluses towards other types of 
investments to decrease the total margin and lessen the appearance of high “profits”. However, we would 
expect larger margins to lead to larger community benefit spending. 
 
II. Local market characteristics 
 
Median personal income: The median per capita income of residents in the county in which the hospital 
was located. 
 
Rationale: We would expect larger community benefit spending in areas with lower the median income. 
This may come from larger community benefit spending on charity care, government program shortfalls 
and subsidized health services. 
 
Unemployment rate: This is the percentage of residents (aged 18 and older) in the county in which the 





Rationale: We would expect larger community benefit spending in areas with higher unemployment. This 
may come from larger community benefit spending on charity care, government program shortfalls and 
subsidized health services. 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): Market concentration was measured in accordance with the HHI. It 
was computed by summing the squared values of each hospital’s proportion of total hospital patients 
admitted to general, acute care hospitals within its market (defined as hospital referral region).  The 
theoretical range for the HHI is 0 to 1 where 1 indicates a monopoly (i.e., one firm in the market). For 
example, if there are two hospitals in a market, one with .25 share of total admissions and the other with 
.75 share of the admissions, the HHI would be .625 (.252, + .752).       
 
Rationale: Hospitals located in more competitive markets may have lower total margins which may lead 
to lower community benefit spending. Hospital boards may prioritize the financial health and survival of 
the hospitals in more competitive markets, which may lessen the focus on community benefit spending. 
 
Uninsurance rate: This is the percentage of residents in the county in which the hospital was located that 
are uninsured. 
 
Rationale: We would expect larger community benefit spending in areas with higher uninsurance rate. 
This may come from larger community benefit spending on charity care, government program shortfalls 
and subsidized health services. 
 
III. State-level characteristics 
 
Medicaid Expansion Status  
 Expanded Medicaid in 2014: State expanded Medicaid at any point during 2014. 
 Expanded Medicaid in 2015: State expanded Medicaid at any point during 2015. 
 
Rationale: States that expanded Medicaid have been shown to be better financially positioned. This 
increased margin has not necessarily translated into larger community benefit spending. However, 
community benefit spending on Medicaid shortfalls is directly affected by the number of Medicaid 
patients served. 
 
State Innovation Model: State participated in the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation State 
Innovation Model 
 
 Round 1 Design: CA, CT, DE, HI, ID, IL, MD, MI, NH, OH, PA, RI, TN, TX, and UT 
 Round 1 Pre-Test: CO, NY, and WA 
 Round 1 Test: AR, MN, MA, MN, OR, and VT 
 Round 2 Design: AZ, CA, DC, HI, KY, IL, MD, MT, NV, NH, NJ, NM, OK, PA, PR, UT, VA, WV, and WI 
(Note: AS, MP, and PR participated, but US territories were excluded from the sample population) 
 Round 2 Test: CO, CT, DE, ID, IA, MI, NY, RI, OH, TN, and WA 
 
Rationale: Participation in the State Innovation Model (SIM) may have varying levels of effect on 
community benefit spending. All of these models are centered on improving population health and 




exist in SIM states to be more committed to improving the health of their local population, which could 
lead to larger community benefit spending. It could also turn the hospital focus away from community 
benefit towards the specific goals of the SIM program they’re implementing. However, the willingness of 
states to apply for these grants and their readiness to be awarded may serve as another proxy for the 
state’s commitment to population health from the healthcare sector perspective. 
 
IV. State fixed effects: dummy variable for each state 
 
V. Year fixed effects: dummy variable for each year in the study period (2009-2015) 
 
Part 3. Community Benefit Spending Categories: Definition Based on IRS Form 990 Schedule H  
 
Charity Care (Financial Assistance at Cost): “Financial assistance includes free or discounted health 
services provided to persons who meet the organization’s criteria for financial assistance and are unable 
to pay for all or a portion of the services. Financial assistance does not include: bad debt or uncollectible 
charges that the organization recorded as revenue but wrote off due to a patient’s failure to pay, or the 
cost of providing such care to such patients; the difference between the cost of care provided under 
Medicaid or other means-tested government programs or under Medicare and the revenue derived 
therefrom; self-pay or prompt pay discounts; or contractual adjustments with any third-party payors.” 
 
Unreimbursed Costs from Medicaid: Medicaid “means the United States health program for individuals 
and families with low incomes and resources.” The difference between the cost of care provided under 
Medicaid and the revenue derived therefrom. 
 
Unreimbursed Costs from Other Means-Tested Programs: Other means-tested government programs, 
“means government-sponsored health programs where eligibility for benefits or coverage is determined 
by income or assets. Examples include: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a United 
States federal government program that gives funds to states, in order to provide health insurance to 
families with children; and Other federal, state, or local health care programs.” The difference between 
the cost of care provided under other means-tested government programs and the revenue derived 
therefrom. 
 
Community Health Improvement Services and Operations: “Community health improvement services 
means activities or programs, subsidized by the health care organization, carried out or supported for the 
express purpose of improving community health. Such services do not generate inpatient or outpatient 
revenue, although there may be a nominal patient fee or sliding scale fee for these services. Community 
benefit operations means activities associated with conducting community health needs assessments, 
community benefit program administration, and the organization’s activities associated with fundraising 
or grant-writing for community benefit programs.” 
 
Health Professions Education: “Health professions education means educational programs that result in 
a degree, certificate, or training necessary to be licensed to practice as a health professional, as required 
by state law, or continuing education necessary to retain state license or certification by a board in the 
individual’s health profession specialty. It does not include education or training programs available 
exclusively to the organization’s employees and medical staff or scholarships provided to those 




educate health professionals in the broader community. Costs for medical residents and interns can be 
included, even if they are considered ‘employees’ for purposes of Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement.” 
 
Subsidized Health Services (these are not means-tested): “Subsidized health services means clinical 
services provided despite a financial loss to the organization. The financial loss is measured after removing 
losses associated with bad debt, financial assistance, Medicaid, and other means-tested government 
programs. A service meets an identified community need if it is reasonable to conclude that if the 
organization no longer offered the service, the service would be unavailable in the community, the 
community’s capacity to provide the service would be below the community’s need, or the service would 
become the responsibility of government or another tax-exempt organization.” 
 
Research: “Research means any study or investigation the goal of which is to generate increased 
generalizable knowledge made available to the public (for example: knowledge about underlying 
biological mechanisms of health and disease, natural processes, or principles affecting health or illness; 
evaluation of safety and efficacy of interventions for disease such as clinical trials and studies of 
therapeutic protocols; laboratory-based studies; epidemiology, health outcomes, and effectiveness; 
behavioral or sociological studies related to health, delivery of care, or prevention; studies related to 
changes in the health care delivery system; and communication of findings and observations, including 
publication in a medical journal.) The organization can include the cost of internally funded research it 
conducts, as well as the cost of research it conducts funded by a tax-exempt or government entity.” 
 
Cash and In-Kind Contributions for Community Benefit: “Cash and in-kind contributions means 
contributions made by the organization to health care organizations and other community groups 
restricted, in writing, to one or more of the community benefit activities described [above]. In-kind 
contributions include the cost of staff hours donated by the organization to the community while on the 
organization’s payroll, indirect cost of space donated to tax-exempt community groups, and the financial 
value of donated food, equipment, and supplies.” 
 
Community Building Activities: Hospital activities to protect or improve the community's health or safety, 
and that are not reportable in the above categories. This category is subdivided into: (a) physical 
improvements and housing; (b) economic development; (c) community support; (d) environmental 
improvements; (e) leadership development and training for community members; (f) coalition building; 
(g) community health improvement advocacy; (h) workforce development; and (i) other. If the hospital 
makes a grant to an organization to be used to accomplish one of the community building activities listed 


























Alabama No No No No No












Arkansas No No No No No
California No No No No No
Colorado No
Yes (statute; every 
5yrs)
Yes (statute; every 
5yrs)
Connecticut No No No No No
Delaware No No No No No
Florida No Yes (policy directive) Yes (policy directive)
Georgia No No No No No
Hawaii No No No No No













Iowa No No No
Yes (option for a 
bonus within state 
grant program; every 
5 yrs)
Yes (option for a 
bonus within state 
grant program; every 
5 yrs)
Kansas 
b No No No No No
Kentucky No No No No No
Louisiana No No No No No
Maine No No No No No
Maryland No No No
Yes (statute; no 
longer active)
No





















Maryland No No No
Yes (statute; no 
longer active)
No
Massachusetts No No No No No
Michigan No No No No No
Minnesota No
Yes (statute; every 5 
yrs)
Yes (statute; every 5 
yrs)
Mississippi No No No No No
Missouri No
Yes (contract 
language; no longer 
active)
Yes (contract 
language; no longer 
active)
No No
Montana No No No No No







Nevada No No No No No
New Hampshire No No No No No
New Jersey No
Yes (through legal 
rule making)
Yes (through legal 
rule making)
New Mexico No No No No No
New York 
c Yes + (CHNA 
every 3 yrs)
Yes (statute and 
regulations; every 4 
yrs)
Yes (statute and 





every 3 to 4 
yrs)
Yes (every 4 yrs) Yes (every 4 yrs)









Ohio No No No No No
Oklahoma No No No No No
Oregon No No No No No
Pennsylvania No No No No No
Rhode Island No No No No No






















South Dakota No No No No No
Tennessee No No No No No
Texas No No No No No
Utah No No No No No
Vermont No No No No
Yes (legal duties of 
the agency)
Virginia No No No No No
Washington No
Yes (policy and 
contract language)
Yes (policy and 
contract language)
West Virginia No
Yes (through legal 
rule making)




Yes (legal mandate 
for a public health 
agenda)
Yes (legal mandate 
for a public health 
agenda)
Wyoming No No No No No
State-Level Regulatory and Legal Tools for Local Health Departments
a
a.  These apply to local health departments only.  Note that some states have requirements for the State Health Department.  
These requirements are based on data collected as of January 2013 for LHDs.
b.  Kansas Hospital Association (KHA) and the Kansas Association of Local Health Departments (KALHD) signed a joint 
resolution encouraging local health departments and hospitals to work together in conducting community health needs 
assessments 
c.  New York State Prevention Agenda (NYPA) “strongly recommends” nonprofit hospitals and LHDs to conduct collaborative 
community health needs assessments and community health improvement plans. Nonprofit hospitals and LHDs jointly 
select two to three health priorities. Furthermore, it provides a blueprint for action to address five health priorities aligned 
with the health care challenges identified under the Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (DSRIP) Program. DSRIP 
guidance integrates hospital and prevention activities by requiring DSRIP applicants to include NYPAactivities in their 
d.  The NC Public Health/Hospital Collaborative is a partnership of local and state public health leaders, hospital leaders, 
and community-based stakeholders created to focus health improvement initiatives, unify health advocacy, share data and 
information, and capture and disseminate best practices. The state modified its accreditation standard to require LHDs to 
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Part 4. Distributions of Total Community Benefit and Population Health Spending 
 
Appendix Tables M and N are included to justify the use of logged spending in our specifications. In each 
case, the logged variable more closely approximates a normal distribution.  
 
Appendix Table M. Distribution of Total Community Benefit Spending: Non-logged and Logged 
 



























Appendix Table N. Distribution of Population Health Spending: Non-logged and Logged 
 























APPENDIX B: APPENDIX FOR AIM 2 (CHAPTER IV) 
Appendix: Hospital Collaboration With Local Health Departments on Community Health Improvement 
Activities: Is the Whole More Effective Than the Sum of Its Parts? 
 
Part 1. Full Regression Results 
 
I. Main Specification: Unadjusted and Fully-Adjusted Regression Estimates (Appendix Table A) 
Appendix Table A presents the full estimate results for the main specification. 
 
Part 2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
I. Balanced Sample (Appendix Table B Column A) 
The results in Appendix Table B Column A are based on a balanced sample and are very similar to those 
reported in Appendix Table A. This addresses concerns related to potential sample bias and internal 
validity because some counties come in and out of the sample due to mortality data suppression. 
 
II. Different Treatment Start Years (Appendix Table B Columns B and C) 
Appendix Table B (Columns B and C) presents the full estimate results for different treatment start dates. 
In Column B, the treatment was set to start at 2012 (i.e., post-treatment period 2012-16 as opposed to 
the main specification of 2014-16). In Column C, the treatment was set to start at 2015 (i.e., post-
treatment period 2015-16). We estimated these specifications to support our definition of the treatment 
start year (i.e., 2013) and washout period (i.e., 2013). 
When we set the treatment start year at 2012, we did not observe a treatment effect in NY treatment 
counties. When treatment start year was set at 2015, findings were also non-significant for NY treatment 
counties. One reason that we did not observe a treatment effect with the earlier treatment start year is 
that all nonprofit hospitals in the study sample completed their implementation strategy in 2013, and 
started actual implementation of their plans in early 2014. The post period covering 2012-16 includes two 
years during which nonprofit hospitals were in the planning phase (i.e., 2012 and 2013) and we would not 
expect planning to have an effect on drug-induced mortality.  
These results give us confidence that our main specification which includes a 2013 washout period more 
accurately reflects the timing of the planning and implementation phases associated with CHNA and 
implementation strategy. 
 
III. Counties Located in States that Implemented a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Use Mandate 
(Appendix Table C Column A) 
We limited this analysis to counties that exist in states that implemented an PDMP use mandate. We 
sought to make all study groups as comparable as possible from the perspective of a state law that has 
been shown to be associated with reductions in prescribing rates and drug-induced mortality. Also, there 
may have been state-level factors associated with the passage and implementation of this law that we did 
not control for in our main specification, which could bias our results. If this was the case, then the 
treatment estimate would be different. As reported in the table, the coefficient on the treatment (i.e., NY 
effect) is very similar to our main specification, which gives us further confidence that our main model did 





IV. Counties Located in States that Implemented Good Samaritan Laws (Appendix Table C Column B) 
We limited this analysis to counties that exist in states that implemented Good Samaritan laws. The 
rationale for estimating this model is similar to the one above (i.e., PDMP).  
 
V. Counties Located in States that Implemented Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws (Appendix Table 
C Column C) 
We limited this analysis to counties that exist in states that implemented naloxone overdose prevention 
laws. The rationale for estimating this model is similar to the one above (i.e., PDMP). 
 
VI. Main Specification Including State-Year Specific Trends (Appendix Table C Column D) 
 
Part 3. Falsification Tests 
 
I. Placebo Test: Treatment Effect in Counties That Did Not Select Substance Abuse (Appendix Table D 
Column A) 
In this specification, we limited the sample to counties that did not select substance abuse as a health 
priority both in NY and in control counties. We implemented this to further examine whether 
collaboration on all three local health planning activities, as well as joint prioritization and 
implementation of substance abuse initiatives are necessary for counties to experience changes in drug-
induced mortality. The findings support our definition of the study treatment; that is, nonprofit hospitals 
and local health departments must collaborate on all three local health planning activities (community 
health needs assessment, joint prioritization, and implementation of initiatives to target the priority) AND 
jointly prioritize substance abuse for an effect on drug-induced mortality to be observed. 
 
II. NY Counties that Did Not Select Substance Abuse as a Health Priority Compared to Counties that 
Selected Substance Abuse (Appendix Table D Column B) 
In this specification, we compared two groups: counties in NY that did not jointly select substance abuse; 
and counties outside of NY that selected substance abuse. This specification addressed concerns that the 
treatment effect observed in the main specification is due to other unobserved trends in NY. The non-
significant result gives us confidence that our models did not fail to account for other trends in NY that 
might have driven the decrease in drug-induced mortality. 
 
III. Placebo Tests: All-Transport Mortality and Percentage of Vacant Housing Units (Appendix Table D 
Columns C and D) 
These specifications used outcomes that we would not expect to be affected by the study treatment. All 
treatment estimates were non-significant. This serves to further support the main study findings, and 
importantly, that the findings are not merely due to spurious correlations. 
 
Part 4. Models With and Without State-by-Year and County-by-Year Controls Data (Appendix Table E) 
The rationale for these specifications is detailed in the “notes” section of Appendix Table E. 
 






Appendix Table A. Main Specification: Unadjusted and Fully-Adjusted Regression Estimates 
  
UNADJUSTED FULL MODEL 
NY Effect 0.866 -3.608*
(1.359) (1.868)
  0-19 0.481
(0.893)
  65 and Over -0.00571
(0.574)
  Some College 0.531
(0.381)
  Bachelor of Higher 0.471
(0.535)
  Service -0.403
(0.472)
  Sales and office -0.321
(0.403)
  Production, transportation, and material moving -0.748
(0.548)
  Natural resources, construction, and maintenance -0.471
(0.549)
  Black -0.402
(0.918)
  Other -0.108
(0.222)
  Uninsurance 0.335
(0.248)
  Unemployment 0.261
(0.408)
  Median Income -0.000290***
(0.000102)
  Teaching 0.561
(1.764)
  System Membership 0.0101
(0.436)
  Critical Access 0.426
(0.723)
  Provision of Alcohol/SA Services -0.195
(0.420)
  Number of Large Hospitals -2.742***
(0.965)
  Number of Medium Hospitals -0.745
(0.742)
  Number of Small Hospitals -2.125***
(0.735)




Access to Naloxone -1.993***
(0.694)
PDMP: access for prescribers 0.246
(0.943)
PDMP: use mandate 4.638***
(1.160)
Expanded Medicaid in 2014 1.736***
(0.632)









STATE LAWS AND PROGRAMS
(ref. category is 20-64)
(ref. category is High School or Less)
(ref. category is Management, business, science, and arts)





Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust standard errors clustered on county. Study sample (n=220) 















































Appendix Table B. Balanced Sample and Different Treatment Start Years 
 
Balanced Sample
Treatment Start Year: 
2012
Treatment Start Year: 
2015
A B C
NY Effect -8.815** -0.163 -1.761
(3.783) (1.610) (1.597)
0-19 -0.432 0.540 0.481
(0.720) (0.892) (0.897)
65 and Over 0.161 0.0917 0.0398
(0.644) (0.559) (0.562)
Some College 1.016** 0.566 0.567
(0.500) (0.354) (0.353)
Bachelor of Higher 0.664 0.548 0.536
(0.548) (0.501) (0.501)
Service -0.859 -0.264 -0.256
(0.701) (0.471) (0.468)
Sales and office -0.642 -0.295 -0.286
(0.531) (0.380) (0.379)
Production, transportation, and material moving
-1.032 -0.523 -0.526
(0.717) (0.522) (0.518)
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance -0.410 -0.322 -0.317
(0.680) (0.532) (0.533)
Black -0.588 -0.284 -0.262
(1.165) (0.869) (0.862)
Other 0.125 -0.0863 -0.0870
(0.225) (0.207) (0.207)
Uninsurance 0.551*** 0.264 0.290
(0.186) (0.243) (0.242)
Unemployment 0.139 0.268 0.278
(0.390) (0.413) (0.390)
Median Income -0.000202* -0.000272*** -0.000277***
(0.000109) (9.46e-05) (9.47e-05)
Teaching -0.112 0.545 0.506
(1.229) (1.574) (1.569)
System Membership 1.102** 0.0553 0.0536
(0.522) (0.404) (0.401)
Critical Access 1.049 0.163 0.113
(0.802) (0.714) (0.719)
Provision of Alcohol/SA Services -0.0454 -0.214 -0.236
(0.437) (0.384) (0.387)
Number of Large Hospitals -2.249** -2.584*** -2.674***
(1.065) (0.922) (0.913)
Number of Medium Hospitals -1.323 -0.506 -0.601
(0.999) (0.713) (0.713)
Number of Small Hospitals -1.280* -1.664** -1.657**
(0.676) (0.651) (0.647)
Good Samaritan 2.339** 1.335 1.306*
(0.956) (0.851) (0.759)
Access to Naloxone -2.347*** -2.803*** -2.621***
(0.880) (0.654) (0.604)
PDMP: access for prescribers 0.116 0.445 0.457
(1.079) (0.900) (0.881)
PDMP: use mandate 3.569*** 3.133*** 3.333***
(1.285) (0.918) (0.943)
Expanded Medicaid in 2014 1.913*** 1.581*** 1.632***
(0.688) (0.550) (0.546)
Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -1.245 0.194 0.0975
(1.587) (2.071) (2.064)
Hospital and LHD collaborated on 2012 CHNA 0.856 1.024 1.101
(0.981) (0.858) (0.799)





Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust standard errors clustered on county. Reference categories are 
as follows: age group is 20-64; education is “high school or higher”; occupation is “management, business, science, 
and arts”; and race is “white”. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column A: study sample (n=126) includes 5 counties in NY and 121 control counties.  
 











































Appendix Table C. Results of Other Sensitivity Analyses 
 




A B C D
NY Effect -4.072* -4.459** -3.820** -8.515*
(2.191) (2.105) (1.886) (4.735)
0-19 2.120 1.236 0.656 0.576
(2.094) (1.110) (0.964) (0.875)
65 and Over -0.155 -0.0788 0.0329 -0.180
(1.642) (0.727) (0.669) (0.572)
Some College 0.698 0.125 0.503 -0.176
(0.956) (0.447) (0.417) (0.434)
Bachelor of Higher -0.369 0.0376 0.431 -0.0260
(1.253) (0.730) (0.588) (0.546)
Service -1.355 -0.416 -0.538 -0.227
(0.987) (0.591) (0.541) (0.443)
Sales and office -0.353 -0.138 -0.421 -0.0762
(0.949) (0.441) (0.423) (0.447)
Production, transportation, and material moving
-1.950 -1.242* -0.807 -0.571
(1.199) (0.671) (0.585) (0.461)
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance -1.125 0.0154 -0.277 -0.183
(1.043) (0.671) (0.567) (0.503)
Black -1.532 0.295 -0.187 -1.159*
(2.001) (0.881) (0.992) (0.699)
Other -0.568 -0.173 -0.135 -0.240
(1.792) (0.257) (0.232) (0.191)
Uninsurance -0.000573 0.379 0.279 -0.0111
(0.616) (0.317) (0.288) (0.341)
Unemployment -0.497 0.792 0.354 -0.195
(0.904) (0.549) (0.435) (0.487)
Median Income -0.000362* -0.000247** -0.000302*** -0.000252**
(0.000207) (0.000106) (0.000102) (9.72e-05)
Teaching 2.918 0.151 0.522 1.695
(3.741) (1.984) (1.805) (1.669)
System Membership -0.899 -0.0607 -0.186 -0.483
(0.780) (0.519) (0.463) (0.416)
Critical Access -1.605 -0.435 -0.436 -0.0651
(1.053) (0.813) (0.653) (0.784)
Provision of Alcohol/SA Services -0.781 -0.187 -0.0549 0.106
(0.929) (0.429) (0.434) (0.459)
Number of Large Hospitals -3.610 -2.140** -2.857*** -0.899
(2.184) (0.898) (0.988) (0.818)
Number of Medium Hospitals -1.486 -0.298 -0.897 0.268
(2.058) (0.594) (0.766) (0.605)
Number of Small Hospitals -3.524** -1.828* -3.005*** -1.819**
(1.746) (0.982) (0.936) (0.721)
Good Samaritan 0.843 -0.127 1.135 -18.57***
(1.875) (0.869) (0.941) (4.495)
Access to Naloxone -4.035 -2.182 -2.030*** -28.67***
(1.808) (0.772) (0.709) (8.436)
PDMP: access for prescribers -2.608 -0.0623 0.140 8.740***
(2.491) (1.003) (0.974) (2.733)
PDMP: use mandate -0.368 3.781** 4.712*** 32.29***
(1.643) (1.477) (1.195) (7.598)
Expanded Medicaid in 2014 2.127 1.922** 1.896*** 0.0516
(1.307) (0.756) (0.676) (0.794)
Expanded Medicaid in 2015 2.589 1.771 1.317 1.841
(3.013) (2.769) (2.632) (3.397)
Hospital and LHD collaborated on 2012 CHNA 1.184 1.522 1.556 0.686
(2.125) (1.123) (0.956) (1.143)
Constant 61.95 7.436 20.52 89.69*




Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust standard errors clustered on county. Reference categories are 
as follows: age group is 20-64; education is “high school or higher”; occupation is “management, business, science, 
and arts”; and race is “white”. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Column A: Counties Located in States that Implemented a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program Use Mandate. 
States included are: DE, IN, KY, MA, MN, NM, NY, OH, OK, TN, VA, WA, and WV. Study sample (n=87) includes 22 
counties in NY and 65 control counties.  
Column B: Counties Located in States that Implemented Good Samaritan Laws. States included are: AL, AR, CA, CO, 
DE, FL, IL, IN, KY, MA, MD, MN, NC, NJ, NM, NY, OR, PA, TN, VA, WA, WI, and WV. Study sample (n=158) includes 22 
counties in NY and 136 control counties.  
Column C: Counties Located in States that Implemented Naloxone Overdose Prevention Laws. States included are: 
AL, AR, CA, CO, DE, FL, IA, IL, IN, KY, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, NC, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, TN, TX, VA, WA, WI, 
and WV. Study sample (n=203) includes 22 counties in NY and 181 control counties.  
Column D: Main Specification Including State-Year Specific Trends. Study sample (n=220) includes 22 counties in NY 





















Appendix Table D. Results of Falsification Tests 
 





A B C D
NY Effect 2.191 -2.475 -0.379 0.0350
(1.504) (1.761) (0.736) (0.0242)
0-19 -0.294 0.689 0.236 -0.00366
(0.492) (0.910) (0.298) (0.0154)
65 and Over 0.0206 -0.0260 -0.0775 0.0150
(0.367) (0.561) (0.250) (0.0125)
Some College 0.331 0.661* 0.00638 -0.00139
(0.341) (0.382) (0.191) (0.00533)
Bachelor of Higher 1.009*** 0.511 -0.0394 -0.0151*
(0.363) (0.500) (0.223) (0.00880)
Service 0.207 -0.329 -0.0741 0.00239
(0.332) (0.461) (0.235) (0.00723)
Sales and office -0.227 -0.330 0.112 0.00931
(0.356) (0.395) (0.211) (0.00565)
Production, transportation, and material 
moving 0.686* -0.876 0.0312 0.00186
(0.351) (0.543) (0.342) (0.00679)
Natural resources, construction, and 
maintenance 0.561 -0.358 0.206 0.00417
(0.426) (0.549) (0.275) (0.00749)
Black 0.00993 -0.184 0.0682 -0.00351
(0.398) (0.884) (0.271) (0.0154)
Other 0.139 -0.111 -0.0924 -0.00379
(0.104) (0.208) (0.0794) (0.00526)
Uninsurance 0.0545 0.417* -0.121 -0.000877
(0.143) (0.244) (0.0799) (0.00330)
Unemployment -0.301 0.360 -0.434*** 0.000259
(0.231) (0.404) (0.123) (0.00512)
Median Income -5.02e-06 -0.000284*** 5.61e-05 -7.55e-06***
(6.77e-05) (0.000101) (4.59e-05) (1.64e-06)
Teaching -0.833* -0.350 -0.230 0.0163
(0.482) (0.834) (0.327) (0.0158)
System Membership 0.554 0.0895 -0.0325 0.0116
(0.387) (0.466) (0.252) (0.00715)
Critical Access -0.232 -0.961 -0.584 -0.00444
(0.894) (0.772) (0.393) (0.0133)
Provision of Alcohol/SA Services 0.136 -0.687* -0.317 0.00425
(0.435) (0.398) (0.204) (0.00748)
Number of Large Hospitals -0.130 -1.702** -0.0982 0.000578
(0.495) (0.850) (0.358) (0.0205)
Number of Medium Hospitals 0.433 -0.323 -0.161 -0.00725
(0.342) (0.650) (0.214) (0.0128)
Number of Small Hospitals 0.452 -2.260*** 0.0906 -0.0502***
(0.382) (0.689) (0.329) (0.0175)
Good Samaritan 0.746 1.116 -0.0474 -0.0103
(0.587) (0.842) (0.310) (0.0109)
Access to Naloxone -1.311*** -1.757** -0.570 0.0292**
(0.479) (0.709) (0.349) (0.0127)
PDMP: access for prescribers -1.526 0.426 0.435 0.0328
(1.212) (0.952) (0.452) (0.0254)
PDMP: use mandate 1.678** 4.520*** -1.035* -0.000368
(0.701) (1.124) (0.537) (0.0160)
Expanded Medicaid in 2014 0.586 2.740*** 0.0844 0.0303***
(0.693) (0.671) (0.277) (0.0113)
Expanded Medicaid in 2015 -2.780*** 0.504 -0.703 0.0669**
(0.964) (1.944) (0.693) (0.0315)
Hospital and LHD collaborated on 2012 CHNA 0.783 1.125 -0.324 0.0269*
(0.697) (0.925) (0.365) (0.0157)
Constant -22.57 3.978 9.586 2.791***




Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. p-values were calculated using robust standard errors clustered on county. Reference categories are 
as follows: age group is 20-64; education is “high school or higher”; occupation is “management, business, science, 
and arts”; and race is “white”. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column A: Study sample (n=404): 34 NY counties and 370 control counties. This sample is limited to counties that 
did not prioritize substance abuse. 
Column B: Study sample (n=232): 34 NY counties and 198 control counties. This sample is limited to counties in NY 
that did not prioritize substance abuse (NY control counties) and counties outside of NY that prioritized substance 
abuse. 

































A B C D
Pre-Treatment Trends Test (p-value) 0.465 0.860 0.058 0.287
NY Effect 0.866 -0.963 -2.443 -3.608*
(1.359) (1.469) (1.953) (1.868)
0-19 1.064 0.481
(0.997) (0.893)
65 and Over 0.233 -0.00571
(0.641) (0.574)
Some College 0.745* 0.531
(0.405) (0.381)




Sales and office -0.170 -0.321
(0.429) (0.403)
Production, transportation, and material moving
-0.554 -0.748
(0.582) (0.548)











Median Income -0.000341*** -0.000290***
(0.000102) (0.000102)
Teaching 0.930 0.873 0.561
(1.870) (1.869) (1.764)
System Membership 0.162 -0.0332 0.0101
(0.463) (0.429) (0.436)
Critical Access 0.506 0.545 0.426
(0.727) (0.701) (0.723)
Provision of Alcohol/SA Services -0.0260 -0.0814 -0.195
(0.438) (0.445) (0.420)
Number of Large Hospitals -2.855*** -2.714*** -2.742***
(1.063) (1.019) (0.965)
Number of Medium Hospitals -0.762 -0.702 -0.745
(0.801) (0.746) (0.742)
Number of Small Hospitals -1.940** -2.103*** -2.125***
(0.757) (0.749) (0.735)
Good Samaritan 1.606* 1.332
(0.868) (0.871)
Access to Naloxone -2.656*** -1.993***
(0.698) (0.694)
PDMP: access for prescribers -0.115 0.246
(0.832) (0.943)
PDMP: use mandate 4.937*** 4.638***
(1.320) (1.160)
Expanded Medicaid in 2014 1.248** 1.736***
(0.621) (0.632)
Expanded Medicaid in 2015 0.473 0.513
(2.076) (2.140)
Hospital and LHD collaborated on 2012 CHNA 1.195 1.592* 1.360
(0.959) (0.930) (0.889)
Constant 15.90*** -16.92 20.06*** 19.49




Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. Models include county and year 
fixed effects. Study sample for all models (n=220): 22 NY counties and 198 control counties. p-values were calculated 
using robust standard errors clustered on county. Reference categories are as follows: age group is 20-64; education 
is “high school or higher”; occupation is “management, business, science, and arts”; and race is “white”. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column A: Unadjusted model includes county and year fixed effects. 
Column B: Model does NOT include state-by-year controls (i.e., state laws and Medicaid expansion) 
Column C: Model does NOT include county-by-year controls (i.e., education, occupation, race, uninsurance, 
unemployment, and median income) 
Column D: This is the study’s main model that includes all covariates. 
We estimated the models presented in Appendix Table E to examine the impact of excluding state-by-
year and county-by-year covariates from the main model. Including the state-by-year controls (Column C) 
while excluding the county-by-year controls moves the treatment estimate (i.e., coefficient on NY Effect) 
closer to what we observed in the full model, albeit the coefficient is not significant. Importantly, when 
the county-by-year controls are not included in the model, the pre-treatment trends are no longer parallel 
(p-value highlighted in red). The pre-treatment trends must be parallel for the difference-in-differences 
estimator to be unbiased. This gives us further confidence that the specification that includes the county-
by-year controls is more appropriate based on our study design. Additionally, as described in our main 
manuscript, previous research has shown that a combination of state and county-level factors help explain 
the wide variation in drug-induced mortality.287,291  
The state laws that we included in our main specification (i.e., Good Samaritan, naloxone overdose 
prevention, PDMP/access for prescribers and PDMP/use mandate) have been shown to be associated 
with drug-induced mortality.272,273,283,284,288,274–280,282 Also, the concurrent implementation of these laws 
have also been shown to be effective in decreasing drug-induced mortality. Importantly, the timing of 
each of these laws vary widely across states. In order to minimize the potential for violating the common 
shocks assumption of the difference-in-differences approach, we explicitly modeled the timing of 
implementation of each law, as well as Medicaid expansion.  
The county-by-year controls included in our main specification are also supported by previous studies that 
have looked at county-level factors associated with drug-induced mortality. A key finding of these studies 
is the heterogeneity of how county-level factors are associated with drug-induced mortality by specific 

















 Pre2 Post3 Pre Post (2009-2016) 
TOTAL POPULATION 47,139 48,484 299,524 311,625 >0.001 
Metropolitan Status (%) 28 28.1 73.9 73.5 >0.001 
AGE DISTRIBUTION (%)  
0-19 26.3 25.3 26.7 25.6 >0.001 
20-64 57.6 57.1 59.4 59.0 >0.001 
65 and over 16.1 17.6 13.9 15.4 0.99 
EDUCATION (%)  
High School or Less 53.5 50.6 46.5 43.9 0.99 
Some College 28.6 30.2 29.4 30.4 >0.001 
Bachelor or More 17.9 19.2 24.2 25.6 >0.001 
LABOR MARKET (%)  
Management, business, science, and arts 29.5 30.4 32.7 33.7 >0.001 
Service 17.7 18.2 17.7 18.5 0.01 
Sales and office 22.2 21.7 24.8 23.8 >0.001 
Production, transportation, and material moving 16.5 16.3 14.1 14.0 0.99 
Natural resources, construction, and maintenance 14.1 13.4 10.8 10.0 0.99 
RACE/ETHNICITY (%)  
White 84.0 83.7 83.2 82.6 0.99 
Black 9.2 9.2 8.0 8.2 0.99 
Other 5.0 5.0 6.5 6.5 >0.001 
Hispanic/Latino 7.5 8.3 9.8 10.8 >0.001 
OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC (%)  
Uninsurance 18.5 12.9 16.5 10.8 0.99 
Unemployment 8.6 5.7 9.4 5.7 >0.001 
Median Income ($) 42,466 47122 48,708 53,622 >0.001 
Notes: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, American Community Survey, 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and American Hospital Association. 1) Comparison of mean values 
between counties with and without suppressed mortality data over entire sample period. We used two-sample 
student t-test for continuous variables, and chi-square for categorical variables; 2) Pre-period is 2009-2012; 3) Post-
period is 2014-2016. 4) Asterisk indicates whether the change within the study group was significant. Standard errors 
were calculated with county clustering. These statistics include observations from all years from 2009 to 2016 but 








Part 2. Covariates: Description  
 
I. Hospital characteristics 
 
Hospital size: number of staffed beds. We categorized hospital size based on in-sample percentiles. 
 Large (>=275 beds - 75th percentile) 
 Medium (74-274 beds - 25th to 75th percentile) 
 Small Hospital size (<=73 beds - 25th percentile) 
 
We included a covariate that was equivalent to the number of each hospital size within the county. 
 
Teaching: Hospitals classified as teaching are those institutions that were members of the Council of 
Teaching Hospitals. The omitted reference group comprised non-teaching hospitals.  
 
System membership: refers to hospitals that were members of a corporate entity that owns two or more 
hospitals.  The omitted reference group comprised independent hospitals.  
 
Critical Access Status: dummy variable that equals one if a hospital is designated a critical access hospital 
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services by meeting the following criteria: have 25 or fewer 
acute care inpatient beds; be located more than 35 miles from another hospital; maintain an annual 
average length of stay of 96 hours or less for acute care patients; and prove 24/7 emergency car services. 
 
Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a hospital offers inpatient or 
outpatient alcohol/drug abuse or dependency services. 
 
We created county-level dummy variables that equaled 1 if there was at least one hospital in the county 
that was a: teaching hospital, member of a hospital system, critical access hospital, or that offered alcohol 
and drug use services (e.g., if a county had one teaching hospital, the county “teaching hospital” covariate 
equaled 1, and 0 otherwise). 
 
 
II. County-Level characteristics 
 
Median personal income: The median per capita income of residents in the county. 
 
Unemployment rate: This is the percentage of residents (aged 18 and older) in the county that are 
unemployed. 
 
Uninsurance rate: This is the percentage of residents in the county in which the hospital was located that 
are uninsured. 
 
Age categories: 0-19; 20-64; 65 and over (reference category is 20-64) (percentage in each category) 
 
Race:  White; Black or African American; Other (Other includes: American Indian and Alaska Native; Asian; 






Education level for people 25 and older: (reference category is High School or Less) (percentage in each 
category) 
High school or less: Less than 9th grade; 9th to 12th grade no diploma; and high school graduate 
Some college: some college no degree; and associate’s degree 
Bachelor or higher: bachelor’s degree; and graduate or professional degree  
 
Occupation categories: (reference category is Management, business, science, and arts) (percentage in 
each category) 
Management, business, science, and arts 
Service 
Sales and office 
Natural resources, construction, and maintenance 
Production, transportation, and material moving 
 
 
III. Factors Associated with Community Health Needs Assessment (CHNA) and Community Health 
Improvement Plan 
 
Nonprofit hospital and local health department collaboration on CHNA in 2012/13: dummy variable that 
equals 1 starting in 2012 for counties in which at least one nonprofit hospital and LHD produced a single 
CHNA. 
 
IV. County fixed effects: dummy variable for each county 
 
V. Year fixed effects: dummy variable for each year in the study period (2009-2016) 
 
VI. State-level characteristics 
 
Medicaid Expansion Status: dummy variables that equal 1 during the year the state expanded Medicaid. 
 Expanded Medicaid in 2014: State expanded Medicaid at any point during 2014. 
 Expanded Medicaid in 2015: State expanded Medicaid at any point during 2015. 
 Expanded Medicaid in 2016: State expanded Medicaid at any point during 2016. 
 
Naloxone Overdose Prevention laws (by 2016): Dummy variable that equals 1 during the year that the 
state law was implemented. Laws implemented by July 1st of a given year were coded as being 
implemented in that same year (e.g., 04/01/2011 coded as being implemented in 2011). Laws 
implemented after July 1st of a given year were coded as being implemented in the following year (e.g., 
08/01/2011 coded as being implemented in 2012).  
 
We recoded this variable such that the reference category was the most prevalent group in the post-
period. In other words, states that implemented naloxone overdose prevention laws were coded as 0 
because the majority of states had implemented these laws in the post period. 
 
 All states except for Kansas, Montana, and Wyoming. The timing of implementation differs across 






Good Samaritan laws (by 2016): Dummy variable that equals 1 during the year that the state law was 
implemented. We used the same coding approach as used for naloxone overdose prevention laws. 
 
 All states except for Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. The timing of implementation 
differs across states and can be found here: http://www.pdaps.org/datasets/good-samaritan-
overdose-laws-1501695153  
 
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program: 
We used the same coding approach as used for naloxone overdose prevention laws. 
 
Source: Haffajee RL, Mello MM, Zhang F, Zaslavsky AM, Larochelle MR, Wharam JF. Four States With 









Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (continued) 
Source: Haffajee RL, Mello MM, Zhang F, Zaslavsky AM, Larochelle MR, Wharam JF. Four States With 




















Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (continued) 
Source: Haffajee RL, Mello MM, Zhang F, Zaslavsky AM, Larochelle MR, Wharam JF. Four States With 




















Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (continued) 
Source: Haffajee RL, Mello MM, Zhang F, Zaslavsky AM, Larochelle MR, Wharam JF. Four States With 








Part 3. Initiatives Implemented by Nonprofit Hospitals: Prescription and/or Illicit Drug Misuse 
Initiative Category Example of Initiative 
Prescription Opioids: 
Prescribing practices 
and drug diversion 
Reduce illegal and inappropriate access to prescription drugs; Decrease utilization of 
illegal drugs 
 
Enhance internal protocol to reduce abuse of prescription narcotics 
 
Partner with the County Anti-Drug Coalition to form a prescription drug task force 
 
Patients at the Medical Center’s rural health clinic who are managing chronic pain and 
prescribed potentially addictive medications to treat their pain, must sign a Medication 
Agreement. This contract is shared with the Medical Center’s emergency department 
and prompt care clinics to prevent patients from attempting to obtain additional 
medications.  
 
Information on “Safe Prescribing Practices” was mailed to all providers practicing in the 
County 
 
In an effort to promote responsible management and storage of prescription 
medications, the hospital’s pharmacists have presented to community groups about 
the importance of keeping track of their medications and disposing of any that aren’t 
being used 
  
Work with dentists from the mobile dental clinic and other local dentists regarding 
the over prescribing of medications, and its effects. The goal is to decrease 
overprescribing of pain medications from dentists 
Overdose Reversal 
The hospital supplies emergency response teams in the hospital service area with the 
overdose reversing medication Narcan 
 
Narcan Education/Training-Education and instruction on the use of Narcan 
Neonatal Abstinence 
Syndrome (NAS) 
Increase awareness among the medical community of the prevalence of NAS and 
increase referrals for treatment 
 
Facilitate and coordinate the “Moms on Meds” Coalition to address the substance 
abuse issues of pregnant women and reduce the number of NAS births in Sevier County 
 
Implement “Cuddle Crew” and recruit volunteers to help drug addicted babies 
 
Hospitals will collaborate on a program to reduce the incidence of NAS  
 
Work together with the emergency room, medical staff and local medical community, 
to identify women who could benefit from the “Mothers and Infants Sober Together” 





Part 3. Initiatives Implemented by Nonprofit Hospitals: Prescription and/or Illicit Drug Misuse (cont.) 
Initiative Category Example of Initiative 
Access to care 
Implement an “Emergency Department Integrated Medically Assisted Treatment of 
Opioid Addiction with Buprenorphine” to start the treatment of opioid addiction in the 
ED, with appropriate referral for ongoing treatment 
 
Emergency Physicians program used in ED for patients on pain medication to spell out 
an agreement on pain management.  Mid-level providers in the ED document acute 
pain patients and strive to work with the patient and the patient’s primary provider on 
documenting the pain plan including ED pain management appropriateness of 
scheduled narcotics dispensing 
 
Support the expansion of supportive housing programs for those afflicted with mental 
illness and chemical dependency issues 
 
Project Engage is a unique addiction recovery program based on a peer model and in 
collaboration with a non-profit counseling center in the county 
Law Enforcement and 
Public Safety 
Collaboration 
The Center operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week where patients can safely 
recover from intoxication under the supervision of trained facility staff. The Center 
accepts admissions from any law enforcement agency in the County. 
 
Permanent, medication collection boxes are available at the Marion County Sheriff’s 
Office and Marion Police Department 
 
The hospital participates in the Drug Task Force of the County Sheriff’s Department 
which is also developing a convocation program for the schools 
 
Heroin Is Here: this heroin-focused committee was established by hospital and more 
than 60 people representing health, law enforcement, education, elected officials, 
treatment centers and others 
Drug Take Back 
Initiatives 
Drug Take Back Days are planned throughout the year by the Medical Center’s 
pharmacy department, providing a safe way to dispose of unused prescription drugs 
that could otherwise wind up in the hands of someone who wishes to sell, trade or 
otherwise use the drugs illegally 
 
Participate in and promote prescription drug take back day; 
Establish Rx drug disposal committee  
 
The hospital medication safety pharmacist collaborated with various community 
agencies in organizing and holding Medication Disposal Day events 
Screening 
For appropriate emergency department and trauma patients, the hospital will conduct 
a Screening, Brief Intervention and Referral to Treatment (SBIRT).  SBIRT is a 
comprehensive, integrated, public health approach to the delivery of early intervention 
and treatment services for persons with substance use disorders, as well as those who 
are at risk of developing these disorders 
 






Part 3. Initiatives Implemented by Nonprofit Hospitals: Prescription and/or Illicit Drug Misuse (cont.) 
Initiative Category Example of Initiative 
Other 
Attend/support drug free coalition, community prevention programs, resources for 
patients with drug dependency 
 
Increase awareness regarding available mental health and addiction services available 
through the hospital 
 
Education regarding addiction services to patients admitted to the hospital for 
substance abuse-related conditions 
 
Educational Opportunities for our physician partners on various topics relating to 
prescription and illicit drug use to equip the medical staff with tools to help their 
patients avoid problems with substance abuse 
 
Leadership from the hospital works with the YES Partnership, a community agency that 
supports youth and families in preventing substance abuse 
 
Under the Affordable Care Act, insurance coverage for drug and alcohol programs 
changed. The hospital will educate staff to help link patients to these newly covered 
programs 
 
Opportunities for patients to attend weekly Narcotics Anonymous meetings at the 
inpatient unit 
 
Education materials on (a) substance abuse prevention, (b) guidelines on proper 
disposal of unused medications, and (c) practical means on how to prevent 
prescription drug overdose and abuse 
 
Work with the county Drug Task Force to minimize the abuse of prescription drugs 
 
One initiative from the Heroin Is Here group was to raise awareness about drug abuse 
in this area, and provide direction for those seeking help.  There have been 3 
different message billboards throughout our service area.  These billboards also 
provided direction to seek assistance by calling 211 for resource information 
 
Education is provided to patients about the potential dangers of pain medications to 
help them uphold the conditions of the agreement 
 
In an effort to help individuals identify when a friend or family member has an issue 
with heroin, credit card sized cards were printed listing the signs to look for during and 







APPENDIX C: APPENDIX FOR AIM 3 (CHAPTER V) 
Note for all appendix tables: Authors’ analysis of data from CDC WONDER underlying cause of death, 
American Community Survey, National Association of County and City Health Officials, US Census Bureau, 
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our models included state fixed effects and used robust standard errors 
(in parentheses). Outcomes are defined in the text. We used 1-year lagged outcomes except for 2009 
models using intermediate outcomes which used 2-year lagged outcomes. Sample size is 280 counties in 
2009 and 338 counties in 2017. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 
We estimated nine different multivariate models for each year and outcome. All models controlled for 
the county-by-year covariates and state fixed effects. Model 1 only included the county-by-year controls 
and state fixed effects. For Models 2 to 5, we added each of the social capital measures individually to 
examine their association with the outcome. In Model 6, we added both network size variables; that is, 
network size defined based on the presence of any type of relationship between the LHD and organization, 
and network size defined based on the simultaneous presence of all types of relationships (i.e., strength 
of tie dimension). Building on the previous model, we added the cross-sectorial organizational network 
measure (i.e., breadth of resources dimension) in Model 7. Finally, in Model 8 we added the LHD sub-
network indicator for networks that contain all five top organizations. The full estimate results for Models 
1-9 can be found in the Appendix.  
 
















MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
New York * Cross Sectorial 21.22 28.63 20.83 25.63 20.63 30.31 30.47 31.16 12.04
(20.65) (20.80) (20.60) (20.42) (20.96) (20.54) (20.61) (21.05) (74.56)
New York 4.920
(21.61)
Network Size (any tie) -1.782 -2.334* -2.250 -3.244* -3.234*
(1.145) (1.227) (1.537) (1.892) (1.909)
Network Size (multiplex) 1.792 2.877* 2.873* 2.843* 2.837*
(1.486) (1.633) (1.640) (1.621) (1.630)
Cross-Sectorial Networks -7.443 -0.866 0.289 0.213
(6.375) (8.141) (8.269) (8.414)
Sub-Network (ALL 5 top organiz 2.883 13.56 13.44
(7.141) (9.344) (9.567)
Total Population 1.67e-06 2.46e-06 4.94e-07 1.88e-06 1.54e-06 8.08e-07 7.98e-07 5.76e-07 5.70e-07
(2.71e-06) (2.71e-06) (2.74e-06) (2.73e-06) (2.64e-06) (2.72e-06) (2.72e-06) (2.66e-06) (2.66e-06)
Metropolitan Status -25.74*** -23.89*** -25.98*** -24.06*** -26.11*** -23.70*** -23.59*** -24.55*** -24.52***
(7.372) (7.422) (7.449) (7.199) (7.495) (7.579) (7.408) (7.454) (7.468)
   0-19 -3.150* -3.117* -3.186* -3.159* -3.202* -3.165* -3.167* -3.393** -3.381**
(1.726) (1.720) (1.709) (1.733) (1.709) (1.694) (1.696) (1.707) (1.713)
   65+ 11.70*** 11.90*** 11.86*** 11.76*** 11.67*** 12.23*** 12.23*** 12.19*** 12.20***
(1.417) (1.412) (1.420) (1.419) (1.419) (1.407) (1.408) (1.419) (1.424)
   Black 0.829* 0.883* 0.853* 0.848* 0.824* 0.939* 0.938* 0.943** 0.945**
(0.451) (0.470) (0.452) (0.467) (0.449) (0.477) (0.478) (0.468) (0.471)
   Other -0.0876 -0.0718 -0.0480 -0.0803 -0.0933 -0.00335 -0.00335 -0.0231 -0.0230
(0.417) (0.414) (0.410) (0.414) (0.420) (0.402) (0.403) (0.408) (0.409)
Uninsurance 0.284 0.0137 0.557 0.107 0.435 0.367 0.359 0.939 0.938
(1.566) (1.527) (1.601) (1.583) (1.525) (1.572) (1.598) (1.618) (1.621)
Unemployment 0.0857 0.469 0.0339 0.277 0.0865 0.505 0.509 0.698 0.696
(1.388) (1.382) (1.394) (1.413) (1.390) (1.370) (1.380) (1.376) (1.379)
Median Income -0.000966** -0.000969** -0.000955** -0.00102** -0.000940** -0.000954** -0.000960** -0.000832* -0.000829*
(0.000438) (0.000446) (0.000437) (0.000441) (0.000432) (0.000446) (0.000453) (0.000462) (0.000465)
Local Board of Health 36.34*** 33.63*** 36.06*** 36.42*** 36.63*** 32.35*** 32.49*** 32.34*** 32.42***
(10.76) (10.26) (10.72) (10.73) (10.68) (10.13) (10.06) (9.981) (10.09)
Conducted CHA -6.900 -6.600 -6.974 -5.938 -7.167 -6.626 -6.528 -7.765 -7.843
(6.634) (6.598) (6.627) (6.581) (6.631) (6.560) (6.638) (6.757) (6.830)
Conducted CHIP -2.355 -0.0254 -3.477 -1.955 -2.752 -1.105 -1.165 -1.778 -1.680
(6.406) (6.515) (6.674) (6.381) (6.454) (6.660) (6.612) (6.568) (6.669)
Constant 193.2*** 212.9*** 187.8*** 218.8*** 190.2*** 210.3*** 212.4*** 205.6*** 205.1***































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -60.54*** -58.35*** -60.70*** -57.12*** -60.08*** -58.46*** -57.26*** -57.47*** 155.6**
(20.99) (21.04) (21.02) (20.98) (20.99) (21.04) (21.04) (21.09) (72.84)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -55.48***
(19.99)
net_size -0.466 -0.482 -0.0294 0.137 0.0354
(0.934) (0.934) (1.800) (1.918) (1.929)
net_size_intense 0.650 0.776 0.684 0.668 0.239
(2.106) (2.083) (2.094) (2.086) (2.039)
cross_sectorial -3.518 -3.397 -3.685 -2.973
(5.740) (10.92) (10.88) (10.92)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -3.566 -2.238 0.148
(9.138) (10.88) (11.20)
tot_pop_ACS 1.83e-07 6.05e-07 -2.99e-07 2.62e-07 3.95e-07 4.51e-08 -2.22e-07 -2.21e-07 5.63e-07
(5.90e-06) (5.86e-06) (5.97e-06) (5.87e-06) (5.81e-06) (5.93e-06) (5.81e-06) (5.79e-06) (5.92e-06)
1.metro -20.04** -19.34** -20.14** -19.61** -19.54** -19.44** -19.69** -19.59** -20.25**
(8.955) (8.885) (8.984) (8.977) (8.998) (8.918) (8.892) (8.950) (8.942)
age_0_19 0.513 0.523 0.542 0.460 0.530 0.559 0.494 0.496 0.216
(2.096) (2.095) (2.105) (2.089) (2.097) (2.104) (2.101) (2.104) (2.127)
age_65_over 9.691*** 9.623*** 9.689*** 9.580*** 9.645*** 9.618*** 9.578*** 9.564*** 9.410***
(1.656) (1.650) (1.661) (1.669) (1.644) (1.655) (1.677) (1.673) (1.682)
black_afr_ACS -0.0110 -0.0149 -0.0201 -0.000953 -0.00997 -0.0259 -0.0111 -0.00805 -0.0430
(0.387) (0.384) (0.394) (0.387) (0.388) (0.390) (0.374) (0.376) (0.376)
other_race -0.275 -0.278 -0.282 -0.341 -0.236 -0.286 -0.345 -0.325 -0.395
(0.789) (0.795) (0.785) (0.791) (0.791) (0.790) (0.789) (0.797) (0.826)
unins_rate -5.162** -5.178** -5.164** -5.035** -5.253** -5.181** -5.042** -5.083** -5.139**
(2.076) (2.071) (2.078) (2.038) (2.100) (2.072) (2.073) (2.090) (2.085)
ur_rate 5.401** 5.524** 5.396** 5.473** 5.319** 5.522** 5.473** 5.384** 5.547**
(2.411) (2.414) (2.415) (2.436) (2.419) (2.421) (2.429) (2.453) (2.466)
median_income -0.00223*** -0.00225*** -0.00224*** -0.00223*** -0.00224*** -0.00226*** -0.00224*** -0.00224*** -0.00229***
(0.000308) (0.000308) (0.000306) (0.000308) (0.000306) (0.000306) (0.000307) (0.000307) (0.000309)
1.lboh -2.323 -1.880 -2.336 -1.679 -2.285 -1.880 -1.687 -1.769 -2.160
(9.257) (9.012) (9.277) (9.050) (9.244) (9.031) (9.058) (9.134) (9.097)
1.cha 8.665 8.952 8.703 8.898 8.682 9.007 8.948 8.874 9.021
(9.685) (9.744) (9.707) (9.640) (9.731) (9.767) (9.807) (9.861) (9.870)
1.chip 11.92 12.52 11.81 12.66 12.19 12.40 12.55 12.57 12.53
(9.107) (9.251) (9.138) (9.060) (9.194) (9.278) (9.208) (9.219) (9.252)
Constant 248.1*** 253.9*** 248.2*** 259.0*** 251.4*** 254.2*** 259.1*** 260.0*** 270.8***































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY 2.124 2.286 2.138 1.471 2.660 2.241 1.850 1.946 11.61*
(2.024) (2.103) (2.028) (2.208) (1.938) (2.116) (2.214) (2.111) (6.753)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -2.490
(1.928)
net_size -0.0346 -0.0224 -0.196 -0.0677 -0.0736
(0.0939) (0.0969) (0.142) (0.146) (0.146)
net_size_intense -0.0719 -0.0615 -0.0567 -0.0511 -0.0477
(0.114) (0.116) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113)
cross_sectorial 0.961* 1.767** 1.605** 1.648**
(0.501) (0.779) (0.770) (0.778)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -1.757** -1.929** -1.851**
(0.742) (0.762) (0.781)
tot_pop_ACS 2.36e-08 3.54e-08 7.22e-08 1.55e-08 8.66e-08 7.28e-08 1.14e-07 1.37e-07 1.41e-07
(3.43e-07) (3.44e-07) (3.44e-07) (3.33e-07) (3.33e-07) (3.44e-07) (3.20e-07) (3.20e-07) (3.20e-07)
1.metro 0.439 0.471 0.451 0.298 0.646 0.469 0.368 0.500 0.484
(0.861) (0.880) (0.865) (0.864) (0.856) (0.882) (0.866) (0.851) (0.854)
age_0_19 -0.0494 -0.0530 -0.0461 -0.0209 -0.0391 -0.0489 -0.0150 0.00474 -0.00167
(0.189) (0.190) (0.190) (0.188) (0.184) (0.191) (0.187) (0.182) (0.183)
age_65_over -0.208* -0.205 -0.214* -0.212* -0.202 -0.211* -0.205 -0.208 -0.210
(0.124) (0.125) (0.127) (0.124) (0.128) (0.127) (0.130) (0.132) (0.132)
black_afr_ACS -0.0799** -0.0783** -0.0813** -0.0877** -0.0767** -0.0801** -0.0867** -0.0874** -0.0888**
(0.0371) (0.0370) (0.0370) (0.0383) (0.0356) (0.0372) (0.0377) (0.0366) (0.0368)
other_race 0.107* 0.108* 0.105* 0.0977 0.110* 0.106* 0.0953 0.0958 0.0955
(0.0624) (0.0623) (0.0630) (0.0630) (0.0589) (0.0629) (0.0625) (0.0596) (0.0600)
unins_rate -0.291* -0.296* -0.302* -0.257* -0.370** -0.303* -0.265* -0.338** -0.336**
(0.157) (0.157) (0.155) (0.153) (0.155) (0.156) (0.150) (0.148) (0.148)
ur_rate 0.262 0.271 0.266 0.226 0.277 0.271 0.249 0.237 0.237
(0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.188) (0.181) (0.182) (0.183)
median_income -0.000233*** -0.000233*** -0.000234*** -0.000228*** -0.000247*** -0.000234*** -0.000223*** -0.000240*** -0.000241***
(4.08e-05) (4.11e-05) (4.11e-05) (3.98e-05) (4.03e-05) (4.13e-05) (4.09e-05) (3.95e-05) (3.98e-05)
1.lboh 3.002*** 2.968*** 3.015*** 2.928*** 2.965*** 2.991*** 2.684*** 2.781*** 2.727***
(0.844) (0.861) (0.847) (0.837) (0.857) (0.865) (0.909) (0.900) (0.905)
1.cha -0.905 -0.906 -0.899 -0.976 -0.818 -0.900 -1.035 -0.924 -0.876
(0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.679) (0.657) (0.681) (0.682) (0.669) (0.681)
1.chip 0.0439 0.0890 0.0965 0.00646 0.312 0.118 0.273 0.401 0.341
(0.631) (0.628) (0.628) (0.631) (0.613) (0.628) (0.629) (0.618) (0.628)
Constant 36.83*** 37.29*** 36.99*** 32.90*** 38.81*** 37.26*** 32.33*** 33.45*** 33.70***































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -1.550*** -1.557*** -1.551*** -1.630*** -1.540*** -1.558*** -1.626*** -1.638*** -3.319
(0.502) (0.513) (0.502) (0.526) (0.501) (0.514) (0.525) (0.529) (2.091)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial 0.437
(0.526)
net_size 0.00159 0.00150 -0.0244 -0.0173 -0.0165
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0331) (0.0370) (0.0372)
net_size_intense 0.00496 0.00460 0.0101 0.00932 0.0126
(0.0796) (0.0797) (0.0794) (0.0797) (0.0817)
cross_sectorial 0.0847 0.198 0.187 0.182
(0.112) (0.195) (0.196) (0.197)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -0.0857 -0.103 -0.121
(0.193) (0.237) (0.248)
tot_pop_ACS -1.07e-06*** -1.07e-06*** -1.07e-06*** -1.07e-06*** -1.07e-06*** -1.07e-06*** -1.06e-06*** -1.06e-06*** -1.06e-06***
(3.14e-07) (3.16e-07) (3.27e-07) (3.16e-07) (3.13e-07) (3.29e-07) (3.29e-07) (3.28e-07) (3.32e-07)
1.metro -0.0502 -0.0526 -0.0511 -0.0602 -0.0388 -0.0533 -0.0384 -0.0341 -0.0291
(0.207) (0.209) (0.208) (0.207) (0.206) (0.210) (0.209) (0.208) (0.209)
age_0_19 0.0337 0.0336 0.0339 0.0351 0.0337 0.0338 0.0379 0.0376 0.0396
(0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0587) (0.0587) (0.0585) (0.0584) (0.0593)
age_65_over -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.120*** -0.121*** -0.120***
(0.0418) (0.0420) (0.0419) (0.0419) (0.0416) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0416) (0.0422)
black_afr_ACS 0.0227** 0.0227** 0.0227** 0.0225** 0.0227** 0.0227** 0.0219** 0.0220** 0.0222**
(0.00993) (0.00995) (0.00975) (0.00992) (0.00994) (0.00975) (0.00951) (0.00956) (0.00968)
other_race 0.0900* 0.0900* 0.0900* 0.0916** 0.0910** 0.0900* 0.0934** 0.0945** 0.0951**
(0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0457) (0.0460) (0.0459) (0.0458) (0.0461) (0.0464) (0.0466)
unins_rate -0.00721 -0.00712 -0.00727 -0.00994 -0.00952 -0.00718 -0.0151 -0.0171 -0.0169
(0.0519) (0.0519) (0.0520) (0.0526) (0.0520) (0.0520) (0.0528) (0.0531) (0.0532)
ur_rate 0.112 0.111 0.112 0.110 0.110 0.111 0.114 0.110 0.109
(0.0856) (0.0858) (0.0857) (0.0847) (0.0862) (0.0859) (0.0840) (0.0851) (0.0854)
median_income -0.000129*** -0.000128*** -0.000129*** -0.000129*** -0.000129*** -0.000129*** -0.000129*** -0.000130*** -0.000129***
(1.10e-05) (1.11e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.10e-05) (1.11e-05) (1.11e-05) (1.11e-05)
1.lboh 0.255 0.254 0.255 0.240 0.256 0.254 0.243 0.239 0.243
(0.216) (0.216) (0.217) (0.215) (0.216) (0.216) (0.216) (0.217) (0.217)
1.cha 0.265 0.264 0.265 0.259 0.265 0.264 0.263 0.260 0.259
(0.259) (0.261) (0.259) (0.260) (0.260) (0.261) (0.260) (0.261) (0.262)
1.chip -0.00492 -0.00688 -0.00578 -0.0218 0.00212 -0.00756 -0.0160 -0.0140 -0.0134
(0.238) (0.242) (0.238) (0.240) (0.240) (0.242) (0.241) (0.242) (0.242)
Constant 24.93*** 24.91*** 24.93*** 24.66*** 25.03*** 24.92*** 24.61*** 24.67*** 24.59***































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY 2.017 2.833 2.078 2.025 1.920 2.827 2.569 2.349 5.271
(4.598) (4.854) (4.618) (4.703) (4.916) (4.880) (4.803) (4.940) (17.57)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -0.751
(4.629)
net_size -0.393 -0.410 -0.736 -0.627 -0.631
(0.325) (0.350) (0.504) (0.466) (0.471)
net_size_intense -0.104 0.0720 0.104 0.0912 0.0929
(0.262) (0.284) (0.301) (0.292) (0.292)
cross_sectorial -0.0249 2.879 2.729 2.752
(2.480) (3.311) (3.230) (3.310)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -3.075 -1.561 -1.517
(2.719) (2.625) (2.762)
tot_pop_ACS -1.30e-06** -1.15e-06* -1.24e-06* -1.30e-06** -1.20e-06** -1.19e-06* -1.11e-06* -1.09e-06* -1.09e-06*
(6.51e-07) (6.08e-07) (6.87e-07) (6.53e-07) (5.96e-07) (6.54e-07) (6.48e-07) (6.33e-07) (6.36e-07)
1.metro -2.752 -2.379 -2.765 -2.747 -2.633 -2.354 -2.604 -2.619 -2.622
(1.899) (1.876) (1.901) (1.874) (1.878) (1.880) (1.847) (1.849) (1.855)
age_0_19 -0.0915 -0.0994 -0.0938 -0.0918 -0.0356 -0.0982 -0.0641 -0.0359 -0.0397
(0.427) (0.426) (0.428) (0.425) (0.429) (0.429) (0.440) (0.449) (0.459)
age_65_over 0.961*** 1.012*** 0.943** 0.961*** 1.020*** 1.027*** 1.046** 1.061** 1.059**
(0.347) (0.358) (0.362) (0.349) (0.376) (0.384) (0.405) (0.421) (0.425)
black_afr_ACS 0.121 0.101 0.119 0.121 0.0912 0.102 0.0945 0.0841 0.0842
(0.0929) (0.0948) (0.0938) (0.0925) (0.0946) (0.0950) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103)
other_race 0.157 0.179 0.151 0.157 0.187 0.183 0.200 0.209 0.209
(0.188) (0.187) (0.191) (0.189) (0.189) (0.190) (0.195) (0.197) (0.198)
unins_rate 0.731* 0.677 0.721 0.731* 0.582 0.681 0.666 0.602 0.604
(0.434) (0.430) (0.438) (0.440) (0.413) (0.432) (0.414) (0.412) (0.415)
ur_rate -0.0891 -0.0308 -0.0876 -0.0889 -0.0911 -0.0292 -0.00199 -0.0179 -0.0172
(0.288) (0.279) (0.289) (0.288) (0.283) (0.280) (0.275) (0.277) (0.279)
median_income -0.000304*** -0.000302*** -0.000305*** -0.000304*** -0.000324*** -0.000301*** -0.000291*** -0.000302*** -0.000303***
(7.61e-05) (7.68e-05) (7.62e-05) (7.68e-05) (7.70e-05) (7.71e-05) (7.86e-05) (7.82e-05) (7.85e-05)
1.lboh -0.246 -0.626 -0.200 -0.248 -0.427 -0.675 -0.726 -0.721 -0.737
(1.675) (1.654) (1.659) (1.669) (1.709) (1.666) (1.660) (1.671) (1.693)
1.cha 2.137 2.095 2.145 2.139 2.231 2.088 1.849 1.920 1.937
(1.741) (1.733) (1.744) (1.706) (1.761) (1.734) (1.646) (1.684) (1.711)
1.chip -0.610 -0.0831 -0.539 -0.608 -0.103 -0.109 0.0913 0.223 0.197
(1.523) (1.605) (1.491) (1.505) (1.728) (1.579) (1.681) (1.790) (1.851)
Constant 17.08 22.59 17.57 17.18 20.35 22.50 15.70 16.48 16.55































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -4.311 -2.931 -4.091 -3.240 -3.369 -2.786 -2.768 -3.025 8.982
(8.059) (7.928) (8.085) (7.691) (7.709) (7.945) (7.874) (7.615) (26.27)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -3.149
(6.475)
net_size -0.373 -0.361 -0.337 -0.00877 -0.0129
(0.373) (0.379) (0.500) (0.567) (0.570)
net_size_intense -0.511 -0.442 -0.447 -0.486 -0.519
(0.533) (0.540) (0.547) (0.543) (0.545)
cross_sectorial -1.631 -0.157 -0.212 -0.186
(2.190) (3.091) (3.156) (3.173)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -6.028* -5.790 -5.507
(3.535) (4.463) (4.848)
tot_pop_ACS -4.31e-06** -3.98e-06* -3.96e-06* -4.25e-06** -4.17e-06** -3.69e-06* -3.70e-06* -3.82e-06* -3.76e-06*
(2.05e-06) (2.15e-06) (2.01e-06) (2.07e-06) (2.08e-06) (2.09e-06) (2.10e-06) (2.09e-06) (2.08e-06)
1.metro -9.072*** -8.413*** -8.931*** -8.882*** -8.287*** -8.312*** -8.334*** -8.144*** -8.211***
(2.291) (2.246) (2.316) (2.268) (2.307) (2.263) (2.280) (2.292) (2.308)
age_0_19 -0.426 -0.386 -0.468 -0.408 -0.444 -0.423 -0.425 -0.480 -0.504
(0.673) (0.676) (0.675) (0.674) (0.657) (0.681) (0.685) (0.671) (0.690)
age_65_over 0.525 0.537 0.526 0.509 0.528 0.538 0.535 0.527 0.511
(0.450) (0.452) (0.448) (0.445) (0.443) (0.451) (0.450) (0.441) (0.454)
black_afr_ACS 0.347*** 0.350*** 0.361*** 0.352*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 0.362*** 0.373*** 0.371***
(0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.112) (0.109) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115)
other_race 0.131 0.106 0.132 0.0957 0.165 0.107 0.105 0.159 0.151
(0.177) (0.174) (0.177) (0.180) (0.181) (0.174) (0.178) (0.187) (0.189)
unins_rate -0.0566 -0.103 -0.0473 -0.0307 -0.217 -0.0930 -0.0875 -0.199 -0.197
(0.474) (0.468) (0.474) (0.470) (0.478) (0.469) (0.463) (0.472) (0.472)
ur_rate -0.0478 0.00916 -0.0632 -0.0435 -0.0184 -0.00603 -0.00941 -0.0323 -0.0249
(0.575) (0.574) (0.574) (0.577) (0.573) (0.574) (0.590) (0.599) (0.604)
median_income -0.000363*** -0.000380*** -0.000356*** -0.000369*** -0.000366*** -0.000373*** -0.000373*** -0.000361*** -0.000364***
(8.22e-05) (8.30e-05) (8.25e-05) (8.28e-05) (7.90e-05) (8.37e-05) (8.31e-05) (8.11e-05) (8.20e-05)
1.lboh 0.933 1.105 0.901 1.328 0.517 1.072 1.099 0.559 0.558
(2.177) (2.305) (2.199) (2.340) (2.251) (2.327) (2.387) (2.413) (2.418)
1.cha 0.253 0.518 0.182 0.361 -0.0210 0.448 0.441 -0.0578 -0.0359
(3.684) (3.677) (3.666) (3.706) (3.558) (3.664) (3.666) (3.456) (3.462)
1.chip 2.567 2.756 2.674 2.895 2.803 2.842 2.863 2.942 2.952
(3.094) (3.115) (3.093) (3.153) (2.957) (3.115) (3.126) (3.042) (3.058)
Constant 54.06** 58.15** 54.41** 58.51** 59.08*** 58.31** 58.49** 59.88** 60.71**































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY 3.477* 2.365 3.496* 3.269* 3.043 2.233 2.411 2.474 1.711
(1.866) (1.972) (1.869) (1.938) (1.962) (1.987) (1.948) (1.999) (6.587)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial 0.196
(1.886)
net_size 0.263** 0.306** 0.404** 0.311* 0.311*
(0.120) (0.129) (0.161) (0.180) (0.182)
net_size_intense -0.0902 -0.231 -0.236 -0.240 -0.240
(0.153) (0.161) (0.160) (0.159) (0.159)
cross_sectorial 0.357 -1.015 -0.904 -0.907
(0.775) (0.946) (0.940) (0.952)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 2.102** 1.302 1.297
(0.865) (1.037) (1.054)
tot_pop_ACS 3.82e-07 2.63e-07 4.42e-07 3.73e-07 2.81e-07 3.96e-07 3.83e-07 3.62e-07 3.61e-07
(3.91e-07) (3.85e-07) (4.05e-07) (3.93e-07) (3.84e-07) (3.87e-07) (3.85e-07) (3.84e-07) (3.84e-07)
1.metro 0.568 0.301 0.580 0.487 0.302 0.289 0.422 0.327 0.328
(0.778) (0.792) (0.779) (0.791) (0.794) (0.796) (0.794) (0.803) (0.805)
age_0_19 -0.137 -0.133 -0.135 -0.136 -0.172 -0.127 -0.127 -0.150 -0.150
(0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.205) (0.206) (0.204) (0.207) (0.204) (0.204)
age_65_over -0.123 -0.141 -0.131 -0.124 -0.141 -0.164 -0.167 -0.173 -0.173
(0.156) (0.158) (0.158) (0.156) (0.156) (0.161) (0.163) (0.162) (0.163)
black_afr_ACS -0.0762* -0.0837* -0.0774* -0.0769* -0.0795* -0.0881** -0.0888** -0.0884** -0.0883**
(0.0423) (0.0425) (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0429) (0.0417) (0.0415) (0.0422) (0.0424)
other_race -0.500*** -0.502*** -0.502*** -0.500*** -0.505*** -0.508*** -0.509*** -0.511*** -0.511***
(0.108) (0.104) (0.108) (0.108) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.102) (0.102)
unins_rate 0.163 0.205 0.150 0.170 0.274 0.177 0.172 0.228 0.228
(0.210) (0.210) (0.213) (0.213) (0.212) (0.212) (0.215) (0.217) (0.218)
ur_rate 0.0438 -0.0180 0.0463 0.0343 0.0430 -0.0216 -0.0175 0.00116 0.00110
(0.199) (0.193) (0.200) (0.199) (0.194) (0.193) (0.190) (0.188) (0.189)
median_income 0.000129*** 0.000131*** 0.000129*** 0.000132*** 0.000148*** 0.000130*** 0.000123** 0.000135*** 0.000135***
(4.84e-05) (4.82e-05) (4.84e-05) (4.88e-05) (4.75e-05) (4.78e-05) (4.80e-05) (4.78e-05) (4.79e-05)
1.lboh -2.412* -1.998 -2.399* -2.401* -2.202* -1.898 -1.772 -1.786 -1.783
(1.234) (1.259) (1.239) (1.235) (1.264) (1.276) (1.307) (1.315) (1.325)
1.cha -0.350 -0.385 -0.345 -0.403 -0.538 -0.378 -0.240 -0.360 -0.363
(0.882) (0.883) (0.883) (0.868) (0.884) (0.884) (0.872) (0.880) (0.894)
1.chip 0.362 0.0143 0.418 0.345 0.0705 0.102 0.0227 -0.0371 -0.0332
(0.765) (0.768) (0.772) (0.766) (0.773) (0.771) (0.776) (0.781) (0.795)































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY 3.319** 3.471** 3.352** 3.797** 3.307** 3.492** 3.821** 3.858** 3.560
(1.433) (1.480) (1.436) (1.484) (1.436) (1.482) (1.481) (1.501) (4.654)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial 0.0778
(1.259)
net_size -0.0331 -0.0310 0.0892 0.0686 0.0688
(0.0544) (0.0545) (0.105) (0.119) (0.120)
net_size_intense -0.114 -0.107 -0.131 -0.128 -0.128
(0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134)
cross_sectorial -0.500 -0.913 -0.883 -0.884
(0.343) (0.647) (0.655) (0.659)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 0.139 0.303 0.300
(0.510) (0.652) (0.676)
tot_pop_ACS 6.27e-07 6.57e-07 7.10e-07 6.40e-07 6.21e-07 7.33e-07 6.65e-07 6.67e-07 6.66e-07
(4.45e-07) (4.42e-07) (4.60e-07) (4.37e-07) (4.45e-07) (4.56e-07) (4.47e-07) (4.45e-07) (4.49e-07)
1.metro 1.252** 1.303** 1.272** 1.311*** 1.233** 1.318** 1.246** 1.232** 1.233**
(0.503) (0.514) (0.502) (0.505) (0.511) (0.513) (0.519) (0.519) (0.521)
age_0_19 0.225* 0.225* 0.220* 0.217* 0.226* 0.220* 0.206 0.207 0.208
(0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) (0.130) (0.132)
age_65_over 0.116 0.111 0.116 0.0998 0.118 0.111 0.1000 0.104 0.104
(0.0841) (0.0850) (0.0841) (0.0853) (0.0840) (0.0850) (0.0853) (0.0845) (0.0851)
black_afr_ACS -0.0184 -0.0187 -0.0168 -0.0170 -0.0184 -0.0172 -0.0132 -0.0135 -0.0135
(0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0176)
other_race -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.253*** -0.263*** -0.256*** -0.253*** -0.269*** -0.273*** -0.272***
(0.0718) (0.0722) (0.0723) (0.0713) (0.0715) (0.0726) (0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0714)
unins_rate 0.154 0.152 0.156 0.171 0.159 0.153 0.193 0.200 0.200
(0.127) (0.126) (0.127) (0.128) (0.129) (0.126) (0.127) (0.130) (0.131)
ur_rate 0.145 0.155 0.146 0.156 0.148 0.155 0.140 0.152 0.151
(0.154) (0.154) (0.154) (0.151) (0.155) (0.154) (0.151) (0.153) (0.154)
median_income 5.70e-05*** 5.57e-05*** 5.85e-05*** 5.66e-05*** 5.73e-05*** 5.73e-05*** 6.14e-05*** 6.15e-05*** 6.16e-05***
(2.00e-05) (1.98e-05) (2.02e-05) (1.97e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.00e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.01e-05) (2.02e-05)
1.lboh -0.422 -0.395 -0.424 -0.329 -0.420 -0.398 -0.327 -0.312 -0.311
(0.605) (0.597) (0.603) (0.581) (0.608) (0.595) (0.585) (0.583) (0.586)
1.cha 1.249** 1.265** 1.244** 1.283** 1.249** 1.259** 1.263** 1.270** 1.269**
(0.569) (0.570) (0.570) (0.568) (0.570) (0.572) (0.573) (0.571) (0.571)
1.chip -0.615 -0.575 -0.596 -0.515 -0.626 -0.559 -0.518 -0.523 -0.523
(0.653) (0.665) (0.659) (0.647) (0.657) (0.670) (0.653) (0.653) (0.654)
Constant 72.31*** 72.76*** 72.29*** 73.88*** 72.13*** 72.71*** 73.94*** 73.73*** 73.71***































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -256.4* -274.7** -233.4* -271.5** -249.0* -292.2** -300.0** -328.6** -991.7*
(128.9) (133.1) (124.3) (134.2) (131.3) (126.2) (129.6) (144.4) (569.1)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial 175.2
(152.5)
net_size 3.422 12.33 9.525 15.72 17.28
(8.813) (11.10) (14.37) (14.82) (15.11)
net_size_intense -17.62* -23.04* -23.57* -26.34** -26.94**
(9.199) (11.89) (12.01) (12.05) (12.22)
cross_sectorial 18.08 28.05 49.67 39.81
(53.55) (76.45) (83.06) (86.30)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -52.35 -133.3 -166.2
(69.19) (110.1) (119.0)
tot_pop_ACS -1.13e-05 -1.20e-05 -1.89e-06 -1.15e-05 -1.10e-05 -1.68e-06 -1.17e-06 -5.98e-07 -5.66e-07
(2.24e-05) (2.26e-05) (2.11e-05) (2.30e-05) (2.25e-05) (2.04e-05) (2.02e-05) (2.02e-05) (2.01e-05)
1.metro -111.8 -112.1 -123.2 -109.0 -98.68 -127.7 -123.5 -89.12 -94.61
(81.76) (81.91) (87.21) (84.43) (89.04) (86.07) (90.31) (102.8) (107.5)
age_0_19 -16.40 -16.67 -14.70 -16.37 -15.07 -15.17 -14.85 -11.68 -9.297
(20.94) (21.25) (19.94) (21.10) (20.71) (19.95) (19.68) (18.65) (18.72)
age_65_over -12.59 -13.40 -16.23 -13.03 -11.23 -20.26 -20.40 -19.52 -19.07
(12.02) (12.77) (12.40) (12.59) (12.22) (13.91) (14.18) (14.24) (14.03)
black_afr_ACS 2.594 2.676 2.732 2.443 2.240 3.069 2.772 1.860 2.040
(4.172) (4.187) (4.094) (4.422) (4.330) (4.071) (4.515) (4.789) (4.829)
other_race 0.412 -0.0675 -0.656 0.0661 1.161 -2.714 -2.890 -2.437 -2.025
(5.000) (5.148) (5.253) (4.957) (5.220) (5.770) (5.799) (5.944) (6.109)
unins_rate 12.27 12.90 9.925 13.38 10.19 11.48 12.62 9.446 7.782
(19.06) (19.44) (19.16) (20.39) (18.90) (19.78) (20.97) (19.43) (19.58)
ur_rate 11.05 10.50 13.24 10.95 11.05 11.96 12.33 11.58 10.29
(9.515) (9.556) (10.00) (9.626) (9.528) (10.16) (10.36) (10.65) (10.86)
median_income -0.00479* -0.00477* -0.00496* -0.00460* -0.00501* -0.00494* -0.00466* -0.00498* -0.00506*
(0.00271) (0.00274) (0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00278) (0.00273) (0.00277) (0.00276) (0.00273)
1.lboh 76.90 75.18 95.61 75.61 84.10 95.17 95.14 111.7 120.0*
(71.61) (72.12) (68.32) (72.12) (72.02) (68.69) (68.88) (70.63) (70.68)
1.cha 27.87 26.47 42.49 29.42 30.16 41.97 45.97 53.44 37.60
(54.22) (54.11) (55.50) (56.42) (55.51) (55.31) (60.76) (62.65) (68.48)
1.chip -41.65 -42.57 -40.56 -42.63 -36.75 -43.56 -44.28 -34.48 -16.73
(61.78) (62.14) (63.43) (61.46) (63.33) (63.21) (62.97) (62.05) (65.90)
Constant 1,500*** 1,475** 1,508*** 1,427*** 1,496*** 1,420** 1,328** 1,187** 1,176**































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -178.7 -308.8 -167.4 -344.5 -184.0 -293.8 -344.0 -381.4 1,530
(261.9) (270.0) (251.4) (261.4) (262.4) (254.2) (249.3) (260.6) (1,791)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -516.8
(489.9)
net_size -24.84 -23.88 -7.238 -8.826 -7.945
(17.06) (16.26) (16.54) (16.95) (17.70)
net_size_intense -19.84 -17.33 -19.84 -19.44 -25.98
(23.50) (21.66) (23.15) (23.69) (27.52)
cross_sectorial -166.0 -139.0 -187.0 -203.6
(113.0) (133.5) (136.5) (146.8)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -52.36 191.9 429.6
(160.1) (165.5) (296.6)
tot_pop_ACS -3.56e-05 -2.42e-05 -2.72e-05 -4.13e-05 -3.44e-05 -1.73e-05 -2.86e-05 -3.41e-05 -2.94e-05
(6.54e-05) (6.42e-05) (6.49e-05) (6.28e-05) (6.56e-05) (6.38e-05) (6.27e-05) (6.33e-05) (6.18e-05)
1.metro -458.7** -407.8** -470.3** -484.6*** -441.9** -419.9** -477.2** -542.7*** -643.3**
(179.4) (180.8) (184.9) (178.3) (193.2) (181.7) (190.1) (191.8) (245.4)
age_0_19 -51.99 -55.48 -55.35 -55.93 -53.49 -58.28 -59.66 -55.46 -60.73
(44.03) (44.62) (45.62) (44.49) (46.18) (46.10) (46.47) (46.45) (49.27)
age_65_over -21.61 -21.71 -21.86 -24.70 -22.64 -21.92 -24.48 -21.57 -24.47
(26.03) (25.87) (26.28) (26.68) (27.57) (26.16) (27.27) (27.32) (28.70)
black_afr_ACS 5.334 3.900 5.809 3.705 4.839 4.370 4.027 5.269 6.090
(6.905) (6.917) (6.131) (7.063) (7.821) (6.221) (6.338) (6.736) (6.466)
other_race -13.48 -14.06 -12.80 -16.15 -13.47 -13.44 -15.20 -16.07 -18.18
(13.87) (13.97) (13.63) (14.74) (13.98) (13.74) (14.57) (14.52) (15.77)
unins_rate 12.41 11.81 13.70 14.41 12.49 12.96 15.20 15.42 16.17
(23.26) (22.49) (22.37) (23.51) (23.43) (21.77) (22.83) (22.93) (23.17)
ur_rate 121.7 145.5 117.4 147.5 123.4 140.8 145.9 148.6 153.1
(89.17) (98.35) (86.69) (98.74) (92.49) (95.50) (97.14) (97.52) (98.51)
median_income -0.00880* -0.00888* -0.00845* -0.00815* -0.00888* -0.00857* -0.00792* -0.00747 -0.00742
(0.00512) (0.00508) (0.00492) (0.00473) (0.00525) (0.00489) (0.00462) (0.00461) (0.00465)
1.lboh 79.19 53.50 71.49 68.87 81.28 47.77 55.37 43.25 33.53
(83.93) (83.82) (84.53) (83.34) (84.84) (84.94) (85.92) (84.41) (88.88)
1.cha 95.41 158.2 93.93 169.4 93.18 154.5 174.2 207.8 219.5
(107.3) (127.6) (107.8) (132.2) (108.3) (126.7) (134.9) (141.4) (144.8)
1.chip 30.33 55.74 33.95 95.03 30.78 57.93 95.52 114.2 117.7
(94.76) (97.41) (96.20) (107.7) (95.83) (98.97) (111.4) (110.5) (111.6)
Constant 2,619* 3,059** 2,708* 3,309** 2,697* 3,120** 3,414** 3,353* 3,480*































MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -1.658*** -1.749*** -1.658*** -1.631*** -1.722*** -1.753*** -1.712*** -1.690*** -2.335*
(0.381) (0.384) (0.383) (0.401) (0.368) (0.385) (0.395) (0.389) (1.263)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial 0.166
(0.350)
net_size 0.0216 0.0231 0.0434** 0.0191 0.0195
(0.0148) (0.0159) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0228)
net_size_intense 0.00375 -0.00711 -0.00845 -0.00866 -0.00889
(0.0230) (0.0246) (0.0244) (0.0242) (0.0243)
cross_sectorial -0.0429 -0.204 -0.172 -0.174
(0.101) (0.127) (0.133) (0.135)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 0.334** 0.316** 0.311*
(0.133) (0.155) (0.160)
tot_pop_ACS 9.99e-08 9.08e-08 9.75e-08 1.01e-07 8.54e-08 9.48e-08 9.40e-08 8.97e-08 8.95e-08
(6.49e-08) (6.35e-08) (6.56e-08) (6.53e-08) (6.09e-08) (6.48e-08) (6.63e-08) (6.40e-08) (6.40e-08)
1.metro -0.0256 -0.0484 -0.0260 -0.0155 -0.0676 -0.0491 -0.0224 -0.0440 -0.0431
(0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.131) (0.129) (0.133) (0.130) (0.127) (0.127)
age_0_19 -0.0597 -0.0599 -0.0598 -0.0598 -0.0658 -0.0598 -0.0604 -0.0659 -0.0655
(0.0394) (0.0391) (0.0396) (0.0400) (0.0412) (0.0392) (0.0410) (0.0430) (0.0433)
age_65_over -0.0555** -0.0581** -0.0551** -0.0551** -0.0594** -0.0590** -0.0597** -0.0607** -0.0606**
(0.0271) (0.0267) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.0269) (0.0269)
black_afr_ACS 0.0672*** 0.0665*** 0.0673*** 0.0674*** 0.0667*** 0.0664*** 0.0663*** 0.0666*** 0.0666***
(0.00866) (0.00892) (0.00868) (0.00871) (0.00908) (0.00896) (0.00872) (0.00899) (0.00902)
other_race 0.0244** 0.0243** 0.0245** 0.0241** 0.0228** 0.0242** 0.0228** 0.0216** 0.0217**
(0.0101) (0.00992) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.00993) (0.00998) (0.0104) (0.0104)
unins_rate -0.0486 -0.0459 -0.0479 -0.0491 -0.0303 -0.0470 -0.0473 -0.0326 -0.0327
(0.0308) (0.0307) (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0337) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0349) (0.0350)
ur_rate -8.51e-05 -0.00430 -0.000236 0.000861 -0.000103 -0.00429 -0.00372 0.000312 0.000285
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0257) (0.0257)
median_income -3.41e-05*** -3.42e-05*** -3.41e-05*** -3.44e-05*** -3.10e-05*** -3.43e-05*** -3.54e-05*** -3.22e-05*** -3.22e-05***
(8.42e-06) (8.31e-06) (8.42e-06) (8.41e-06) (8.54e-06) (8.30e-06) (8.23e-06) (8.57e-06) (8.58e-06)
1.lboh -0.0317 0.00215 -0.0324 -0.0314 0.00186 0.00560 0.0393 0.0328 0.0355
(0.161) (0.166) (0.161) (0.160) (0.160) (0.165) (0.163) (0.159) (0.160)
1.cha -0.0628 -0.0659 -0.0630 -0.0569 -0.0940 -0.0657 -0.0405 -0.0709 -0.0735
(0.111) (0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.110) (0.111) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113)
1.chip -0.118 -0.146 -0.120 -0.116 -0.165 -0.143 -0.158 -0.173 -0.169
(0.119) (0.118) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) (0.124)
Constant 13.28*** 13.05*** 13.27*** 13.42*** 12.93*** 13.05*** 13.50*** 13.32*** 13.31***



























MODEL 6: Both 
Network Size 
Measures
MODEL 7: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks
MODEL 8: Both 
Network Size 
Measures + Cross 
Sectorial Networks 
+ Sub-Network
MODEL 9: FULL 
MODEL
1.NY -2.327*** -2.208*** -2.325*** -2.246*** -2.299*** -2.208*** -2.240*** -2.256*** -1.587
(0.485) (0.501) (0.486) (0.522) (0.486) (0.501) (0.513) (0.514) (2.663)
1.NY#c.cross_sectorial -0.174
(0.684)
net_size -0.0259 -0.0259 -0.0381 -0.0273 -0.0276
(0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0316) (0.0359) (0.0361)
net_size_intense -0.00507 0.00148 0.00414 0.00290 0.00158
(0.0490) (0.0488) (0.0486) (0.0484) (0.0489)
cross_sectorial -0.0852 0.0920 0.0742 0.0763
(0.116) (0.184) (0.187) (0.189)
1.natural_net_ALL_TOP5 -0.251 -0.150 -0.142
(0.186) (0.220) (0.228)
tot_pop_ACS 2.42e-07* 2.66e-07** 2.46e-07* 2.44e-07* 2.56e-07* 2.65e-07* 2.72e-07* 2.72e-07* 2.74e-07*
(1.37e-07) (1.33e-07) (1.45e-07) (1.36e-07) (1.37e-07) (1.39e-07) (1.39e-07) (1.40e-07) (1.41e-07)
1.metro 0.0407 0.0794 0.0416 0.0508 0.0741 0.0792 0.0861 0.0922 0.0903
(0.160) (0.166) (0.160) (0.162) (0.168) (0.166) (0.166) (0.169) (0.170)
age_0_19 0.0256 0.0265 0.0254 0.0242 0.0258 0.0266 0.0286 0.0280 0.0272
(0.0500) (0.0498) (0.0504) (0.0501) (0.0502) (0.0502) (0.0499) (0.0501) (0.0507)
age_65_over 0.0331 0.0297 0.0332 0.0304 0.0292 0.0297 0.0310 0.0295 0.0291
(0.0367) (0.0370) (0.0368) (0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0368) (0.0371)
black_afr_ACS 0.0698*** 0.0696*** 0.0699*** 0.0700*** 0.0698*** 0.0696*** 0.0692*** 0.0693*** 0.0692***
(0.00772) (0.00752) (0.00775) (0.00771) (0.00762) (0.00756) (0.00750) (0.00752) (0.00756)
other_race 0.00957 0.00940 0.00962 0.00803 0.0126 0.00939 0.0110 0.0125 0.0123
(0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0152)
unins_rate -0.0908** -0.0924** -0.0908** -0.0881* -0.0976** -0.0924** -0.0961** -0.0989** -0.0990**
(0.0454) (0.0450) (0.0455) (0.0461) (0.0454) (0.0451) (0.0456) (0.0459) (0.0460)
ur_rate 0.0871 0.0943 0.0871 0.0890 0.0817 0.0943 0.0956 0.0898 0.0903
(0.0641) (0.0659) (0.0642) (0.0654) (0.0648) (0.0660) (0.0656) (0.0668) (0.0671)
median_income -3.12e-05*** -3.22e-05*** -3.11e-05*** -3.13e-05*** -3.19e-05*** -3.22e-05*** -3.26e-05*** -3.26e-05*** -3.28e-05***
(7.84e-06) (7.90e-06) (7.92e-06) (7.89e-06) (7.85e-06) (7.98e-06) (7.93e-06) (7.93e-06) (8.01e-06)
1.lboh 0.0109 0.0344 0.0109 0.0264 0.0145 0.0345 0.0288 0.0244 0.0230
(0.181) (0.182) (0.182) (0.185) (0.180) (0.182) (0.183) (0.182) (0.183)
1.cha -0.0500 -0.0344 -0.0502 -0.0442 -0.0501 -0.0343 -0.0330 -0.0385 -0.0379
(0.197) (0.195) (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197)
1.chip -0.00871 0.0233 -0.00783 0.00826 0.0118 0.0231 0.0194 0.0221 0.0218
(0.186) (0.192) (0.187) (0.189) (0.188) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192) (0.192)
Constant 9.512*** 9.824*** 9.510*** 9.782*** 9.787*** 9.825*** 9.681*** 9.771*** 9.802***
(1.669) (1.697) (1.669) (1.696) (1.675) (1.697) (1.677) (1.676) (1.698)
